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Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-074
Tuesday
18 April 1995

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Daily Report
Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-074 *18 April 1995*

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Contradictions of U.S. Policy Toward Iran Viewed

954F2050A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Kozlovskiy: "Who Will Be Tougher With Iran? The White House and Congress Intend To Limit or Prohibit Completely Trade Contacts With Tehran and Its Partners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] New York—For several months Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Martin Indyk, the new American ambassador to Israel and until recently the White House's principal Near East expert, had been experiencing growing embarrassment over the contradictory nature of the Clinton administration's policy toward Iran: On the one hand it has officially registered it as a "terrorist" and "lawless" state, and on the other, it has permitted American companies to purchase oil from it (as long as they do not resell it within the United States) and t sell it a mass of commodities—from consumer goods and oil equipment to chemicals and gas turbines (although America is only in eighth place among the exporters to Iran and lags considerably behind such countries as Germany, Japan, France, and Britain).

Christopher and Indyk complained that this duality was complicating the job of America's diplomats attempting to persuade the United States' allies to do somewhat less trading with Tehran and, in any event, to refrain from supplying it with technology of potential military significance. Each time that Christopher raised this matter in conversation with the Germans and the Japanese, the latter would throw back in his face the fact that American companies were purchasing oil from Iran.

In this connection the State Department adopted the decision to recommend that the White House prohibit American firms from purchasing Iranian oil on the open market and investing in the Iranian economy. Last year American companies were in first place in the world in terms of purchases of Iranian oil, purchasing approximately one-fourth of it. The recommendations of the State Department, which have been officially presented by First Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and which will be discussed this week at a meeting at the White House, have evoked sharply worded objections on the part of the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Treasury, and Energy, which are trying to show that a reduction in trade with Iran would in no way influence its behavior and would only infringe the interests of American firms.

The loudest objections are coming from representatives of the American Department of Commerce, which under Clinton has been very active in pushing American goods overseas and is unwilling to hear about any restrictions on commerce. But the White House meeting will be chaired by Anthony Lake, the president's national security adviser, who, as Elaine Sholino, correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES, reports, supports an additional cutback in trade with Iran, and the State Department's recommendations will most likely be adopted, therefore.

Christopher's initiative was born not only of the conviction that purchases of oil from Iran are helping it build up its military power but also of a desire to cross the street to Congress, which will almost certainly impose new restrictions on trade with Iran if the White House does not. New York Republican senator Alphonse D'Amato has submitted a resolution prohibiting American firms and their subsidiary enterprises and affiliates overseas from trading with Iran: As the senator declared, "by purchasing Iranian oil, Americans are financing Iranian terrorism."

While the White House is deciding whether it should support this resolution, D'Amato and the Republican Peter King, a member of the House of Representatives, have submitted bills on tougher measures against Iran: They call for the U.S. Government to renounce any deals with any foreign firm trading with Tehran and to prohibit it from performing import-export transactions with American companies. D'Amato and King are demanding a ban on imports of commodities produced by foreign firms which purchase oil from Iran or sell it goods of potential military significance. "Simply put," D'Amato observed, submitting his new resolution, "a foreign corporation or individual citizen would have to choose between trade with the United States and trade with Iran."

As THE WASHINGTON POST observed on Sunday, "an anti-Iran mood has now swept Washington." State Department officers are declaring that "no one is a bigger hawk on the question of Iran than Secretary of State Warren Christopher," and the influential Israel lobby last week began a broad-based campaign for a ban on commercial ties to practically any foreign company doing business with Iran, that is, for the measure proposed by Senator D'Amato, among whose electorate are many Jews. Israel has as of late come to regard Iran as its most malicious potential enemy and is meeting with understanding in Washington, where the Iranians have been out of favor since 1979, when they took captive personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held them for 444 days.

Iran's intention to purchase nuclear reactors and nuclear technology from Russia and its military preparations on several small islands in the Persian Gulf have only reinforced the positions of its American adversaries. Sensitive to the public mood, the Clinton administration recently scored many points by banning a billion-dollar deal that the Conoco oil company had concluded with Iran, but members of Congress like D'Amato and King are calling for it to go even further.

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Effects of Lifting Iraq Sanctions Analyzed

954F2077A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Apr 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Andrey Loginov and Yuriy Khromov: "If Sanctions on Iraq Are Lifted: The World Oil Market and Russia's Interests"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The problem of lifting economic sanctions against Iraq continues to attract the attention of the world community. After 10 April, when consideration of the latest report of the Rolf Ekeus commission on progress on Iraq's disarmament is considered in the UN Security Council, the passions surrounding this will most likely flare up with new force.

Situation on the World Oil Market

Conditions on the world oil market remain stable at the present time. Following the cave-in of oil prices in 1986, no significant price fluctuations were observed even in the period of the military conflict in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Practically all shortfalls in the supply of oil to the world market (as in the case, for example, of the Nigerian oil workers' strike in July-September 1994) have been compensated sufficiently promptly either by other oil exporters or by a draw-down of the oil companies' existing commodity stockpiles, which leveled out the short-term and negligible rise in the price level.

The continued potential excess of the supply of oil over demand is, as before, determining a low price level on the market of this commodity. The efforts of the members of the Organization of Oil- Exporting Countries (OPEC), which actively discussed the stabilization of real prices on the world oil market throughout 1993-1994, have produced no palpable positive results. At the present time the world oil price in real terms has sunk to the 1973 level. In the short term the negligible growth in the world demand for oil, estimated at 0.5-0.8 million b/d (barrels per day), could be met even by independent exporters, which is markedly undermining the effectiveness of the OPEC countries' efforts in limiting production. Nonetheless, it was decided at the last OPEC conference (November 1994) to maintain the current quotas for these states' aggregate oil production at the level of 24.5 b/d in 1995 also, which permits the expectation, in the opinion of experts, of a certain increase in the price of oil. At the same time, on the other hand, this OPEC conference did not even consider the problem of the return of Iraq to the market, which was taken hard in Baghdad.

The majority of forecasts of the development of the world oil market provides for a very modest growth in the demand for oil in the coming decade. According to a survey of the International Energy Agency (IEA) compiled in the summer of 1994, for example, world demand for oil up to the year 2010 will increase 1.8 percent a year. The industrially developed countries plan to maintain the volume of their strategic petroleum reserves at the level of 90 days of import consumption here. In addition, the appearance of new oil exporters, primarily the former republics of the USSR, on the world market is expected. On the whole, though, the supply of oil on the world market will correspond to the dynamics of demand. In the opinion of many experts, there are today no sufficiently serious grounds for a cardinal change in the situation.

However, despite the anticipated "peaceful" development of events, the world oil market remains one of the most strained and unpredictable. An exacerbation of the competitive struggle among the oil producers for sales markets and capital investments is expected. According to the estimates of OPEC experts, the oil sector of the world economy will in the next 10-15 years require up to $500 billion of investments (not counting demand on the part of Russia and the other CIS countries, which is put at approximately the same amount), whereas the possibilities of the international capital markets for allocating funds for these purposes will not exceed $300-400 million. The tightening of environmental demands on power engineering in the industrially developed countries as a whole will also contribute to increased strain in the oil sector of the world economy.

The question of Iraq's resumption of its oil exports remains a factor that could, a number of experts believe, influence the situation on the world oil market. The October (1994) events in the area of the Iraq-Kuwait border had a sharply negative effect on the prospects of the lifting of the UN sanctions against Iraq. The report of a special UN Security Council commission, the draft of which contained conclusions that were largely favorable in respect to Iraq and could have performed a positive role for the lifting of sanctions, was shelved. The position of the United States and Great Britain, which insisted that the sanctions be upheld, received "unexpected" support, and the efforts of Russia, France, and China, which operated in the opposite direction, were weakened appreciably. Many experts link the rigidity of the American position on this issue with the continuation in power in Iraq of the Saddam Husayn administration. In maintaining economic pressure on Iraq on the part of the world community, the United States is hoping that the growth of social, political, and national tension in the country will create insuperable difficulties for the Saddam Husayn regime and will contribute to its further weakening and, in the future, its liquidation.

As observed in UN lobbies, the United States is clearly endeavoring to change the rules of the game in respect to the sanctions against Iraq established by the Security Council itself. Washington is now substituting for the specific disarmament demands which the Security Council made the condition for a lifting of sanctions amorphous demands of the "proof of Baghdad's peaceable intentions" type and also prior conditions of compliance with all Security Council resolutions in respect to Iraq without exception. It is significant that it was for precisely such "brain-washing" that M. Albright recently

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undertook at the direction of President Clinton a tour of the capitals of the Security Council states and that W. Christopher visited for the same purpose countries that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Thus even despite Iraq's recognition of the sovereignty of Kuwait and Baghdad's actual compliance with the demands of the well-known UN resolutions, no solution of the problem of the lifting of sanctions is seen in the coming months, evidently. Specifically, in the opinion of IEA experts who visited Russia in November 1994, the question of the lifting of sanctions could be put on a practical footing no sooner than the end of 1995. D. Hannay, British representative at the United Nations, is more pessimistic. "No change in the regime of sanctions against Iraq is anticipated in the foreseeable future," he declared in mid-March following discussion of this matter in the Security Council.

Influence of the Lifting of Sanctions on the World Oil Market

An assessment of the consequences of the lifting of sanctions in respect to Iraq on the world oil market is of an ambivalent nature. The following scenarios of the development of events may be anticipated.

1. An OPEC conference settles the problem of the allocation of the oil production quota for Iraq within the framework of the preservation of (or a negligible increase in) the aggregate production quota for the OPEC countries. The world oil market experiences practically no additional supply influence, and prices remain stable. Under the conditions of the charted economic upturn in the industrially developed countries a negligible increase in the former, to $18-19 a barrel, may be expected even. The independent exporters with high production costs (Britain, Norway, and Russia) preserve their market positions.

But such a scenario providing for the restoration of Iraq's quota within the OPEC framework on a precrisis scale would obviously be blocked by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as also by certain other countries (Iran or Venezuela, for example), for that matter. This is explained primarily by the substantial fiscal difficulties being experienced by practically all the OPEC countries (whose aggregate budget deficit was in excess of $20 billion in 1993).

According to approximate estimates, granting Iraq its former quota would signify a reduction in Saudi Arabia's quota of 700,000 b/d, which would mean a loss of revenue from oil exports of the order of roughly $3 billion a year. The Saudis are extremely averse to such a development of events for both economic and political reasons. The article "Collapse of Saudi Arabia" published in the French journal LE POINT of 4 February 1995 observes that the country's economy is in crisis. Annual revenue from the sale of oil has declined from $100 billion at the start of the 1980's to $40 billion in recent times, and Saudi Arabia's foreign debt has risen to $80 billion, that is to say, is twice the amount of annual earnings from oil exports. It is obvious that Saudi Arabia, which supported the bulk ($55 billion) of the financial expenditure on the Desert Storm military operation in 1991, would hardly permit the enrichment and restoration of the positions of Iraq in the Persian Gulf region.

2. An OPEC conference grants Iraq the possibility of a modest and gradual return to the world market with a freeze on or a negligible reduction in the quotas of the participants thanks to the anticipated increase in the demand for oil on the world market. Despite the entire apparent rationality of such a solution of this question, it would be extremely difficult keeping to the framework of this scenario. There could hardly be any confidence that Iraq, the restoration of whose economy requires substantial currency receipts, would adhere to the production quotas fixed within the OPEC framework. In the first year following the lifting of sanctions Iraq could raise oil production to the level of 1.5 million b/d, and in a further two years, to 3-3.5 million b/d. At the present time oil production in Iraq constitutes 550,000 b/d. Consequently, Iraq's legal outlet onto the international market would initially even without a reduction in the export quotas of the other OPEC countries bring to the market additionally no more than 1 million b/d, which in terms of its amount could not seriously destabilize this market or lead to a marked fall in price.

In the event of Iraq's phased return to the oil market, the influence of this event on the level of world oil prices would be negligibly slight. But a downward trend in the price dynamics with this scenario could, generally, be forecast, evidently, since Iraq would de facto increase its share in overall OPEC country oil exports. The present practice also points in the direction of such a development: Overseas experts are noting that Iraq has already perfected a mechanism of the illegal sale of oil under the conditions of the operation of international sanctions. First, payment with oil for Western companies' participation in the development of Iraq's oil fields could be employed. Second, Iraq is making extensive use of the payment with oil for supplies of various commodities from abroad. At the start of the year, for example, approximately 1,500 trucks carrying oil and fuel oil, which are sold at prices several times below those on the world market, were daily crossing the Turkish border from Iraq alone. No less a quantity of oil is being exported from the country in small tankers also.

3. And, finally, the third variant of the development of events is that an OPEC conference is unable to reach a solution of the question of the allocation of quotas to Iraq acceptable to all parties. IEA experts do not in this case rule out the possibility of the unleashing of a new price war on the world oil market, whose consequences could be a wholesale fall in the price of oil to the level of $12-13 a barrel. The situation could be made worse by Iraq's withdrawal from OPEC, which would, possibly, place in jeopardy the continued existence and influence of this organization.

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Russia's Interests

The first scenario of the development of events is the most propitious from the viewpoint of the economic interests of Russia, which, while preserving its receipts from the exports of oil and petroleum products, would receive from Iraq payments in defrayal of its foreign debt (estimated at $7 billion). According to calculations of experts of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, in the first three years following the lifting of sanctions Russia could receive from Iraq $200 million, $400 million, and $600 million on account of the old debts.

The lifting of sanctions would lead to other economic benefits for Russia also. The recently signed agreement on bilateral economic relations between Russia and Iraq would come to be realized, which would expand the export markets for Russian commodities (finished products and military equipment). The participation of Russian oil companies in the development of Iraq's oil and gas deposits is possible here. The restoration of Iraq's economy would make it possible to use Russian capital and specialists at other civilian projects also.

With the second scenario of the development of events it may be assumed that Russia's revenue would decline in the event of a lowering of the world oil price. The amounts of these losses would depend on the rate of decline in the price: A reduction in the price of oil by $1 per barrel would result in a receipts shortfall for Russia of $500-600 million a year. Nonetheless, this scenario of the development of events—a modest fall in the price of oil—would preserve for Russia the other advantages of the development of economic relations with Iraq.

The third version of the development of events is the most undesirable for Russia. It could not compensate for the losses from a decline in the price of exported oil, which could amount to $2-3 billion a year. A quantitative increase in Russian exports of oil and petroleum products is limited by the traffic possibilities of the transport arteries, whose capacity at the present time is estimated at a maximum of 100-125 million tonnes a year. In addition, it is highly likely that Russian exporters would also lose some of their traditional markets or would be forced into an even bigger price reduction. Such a cardinal change in the situation on the world oil market would be reflected instantly in Russia's domestic economy, primarily in an intensified slump in the oil- producing industry, a growth of unemployment, a deterioration in the country's balance of payments, and an exacerbation of the foreign debt problem.

Thus two of the three scenarios of the development of the situation on the world oil market in the event of a lifting of sanctions against Iraq threaten the establishment of downward dynamics of the oil price, which would have a negative effect on Russia's position as an oil exporter. Therefore it would be expedient to prepare in the interests of Russia, as of other exporting countries, a number of measures leading to the restoration of a fair price level for this energy source.

Russia's more active participation in the process of dialogue between the oil consumers and producers could contribute to this. It would be expedient to join in the preparation of the meeting within the framework of this dialogue which it is planned to hold in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas in the summer of 1995. The idea of the concordance of actions in the formulation of measures acceptable to the international community aimed at the mutually beneficial regulation of the process of the distribution of vitally important energy sources and the revenue from their sale is actively supported by the OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia included. Certain members of the IEA, mainly the West European countries, are prepared to participate in a discussion of this range of issues also.

Participating in this process, Russia could successfully strike a balance between the interests of the oil producers and the oil consumers. Introducing to this dialogue the idea of the creation of global energy security, Russia could look for a thaw in relations with the leading OPEC countries, primarily Saudi Arabia, which could perform a definite role in the resolution of the problem of Iraq's quota within the framework of the organization of oil exporters.

Thus in the event of a lifting of the UN sanctions against Iraq, Russia would encounter the need to make every effort to stabilize the oil market, which could be achieved thanks to influence in the plane of a softening of its position in OPEC, its observance of "discipline" in the sphere of production, and its renunciation of a sharp increase in exports and also of attempts to persuade Saudi Arabia to find a compromise alternative of a resolution of Iraq's quota within the OPEC framework providing for the gradual restoration of the country's economy.

Arguments Against Poland's Joining NATO

954E0852A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Ivanov: "Need We Rush to Embrace NATO?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our neighbor to the West, Poland, is now experiencing a turning point in its history. I have in mind its present aspiration to join NATO. Such a step is not merely choosing the friends and partners you like, as the Polish side tries to represent it. The stakes are much higher here: This has to do with the country's military and political orientation for decades into the future.

Obviously, such a decision affects the interests of its eastern neighbors, including Russia. How can one evaluate Warsaw's aspiration from a historical perspective?

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In the first place, this is a departure from the foreign political concept of the Second Rzeczpospolita (1918-1939), whose officially declared successor is the current Polish Republic. As we know, its foreign policy during the period between the wars was arranged under the determining influence of J. Pilsudski. And he believed, not without justification, that the country could provide for its sovereignty and a certain freedom of action in the international arena only through equidistance from the two neighboring great powers—the Soviet Union and Germany. The nonaggression treaties concluded by Poland in 1932 and 1934 with these two states, respectively, promoted this policy. Out of the same considerations it did not enter the military-political blocs that existed at that time (the Entente, the Little Entente, the Anticommunist Pact).

Through the years one might say this was on the whole a realistic policy of actually limited neutrality and it proceeded from state interests. In my opinion, this idea has not lost its timeliness. By joining NATO the country would limit its sovereignty to a much greater degree than it did during the period of its membership in the Warsaw Pact. The current Polish politicians prefer to remain silent about this, incidentally.

Second, joining NATO means a final abandonment of the military- political concept that served the country after 1945 until quite recently. From a moral standpoint this was a rather crude step to take against their former closest ally, which for almost a half century had guaranteed Poland's state security.

Let us see how this action squares with the republic's international legal obligations.

The protocol for the termination of the Warsaw Pact of 1 July 1991 is signed by Polish President L. Walesa. It is noted in this document, in particular: The parties shall contribute to "the transition to common European security structures." In a communique of the same date "they speak in favor of further advancement of the Europe-wide process in the interests of creating new structures for security and cooperation." That is, the former participants in the Warsaw Pact decided to link their destiny to nothing other than deepening of the process of the CSCE. Not a word about the possibility of the entry of certain signatories of NATO, which, as a closed military-political grouping, could never join the "new security structures" and certainly not organizations of a "common European nature."

The desire of Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries to become members of NATO, as we see, is far from blameless in the legal sense since its violates the commitments they have made in documents of recent years.

What does it say in the Russian-Polish Treaty on Friendship and Good Neighbor Cooperation of 22 May 1992? Point 2 of Article 3 says: "Neither of the parties shall allow on its territory a third state or third states to commit an act of armed aggression against the other party." This point, although it pertains to both countries, actually applies exclusively to Poland: Even theoretically it is difficult to imagine that some third state or third states would attack Poland using Russia's territory.

At the same time the wording "shall not allow," in spite of its apparently categorical nature, is actually extremely vague and in essence offers no guarantee at all. Thus it will not be an obstacle to Poland's entry into closed military alliances and will not prohibit the concentration of foreign troops on its territory and the possible deployment of nuclear weapons, the construction of military bases and airfields, the performance of intelligence work against Russia, etc., and if all of these elements or some of them are put into action, the possible subsequent fatal development of events will no longer depend on Poland...

This provision of the document is even a step backward as compared to the Treaty on Nonaggression with Poland of 1932, which says: "Each of the parties to the agreement shall be obliged not to participate in any agreements that are hostile to the other party from the standpoint of aggression." True, this treaty was violated by the USSR (there were good reasons for this at the time). But now it turns out that Poland can weaken Russia's security.

Its curtailed commitments not to allow possible aggression from its territory remind one very much of the situation that developed during the thirties. Then every time we drew the attention of the Polish side to the existing danger of an attack from Germany on the USSR, the Polish officials inevitably responded that such a thing was impossible: The USSR had no common border with Germany and in order to attack the German forces would have to cross Poland. And the Polish army "will not allow" this. We know how this "we will not allow" ended.

Thus there are serious complaints about the wording of Article 3 of the 1992 agreement. Thus three years had not passed before the 1992 treaty with respect to ensuring security was already out of date. New negotiations with Poland are needed.

The question arises: How could it have happened that our diplomacy—first Soviet and then Russian—was unable upon the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the concluding of the treaty with their neighbor to provide satisfactorily for the country's national interests? First of all the international situation was evaluated in a dilettantish way and the results of the Paris summit meeting in November 1990 were gullibly perceived as the final culmination of the military and political standoff in Europe and a decisive breakthrough toward honest cooperation within the framework of the CSCE. But instead of disbanding NATO, which was required by the unwritten laws of the gentlemen's agreement, what followed was an increase in its military activity, and then they even conspired to expand it. The proceedings of the CSCE were immediately shifted to the back burner and

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even driven into an impasse by the Western states. No matter what the Polish side may have said, the fact is apparent: The republic decided to enter NATO at a time when in Europe after the end of the Cold War the tension had finally abated, when Poland was objectively not threatened by anyone, and the restored Russia was solemnly proclaiming that it had no enemies on the continent. Thus the conclusion emerges: The entry of Poland and other East European countries into NATO, if an honest approach is taken to questions of security, contradicts the situation favorable to universal cooperation that was about to be established in Europe. The earmarked NATO expansion threatens the shaky balance in Europe and leads to the bloc policy that is condemned by the world community as well as to a deepening division of the continent.

This game, which is aimed at weakening Russia's international position, in our view, is extremely unseemly, and it would be extremely imprudent to continue it: A strong democratic Russia will inevitably soon appear in the east.

As they say, we have already been through a similar situation in bilateral relations. In 1920 Poland also decided to take advantage of the weakness of Russia and its allies, unleashing a war that did nobody any good and trying to annex part of the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Although the preconditions for establishing normal relations existed there too: The new Russia had recognized Poland's state independence, declared all the previous treaty acts concerning the division of Poland to be invalid, and was prepared for extensive cooperation. The outcome is known: Abandoned by its Western allies, Poland, having rejected cooperation with the USSR in 1939, was defeated by Germany and the lands it had seized in 1920 were returned to their real owners.

In recent years in Poland people have been trying to stir up public opinion in favor of an alliance with NATO. And Russia is depicted as the republic's eternal enemy. At the same time they are persistently spreading the idea that all of the country's population without exception are dreaming about how to end up in NATO's embraces as quickly as possible.

But the disclosure of the real will of the population and their attitude toward such extremely important questions will occur through a referendum. So far there has not been a word about this in Warsaw.

In general amazing things are happening on the shores of the Vistula! Judge for yourselves. First there are many years of purposeful propaganda work on the population in an anti-Russian vein. Then polls are conducted during which participants who are selected we know not how respond that they see a threat from Russia and do not object to entering NATO. And, finally, highly placed Polish statesmen are seriously beginning to discuss the notion that there is no alternative to Poland's entering NATO since the majority of the population is in favor of membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. And here again there is nothing to be done... The artificially created circle is closed.

Be that as it may, I would not like to think that the question of Poland's entry into NATO in all probability has been finally decided by the current Polish authorities. But one is automatically led to such reflections by the statement from President L. Walesa: "We will try to enter NATO and we will not ask Russia's permission." Well, if that is the immediate reality, we should obviously take it into account in our foreign policy.

The assertions of certain Polish politicians to the effect that if Poland enters NATO, relations with Russia will immediately normalize completely and finally become truly friendly, will not stand up under any criticism. It would be a mistake to assume that Russia will passively accept the fact that the zone of NATO's operations will be immediately on its western borders. There is no doubt that Poland's presence in the Atlantic bloc would reduce the degree of sincerity in Russian-Polish relations, which has not been great in recent years anyway because of the artificial inflation of Russophobia by the Polish mass media. And it could be that it will actually even eliminate the significance of the 1992 state treaty.

It is my conviction that Poland, as the key country of the region, bears greater responsibility for the consequences of any step in the international arena. In this case, for the inevitable emasculation of the idea of a Europe-wide partnership and collective security implanted in the principles of the CSCE. Russia does not have a prejudiced attitude toward Poland and there are no anti-Polish sentiments in Russian society. The only thing our country is interested in is to have and develop normal good-neighbor cooperation with Poland, sovereign and independent, not included in any closed military blocs, and not obedient to instructions from outside.

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ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 18 Apr

LD1804075095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0542 GMT 18 Apr 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, 18 April (ITAR-TASS)—Today's Russian newspapers front-page the situation in Chechnya, preparations for festivities on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the great victory, the coming Russian-U.S. summit in Moscow, relations between Russia and Ukraine in connection with the situation in the Crimea, ways of settling the Tajik problem, reasons and consequences of passing a bill by the State Duma (Russian parliament lower house) on extending military service in the Army and some other issues.

According to the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA newspaper, President Boris Yeltsin gave replies to these "most important questions of our times" in an interview with ITAR-TASS analyst Tamara Zamyatina. The ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA publish its text in full today, while the TRUD newspaper prints a summary.

Head of the Russian President's Office Sergey Filatov told ROSSIYSKIE VESTI that a representative conference devoted to the anniversary of the public accord treaty will be held in Moscow on May 9.

The forum will examine the Chechen problem, ways of economic stabilisation and preparations for elections to the State Duma. An attempt will be made to complete forming structures of power, especially local self-government.

The bill adopted by the State Duma on extending military service in the Army and on conscription of university graduates has already provoked numerous disputes among the media. The IZVESTIYA newspaper carries today a letter by scholars, educators and men of culture to the Russian president.

In the opinion of the document's authors, the conscription of university graduates to military service will have "dangerous consequences" for the country. The authors single out a desire of Russian generals to preserve a large army and to avoid a military reform among reasons for adopting this bill.

Reasons and prospects for a referendum on extending powers of the Kazakh president till the year 2000 became the main theme of an interview with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev published by IZVESTIYA. If his powers are extended, Kazakhstan will strive for "the closest possible cooperation with Russia and seek integration in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the world community", Nazarbayev noted. Replying to the newspaper's questions, the president dwelt at length on the political and economic situation in Kazakhstan.

Tajikistan can become a junk-yard for nuclear waste, the NAZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper reports. According to its information, the government of that republic is engaged in talks with an unknown U.S. firm on prospects of dumping waste in the Leninabad region. The contract is worth 50 million U.S. dollars.

NAZAVISIMAYA GAZETA described Russia's readiness "to arm Islamists", to resume military cooperation with Sudan and dispatch combat materiel and advisers to that country as "Moscow's new challenge to the West".

The newspaper informs its readers of the results of a recent visit by Russian brass hats to Sudan.

"A fierce assault on the positions of Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov will be launched right after the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the great victory," the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper reports.

In the opinion of the newspaper, many grow apprehensive of the mayor's rising prestige and influence on the eve of the elections. "Irrespective of his personal plans, the mayor may substantially influence the entire election race," the daily notes.

Continuing the election theme, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA runs an article, returning readers to the elections of December 12, 1993. The daily prints "sensational" data by prominent politilogist Anatolih Sobyanin about falsification of the elections.

Moscow will host today the first congress of the Russian United Industrial Party (RUIP). In this connection, TRUD carries an address by the RUIP. It points to the party's desire "to create a state, capable of saving Russian productive forces", relying on "skilled managers, engineers, workers, businessmen, researchers and financiers".

The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper features an interview with chairman of the Russian Communist Party Gennadiy Zyuganov on the results of his visit to India where he participated in the work of the 15th congress of the Indian Marxist Party.

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Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Hallbrooke Remarks on Europe

LD1304180995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1643 GMT 13 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 13 (INTERFAX)—Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin described as incorrect the statement by the Under Secretary of State for Europe and Canada Richard Hallbrooke to the effect that the possibility of Russia's integration into the European security architecture it fell out of in 1917 has just emerged.

"The under secretary's statement is not only incorrect; obviously it distorts the state of affairs on purpose. It would make sense only if NATO could be considered as the only security structure on the continent. But this is not so by far," Karasin said at Thursday's briefing.

"Where will Mr. Hallbrooke apply Russia's participation in the OSCE or, say, in the Agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe?" he asked.

"At a time when Europe is going through a complicated period of search for answers to the new challenges of the post-confrontation era, statements of the kind made by Hallbrooke can hardly be qualified as constructive," Karasin said.

Isakov Reflects on U.S. Trip, NATO

MM1804102895 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 2

[Final article in series by Vladimir Isakov under the rubric "Parliamentary Diary": "The Hand of James"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Conversations on the Potomac

"How do you regard the expansion of NATO? How come you are certain that this is the way to strengthen security in Europe?"—no matter how we wanted to avoid "controversies," during our conversations with officials we were forced to raise this subject:

"The Soviet Union, and then Russia, took the unparalleled step of withdrawing its troops from Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic republics in the name of security and easing military confrontation in Europe. Within a very short timeframe, moreover, and imposing virtually no political conditions. And what is the upshot? Not only has no one said 'Thank you' to Russia, on the contrary it is being cursed more than before at all international forums and the 'vacuum' that has formed is immediately being filled by NATO troops, which are being moved right up to our very borders. Does that accord with the norms of international law? Can you really not see that your actions are destroying the atmosphere of trust between our countries? Can you really not realize that a fresh round of the arms race may result?"

The Americans' answers were not notably varied: "NATO is a defensive bloc. NATO poses no threat to anyone, its task is to protect democracy and stability. Don't worry, the expansion of NATO will not be abrupt or rapid." It turned out to be a futile conversation.

I can understand the Americans, who are settling down as comfortably as they can in the current situation, ensuring their own security at our expense without standing on ceremony.

I fully understand our former friends from the "socialist camp": Shedding a tear, they are trying to reap various economic, political, and military dividends from the West. They stand to gain now from depicting Russia as the enemy.

But I cannot understand those people who permitted this situation to occur. How could they abandon positions without at least ensuring neighboring states' neutrality? Did they really not have the intelligence to agree at least on the nonsiting of foreign troops? Who is to blame for the fact that Russia's advantages, won at the cost of millions of lives, have been lost so heedlessly and hopelessly?

Are We Going To Come To Our Senses?

You cannot make out faces close up. I had to cross the ocean to take a new look at our own Russian problems.

It is absurd and ridiculous to copy an alien economy, alien culture, alien state and legal institutions. Nothing but laughter and disgrace is coming of it. And nor will it:: You cannot make even one old Mercedes out of two old Moskvich cars.

But we do indeed have things to learn from the Americans: liking for hard work, persistence in achieving our goals. Sincere patriotism, a reverential view of U.S. national security. The civilized habit of adapting one's life to the law. And, most importantly, the ability when you move forward to take with you and preserve all the most valuable things that have been achieved before you.

For all the complexity of the current period, I think that Russia is on the verge of a very important watershed—the phase of spiritual and ideological consolidation which prefaces, accompanies, and ensures the process of national revival.

This consolidation will occur not on the basis of dogmatic ideology, both "right-wing" and "left-wing"—Russia has been poisoned by "isms" and I think that it has lost its susceptibility to them for a long time to come—but on the basis of a desire for normal human life. The party and leader who express these values and ideals most fully and comprehensibly for the people will be victorious. They must be victorious!

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During the farewell reception at the Russian Embassy a young American told me the following: Russia has everything it needs for successful development—resources, manpower, and brainpower. Your reform will ultimately take the requisite track and will bear fruit. And within about 50 years Russia may well be the greatest power in the world. For that reason alone it is worth being friends with Russia.

I also believe this. I hope that the moments of weakness and collapse which have been frequent occurrences in Russia's history will be replaced by a period of powerful spiritual and material upsurge. And that is why I hope that the "hand of James," which has brought my country so much pain and suffering, will some day become the hand of a real friend.

Commander 'Confident' Missile Detargeting Accord Being Met

MM1704073495 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 2

[Aleksandr Khokhlov response to reader's letter: "Our Nuclear Program Pruned to 'Zero'"—first paragraph is reader's letter]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Everyone writes that U.S. missiles are not targeted at us. How can this be confirmed? Or do we take the Americans at their word?" Aleksey Pozdnyakov, Orenburg.

We asked Colonel General Viktor Ivanovich Yesin, chief of the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) Main Staff, to answer this question.

"In May 1994 the SMF carried out so-called 'detargeting' measures, and our missiles are now not targeted at any likely enemy. We carried out this obligation in full. Such measures were also carried out by the U.S. side. Russia and the United States have no systems to verify the fulfillment of commitments to detarget strategic missiles. But I am confident that the agreement is being carried out by both parties."

The general did not tell us this, but we know from other editorial office sources that the missiles' target coordinates can be both unloaded and reloaded. Missile specialists believe that the SMF's actual combat readiness following Boris Yeltsin's generous gesture of friendship toward the Americans has not diminished. But how long it takes to retarget a missile is a secret of paramount state importance....

Official Says ABM Treaty Central to Russia's Security

LD1704173095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1705 GMT 17 Apr 95

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 17 (ITAR-TASS)—The treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM) signed by the United States and former Soviet Union in 1972, should remain the most effective international agreement in the arms control sphere, according to an expert of the Moscow centre for disarmament, energy and ecology.

In an exclusive interview with TASS on Monday, Pavel Podvig warned that the current talks in Geneva for amending this document threaten to hurt Russia's national security.

In 1993, the U.S. Administration suggested making a number of conceptual amendments to the ABM Treaty, the expert recalled. Russia's approval of these amendments will amount to its agreement to U.S. going ahead with developing anti-ballistic missile systems intended to protect the United States and its allies against short-range and medium-range missile attacks. The U.S. has already developed and tested such a system called TAAD.

The analysis carried out by Russian and foreign experts shows that the ABM systems designed by the United States in case of amending the treaty, will not only be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, but will also lay down a basis for the country's anti-missile defence system. This is to result in lifting the existing restrictions on deployment of ABM strategic systems, Podvig believes. Therefore, the Russian negotiating team in Geneva should try to preserve intact the main provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty as fully meeting Russia's national interests and security.

General Says CFE Treaty Not in Russia's Interests

LD1704201895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1848 GMT 17 Apr 95

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 17 (ITAR-TASS)—Flank limitations under the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty [CFE] do not meet Russia's national interests, a high-ranking Russian military official said.

In an interview with ITAR-TASS on Monday, Air Force Major-General Nikolay Bezborodov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for Defence, said that Russia has fulfilled its obligations and does not question the importance of the treaty for European security.

However, some of its provisions have become not only outdated, but contradict the current military and geopolitical realities, the general said.

Bezborodov recalled that the CFE treaty was signed at the time of confrontation between two powerful military and political blocs—the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. At that time, flank regions included part of the territory of the former Soviet Union where independent countries emerged later.

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These changes had led to a situation where Russia had to deploy the major part of its conventional weapons not where national security needs required, but in the Kaliningrad region and along the west-east axis. This has broken the balance of forces and become discriminatory with respect to Russia, Bezborodov said.

The situation is especially difficult in the Caucasus where several local conflicts are raging in proximity to the Russian border. Russia cannot allow them to spread. But it will need to employ adequate military means to prevent them from spilling over.

Bezborodov believes this will also require the suspension of some of the provisions of the CFE Treaty. Such a suspension will not be a violation of the fundamental principles of the treaty and will allow Russia to strengthen its positions in the southern flanks and ensure its national security.

CFE Treaty Seen Provoking 'Cold Peace'

MK1804083095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 18 Apr 95 p 1

[Pavel Felgengauer report: "Casus Belli"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For two years influential forces interested in a "cooling" of relations between Moscow and the West have been jointly looking for an appropriate cause for this, but so far in vain. Even such promising conflict situations as NATO expansion to the East and the war in Chechnya were no good from the international-legal point of view. Moscow has no formal grounds to object to NATO expansion: Former members of the Warsaw Pact are unquestionably sovereign in choosing new military allies, just like NATO countries. Chechnya for its part is an internationally recognized part of Russian territory, which sharply limits the legal basis for possible interference.

In international relations, just like in family life, however, there will always be a cause for scandal if there is a wish to fight. It is becoming increasingly clear that the main casus belli for a future "Cold Peace" in Europe will be the CFE Treaty. Last week Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said again that Russia will not honor flank limitations under the CFE, to which the West once again responded with (so far) polite but firm "wishes" for Russia fully to implement all the obligations signed and ratified.

The CFE Treaty has a long and complicated fate. Negotiations on mutual armed forces and arms reductions in Central Europe began in Vienna back in 1973 and continued for 16 years without any serious success. But the time of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze came and the treaties began to be signed almost instantly: In 1989 CFE talks began and in 1990 the treaty was signed in Paris. As a result, the Warsaw Pact and NATO received equal quotas for heavy weapons, with the USSR, naturally, getting the lion's share of the Warsaw Pact's, and, just as naturally, the bulk of heavy weaponry was concentrated on the western border.

During the CFE talks the Warsaw Pact effectively broke up, which to a certain extent made the future treaty meaningless. No sooner had the Paris treaty entered into force than the USSR also disintegrated, and 10 newly independent states at once began to lay claim to the USSR arms quota. As a result, in summer 1992 in Tashkent an intergovernment protocol on quotas was signed. Russia received the right to have by 1995 in the zone covered by the treaty up to 6,400 tanks, 11,480 combat armored vehicles, 6,415 artillery systems, 3,450 combat aircraft, and 890 helicopter gunships.

Such an amount of weapons is surely more than enough for defense. The quotas for "flank areas," however, were only 14 percent of the tanks and 5.5 percent of the combat armored vehicles. Therefore in the Transcaucasus alone today there are more heavy Russian weapons than envisioned both for the Caucasus (including Chechnya) and for the Leningrad Military District put together. The situation is such that flank limitations under the CFE Treaty became absolutely unacceptable for Russia. For more than a year Moscow has tried in some way or another to rectify its own omissions through negotiations, but without any result. The West demands: "First pull out your forces in full by November 1995, and then in spring 1996, under the CFE Treaty, we shall start negotiations on whether they can be brought back" (William Perry).

The CFE Treaty, being fairly reasonable in principle, has nonetheless placed Moscow in an absurd, extremely dangerous, and difficult situation. It is known that in Russia any signed agreement is merely a basis for further bargaining, while the main thing is not a paper with a signature but friendly personal contact. Whereas in the West friendship may be important, but signed treaties must be fulfilled accurately. Therefore in the CFE dispute both sides believe quite honestly that their cause is right and that "the other side remains deaf to reasonable arguments." History shows that there can be no better casus belli.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Conference Previewed

MM1804090095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 95 pp 1, 3

[Report by Aleksandr Sychev: "How Many Nuclear Powers There Will Be After New York"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The foreign ministers of 114 states have gathered in New York for a conference which must resolve a very important question—whether or not to extend the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In three weeks' time it will become clear whether there will still be five official nuclear powers in the world or whether there will be several dozen and an end may boldly be put to nuclear disarmament.

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The nuclear nonproliferation treaty entered into force in 1970. At the time it was ratified by 47 states. Nonnuclear signatory states undertook to refrain for 25 years from acquiring nuclear weapons. In exchange they received the technology for the development of peaceful nuclear energy.

There is no unanimous opinion as to whether or not the treaty has achieved the aims set for it. Thus, three states—India, Pakistan, and Israel—refused to accede to the document. And Israel, according to some opinions, already has an arsenal of approximately 300 nuclear weapons. Moreover, Iraq and North Korea, while being signatories to the agreement, have attempted to create their own nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the nuclear disarmament process is nonetheless gathering momentum—medium-range missiles have been destroyed, the START I treaty is being fulfilled, the START II treaty is ready for ratification, and there is an idea for concluding START III and the nuclear powers are basically refraining from carrying out test blasts. Moreover, in 25 years the "official" nuclear club has not actually expanded its membership although according to all parameters over 10 states could now become habitues of the club and use on the foreign policy scene the language of states with a strong trump card. And that is quite a lot.

There are grounds for supposing that the threat of destabilization of the situation in the regions will nonetheless prompt the majority of states taking part to agree with one option for extending the treaty: making it of indefinite duration, extending it for 25 years or less, or embarking on a compromise proposal—in the absence of objections from the treaty's signatories extending it automatically for a specific period. After hard preliminary talks the nuclear powers seem to have enlisted the support of the necessary majority of countries—over 88 votes.

The positions of the countries which view the treaty as the legal enshrinement of inequality between states and which are demanding that the "big five" fulfill one of the points of the treaty obliging them to disarm remain strong. The problem of Israel, whose accession to the treaty is demanded by Egypt and a number of other Arab states, remains acute. It is true that in recent days Tel Aviv has agreed to international inspections at Israeli sites connected with nuclear power and Cairo has ceased to threaten to denounce the treaty.

To reduce the likelihood of the conference failing, the five nuclear powers are obviously building up political pressure in an attempt to prevent the cessation of the treaty's operation. Britain, zealously guarding its own nuclear positions, has undertaken by 1998 to destroy the entire stock of aviation nuclear bombs and retain only sea-launched missiles. Moreover, the "nuclear five" has announced guarantees of the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states and plans to submit a document in which they will give an account of how they intend to help states subjected to a nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail.

It is perfectly obvious that the steps which have been taken will not release the members of the "club" from the need to explain how and when they intend to disarm right down to the total destruction of all accumulated arsenals, a ban on nuclear tests, and the ending of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

Much will have to be surrendered but quite a lot will be received as a reward—stability in the world and the possibility of continuing disarmament.

Misuse, Decline of Russian Arms Exports

LD1704221395 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 17 Apr 95

[Station commentary; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] In (?1977), the USSR provided arms to foreign countries worth $18 billion—and provided is the right word, because Moscow's ideological brothers were not always able to pay. Now Russia is trading for real money, but at the same time, sales have declined. While three years ago, Russian arms exports reached $2.4 billion, last year they declined really sharply, to $1.7 billion. [Video shows graph giving figures: 1992 - 2.4 billion; 1993 - 2.5 billion; 1994 - 1.7 billion]

For some time now, arms have been traded on Russia's behalf by defense industry enterprises without any experience in the field, and by independent intermediaries—not only businessmen, incidentally, but by entire states. An example involving businessmen: journalists from Germany's STERN magazine discovered Russian T-72 tanks in Croatia that had gotten there in circumvention of UN sanctions. The Germans say the Russian commercial firm Voyintekh was to blame for this.

Ecuador, before its recent war with Peru, was supplied by Nicaragua with Soviet Igla air defense installations, previously received as fraternal assistance from the Soviet people.

Clearly all these stories point to the fact that Russia has lost its reputation as a country able to reliably control the export and reexport of its weaponry. Small wonder that arms sales have declined. But arms trading is about big politics as well as big money.

It seems the situation started to stabilize this year, largely following the arrival of new people in the management of the state company Rosvooruzheniye, which recently became a monopoly in Russia's military and technical cooperation abroad. Rosvooruzheniye has concluded contracts worth $1.5 billion since the start of the year alone. A contract with India for the supply of Tunguska

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surface-to-air missile systems adds another few hundred million. And at that very moment, the criminal cases are launched. There is a great wave of exposures in the press, especially abroad. Nowhere does it say that criminal cases have been instituted against people who no longer work for the company. But the damage to the country's prestige has already been done.

Naturally there is an opportunity here to earn not only money where Rosvooruzheniye's competitors on the international markets are concerned. Something more valuable—political capital—can be gained from these exposures in the first stages of the electoral campaign. [Video shows military aircraft; graph of export figures; foreign news footage of soldier with gun; Rosvooruzheniye publicity video showing aircraft, tank, naval hardware, rocket launcher; company logo; military vehicles]

Scientists See Perils in Iranian Nuclear Contract

MM1704194895 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 95 p 3

[Letter from Academicians V.P. Maslov and V.P. Myasnikov under the "From the Editorial Mailbag" rubric: "On the Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We wish to state honestly that the nuclear station which Russia has contracted to build for Iran will undoubtedly lead to the creation of nuclear weapons in Iran. We will cite additional arguments to those mentioned by Aleksey Yablokov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IZVESTIYA No. 67, 1995).

The project does not provide for funding for adequate guarantees of equipment safety in case of accidents; we know what mistakes can result from possible disasters not envisaged in advance (see the book "Modeling the Damaged Unit of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station]" by V.P. Maslov, V.P. Myasnikov, and V.G. Danilov; Moscow, Nauka, 1987). Therefore it is clear that the chief aim is plutonium production and not a safe AES.

The Iranians are a people with a very ancient, high culture. With our help Iranian scientists will quickly attain the qualifications in the sphere of nuclear power generation which will enable them to create nuclear weapons. At the same time the main necessary ingredients will already be prepared during construction of the AES.

How dangerous for us is the creation of nuclear weapons in Iran? After all, our nuclear might will undoubtedly surpass Iran's many times over. Let us dwell on this question.

There was an Islamic revolution in Iran not so long ago. Politicians frequently underestimate the force of the masses' postrevolutionary ideological enthusiasm and the colossal energy which is released and which seeks to embrace the whole world and to inculcate its own ideology in it. We only want to say that Iran's potential force should not be underestimated. But since, on top of everything, according to Sergey Kovalev, our troops did colossal harm to the Islamic population of Chechnya and words of vengeance against Moscow were spoken on behalf of the Islamic leaders, then this danger is increasing endlessly.

Does it follow from the aforesaid that we are insisting that the deal be abandoned? Let us assume that we abandon it. Where is the guarantee that some other country will not accept the order? For we have already abandoned weapons sales, and the resultant market niche was at once filled, while we, having lost the market, simply found ourselves made fools of.

The following very important circumstance must also be taken into account. In no country have power physicists suddenly found themselves in such a disastrous situation as we have. Before perestroyka, "in the age of stagnation," this sector was funded most generously: The way ahead was opened in the sense both of laboratories and equipment and of introductions [of innovations into production] and, finally, the wages of associates (including bonuses) were at the highest level (among scientific associates and engineers). Now this has all come tumbling down. In addition, three-fourths of the pieces of work done by these scientists was classified, and so the names of the majority of power scientists are not so well known abroad from published works. Did Kurchatov, Sakharov, and Khariton, the "fathers" of the atom bomb, have a lot of them? This means that such scientists are not as well known abroad as those whose work was unclassified. Therefore earnings abroad, which now comprise the scientists' main income, proved problematic for them. But now, at last, the possibility of big earnings, which the suddenly impoverished families of scientists have been waiting for for several years now, is being opened up.

Can we assume responsibility and abandon the contract? Our reply is this: No, we cannot. We can only lay bare the problem and pose it in all its unsightliness—which is what we are doing.

Ambassador Tretyakov on Nuclear Cooperation With Iran

LD1704174995 Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network in Persian 1630 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian ambassador in Tehran today stressed his country's intention to continue cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran in the field of nuclear sciences. He announced: Moscow will not accept any advice from the United States about its relations with other countries, in particular with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In an interview with our correspondent, Mr. Sergey Tretyakov stated his country's firm resolve to enjoy

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all-embracing cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and he emphasized the implementation of the agreement between the two countries on the completion of Bushehr nuclear plant. He added: The Islamic Republic of Iran has signed an accord with the IAEA, and this serves as a guarantee of the peaceful nature of activities by Iran's nuclear institutions.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] How independent is Moscow in relation to fulfilling this contract?

[Tretyakov, in Persian] One hundred percent, I believe.

[Correspondent] If we look ahead, that is to the forthcoming meeting between Mr. Yeltsin and Clinton on 19 Ordibehesht [9 May], what do you think the outcome of this summit will be?

[Tretyakov] The American Government, through different means, that is through either diplomatic channels or personal contacts between the officials of the two countries at different levels, has been trying to dissuade Moscow from implementing this contract. I do not think that any further effort by the American Government will bear any fruit. This is because for Russia the matter is not merely an economic issue, but also a political one. [end recording] [video shows Tretyakov interviewed by unidentified correspondent]

No 'Russian Connection' With Plutonium Seized in Munich

LD1104164395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1428 GMT 11 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Semenova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—There is no "Russian connection" in the case about plutonium-239 confiscated at the Munich airport in August 1994, Major-General Aleksandr Mikhaylov, chief of the public relations centre of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service, told ITAR-TASS on Tuesday.

Commenting on the version advanced by West German journalists and recounted in DER SPIEGEL magazine on Monday, Mikhaylov said that such sensitive material should not be treated so irresponsibly, without citing proof. Mikhaylov noted again that there had been no proof that plutonium had been delivered from Russia. After an uproar in the press a U.S. institute carried out an independent examination of samples of the confiscated plutonium late last summer. The examination has not been able to trace plutonium to Russia.

The problem of guarding nuclear facilities does exist. All competent structures are engaged in the task, Mikhaylov said. However, distinction should be made between fissionable materials that can be used for arms manufacture and materials used by nuclear power plants.

After the "Munich case" the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service and German secret services and law enforcement bodies signed an agreement on interaction in combating illegal circulation of fissionable materials. "Joint work is effective, and contacts are useful", Mikhaylov said. He pointed to excellent understanding between units of the secret services of the two countries that have been given the right of direct cooperation. He said the implementation of the agreement sets an example for joint work of secret services of countries concerned to put a stop to contraband of radioactive materials.

German Allegations of Russian Plutonium Link Denied

MM1304160095 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by A. Baranov, R. Zaripov, and V. Prokopenko under the "Scandal" rubric: "German Special Services 'Glow' from Plutonium"]

[FBIS Translated Text] So there is now a sensational sequel to last year's scandal involving the sale of contraband plutonium from Russia to Germany. As we have already reported, a big article was published in the most recent issue of the German weekly DER SPIEGEL from which it follows that the FRG's special services organized and carried out this operation in order to prove that Russia's system of guarding nuclear materials is unreliable.

At our request, representatives of the relevant Russian departments comment on the publication in DER SPIEGEL.

Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Press Department:

"From the very beginning we spoke of the necessity of carrying out a calm and exhaustive check on any, may I say, 'sensation' of this kind, and we actually put the emphasis on this in contacts with our partners, including the Germans.

"People at the Russian Foreign Ministry do not feel inclined to dramatize the disclosures published in DER SPIEGEL and do not consider that they will have any kind of serious negative effect on the nature of developing Russian-German relations. At the same time, this does not exclude the possibility of certain conclusions being drawn in the context of cooperation between the Russian and German special services."

Georgiy Kaurov, head of the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy press center:

"The article in DER SPIEGEL confirmed the veracity of the statement by the Ministry of Atomic Energy which said that the plutonium found by the German special services at Munich airport in August of last year was produced in Germany. At the time we stated directly that the plutonium on board the Lufthansa airplane was delivered to Moscow and then returned to Munich,

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where they were already 'waiting' for it. For me the most important element in this whole saga is that the German special services compelled almost 400 grams of plutonium to be carried in a passenger airliner, whose flight path crossed densely populated regions.

"You cannot handle plutonium in this manner. Everything that has happened is a provocation.

"But we would not like to inflame the situation, on the contrary: We once more call on our German colleagues to cooperate closely with us. Let us get to the bottom of each specific incident, let us discuss matters together, meet, provide samples for analysis, and compare the results."

Aleksandr Mikhaylov, chief of the Federal Security Service Public Relations Center:

"Germany as a nonnuclear power cannot both in theoretical and practical terms monitor the Russian nuclear complex. What we are coming up against is an attempt to capitalize on the scandal surrounding an alleged 'Russian nuclear trail.' This is, first, an attempt to compromise Russia as a reliable partner in the implementation of all kinds of nuclear programs. Second, an attempt to compromise Russia as a country which is not in control of its radioactive materials, including radioactive plutonium. And third, an attempt to put the Russian nuclear complex under the surveillance of the West. This is explained by the fact that our radioactive substances are sold on the world market at a lower price than Western products, and are of better quality."

Envoy Wants KEDO To Offer DPRK 'Russian-Made' Reactors

OW1304141595 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 13 Apr 95 Morning Edition p 7

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Ambassador to Japan Chizhov was invited to the Research Commission on Foreign Affairs of the Liberal Democratic Party on 12 April. Asked about his views on the Korean Energy Development Organization's [KEDO] plan to provide North Korea with South Korean-type light water reactors, Ambassador Chizhov said: "Russian-made light water reactors should be provided because North Korea is skilled in Russian technology."

On Russia's possible participation in KEDO, he said "we need to think about our interest before making a decision," thus indicating his view the provision of Russian-made reactors is a condition of Russia's participation in KEDO.

Rybkin Cites 1951 San Franciso Treaty on Kurils

MM1704105595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Sergey Agafonov: "Ivan Rybkin Voting for Yeltsin and Making His Contribution to Debate on Territorial Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tokyo—Ivan Rybkin, speaker of the lower house of the Russian parliament, met with representatives of the Japanese mass media and spoke in detail to them during the preparations for his trip to Japan planned for the end of this month.

The first thing that has drawn people's attention in Tokyo is Rybkin's clear "pro-Yeltsin" stance. The Russian speaker swore that his sympathies, support, and vote would go to Yeltsin, were he to run. The Japanese, incidentally, were attracted not so much by Rybkin's intention to vote for Yeltsin as by the speaker's categorical prediction that two-thirds of the deputies would act likewise—that is, support Boris Nikolayevich.

The other subject touched upon in Rybkin's interview is one that is much closer to the hearts of the Japanese than the Russian elections—the prospect of a solution to the territorial issue in bilateral relations. Rybkin considerably puzzled the Japanese by setting out his vision of the problem, which differs sharply from the official position of the Russian Foreign Ministry and President Yeltsin, whom the speaker supports in every possible way. Tokyo is now awash in speculation as to what it all means.

In particular, the speaker told the Japanese that the territorial problem in bilateral relations cannot be resolved within the framework of those bilateral relations themselves. According to Rybkin, this dispute cannot be resolved without the participation of the other states signatory to the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. If Russia and Japan agree to a solution to the territorial dispute, Rybkin believes that it is entirely likely that other countries will object on the basis of the terms of the peace treaty signed in San Francisco.

As is well known, this treaty, which formally concludes the era of confrontation in Japan's relations with its neighbors in the region and its former adversaries in the Pacific War, was signed 8 September 1951 by representatives of 49 states. The Soviet Union did not sign the treaty, although the text of this international document contains a pledge by Japan to waive its rights to the Kuril Islands. Discussion of the territorial problem between Moscow and Tokyo constantly runs up against this pledge—the Japanese do not consider the Southern Kurils, which were occupied by the USSR, to constitute part of the Kurils, and are calling for the return of four disputed islands; opponents on our side are insisting on the opposite.

Rybkin's version, in the form in which it was voiced, promises to upset all the official "applecarts" in both Moscow and Tokyo—no call to revive the "San Francisco process" has ever previously been made at top level and is not taken seriously by anyone. Who prompted its appearance on the lips of the esteemed speaker is a mystery over which not only Japanese but Russian diplomats are currently racking their brains.

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Rybkin Criticizes Meeting With Aum Shinrikyo Leader

OW1404144295 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 14 Apr 95 Morning Edition p 2

[By Yoichi Nishimura]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 13 Apr—Russian lower chamber chairman Ivan Rybkin, one of the most influential Russian politicians, granted an interview to an ASAHI SHIMBUN reporter and other press reporters on 13 April, prior to his visit to Japan set for 27 April.

On the issue of the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo, which had approached prominent Russians, Rybkin said: "Japan and Russia should take prudent measures so the issue does not have an adverse effect on bilateral relations."

He stressed that a bill to revise the "freedom of religion law"—designed to ban activities of religious groups which "harm social security or public order"—has to be adopted at the lower chamber.

Chairman Rybkin maintained that former Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov and former Vice President Alexander Rutskoy "have hurt the honor" of Russia by having met Aum Shinrikyo leader Shoko Asahara. He also called for close cooperation between concerned authorities in the two countries in conducting future investigations.

On the Northern Territories issue, Chairman Rybkin pointed out that the "signatory nations to the (1951) San Francisco Peace Treaty" opposed a solution to the territorial dispute during 1955-1956 Japanese-Soviet negotiations on normalizing diplomatic relations. He had in mind the United States in making the remarks.

He stated that not only bilateral negotiations, but also the participation of the "signatory nations to the San Francisco Peace Treaty" will be necessary to solve the territorial dispute and conclude a peace treaty.

It is believed that by making the remarks, he was emphasizing, from an international point of view, the difficulty of solving the issue.

Chairman Rybkin will make his first visit to Japan over three days beginning 27 April. He is scheduled to meet Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, House of Representatives Speaker Takako Doi, Deputy Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, and other officials.

Kozyrev, Papoulias To Open More Consulates

LD1504184195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1250 GMT 15 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Dmitriy Gorokhov, Yuriy Malinov, Vladimir Malyshev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Athens, 15 Apr—In the interests of developing further traditionally friendly Russian-Greek relations, the foreign ministers of the Russian Federation and the Hellenic Republic have agreed on setting up general consulates: A Russian consulate in Thessaloniki, and Greek consulates in St. Petersburg and Novorossiysk.

For this purpose, and also to discuss other issues relating to consular relations between the two countries and the work of their consulates, the ministers agreed to hold consultations of the directors of the relevant departments in both ministries between 15 May and 15 June in Moscow. The exact dates of the meeting will be agreed through diplomatic channels.

Karolos Papoulias signed the document on behalf of the Hellenic Republic and Andrey Kozyrev on behalf of the Russian Federation.

Zhirinovskiy Ready To Help 'Liberate' North Cyprus

LD1704184595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1740 GMT 17 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Yevrochenkov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nicosia, 17 Apr—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, described as inadmissible the 21-year-long occupation of North Cyprus by Turkish troops. He is on a private visit there. In his statement, he described the occupation as comparable to fascism.

After today's meeting with Alexis Galanos, president of parliament's House of Representatives, Zhirinovskiy told journalists that Turkey is still unpunished following the intervention on Cyprus, while the same situation is now recurring with the Kurds in north Iraq. Zhirinovskiy suggested that Russia's relations with Cyprus and Greece and all the Orthodox Balkan peoples should be strengthened since historical tries and a long joint struggle have brought them together.

In reply to the question of how Russia can give practical help to Cyprus, Zhirinovskiy said that Russia can provide help in many spheres, including trade and economy. He said that military help is also possible. "We are working toward a peaceful solution. A military solution, however, cannot be ruled out, if need be."

Earlier, on arrival in Cyprus last Saturday, Zhirinovskiy said that if elected president in 1996 and asked by Cyprus, he "will send Russian troops to liberate the island from the Turkish troops."

Foreign Ministry Hails New Stage in Relations With Albania

LD1304210895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1954 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Valeriy Sevryukov]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 13 TASS—Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania Aleksander Meksi ended his state visit to Moscow today. It was the first visit by any head of Albanian Government not only after the normalization of relations between the two states in 1990, but during the past 35 years too.

As a result of talks held between the Albanian prime minister and Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin inter-government agreements on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, encouragment to and mutual protection of capital investments, cultural and scientific cooperation, as well as consular convention and convention on avoiding double taxation on incomes and property were signed. A friendship and cooperation treaty between Russia and Albania was also initialled.

The significance of this visit is determined not only by the number of documents signed, but above all, by the fact that it has finally drawn a line across the past complex relations, which had been marred by shadows of ideological differences for almost 30 years, the Foreign Minsitry spokesman noted.

The visit also heralds a new stage of Russian-Albanian relations, strengthens the atmosphere of understanding and trust, respect for each other's interests, demonstrates readiness of the two sides for further advancement on the path of cooperation, goodneighbourliness and peace, Grigoriy Karasin said.

Butrus Ghali Says Chechnya Moscow's Internal Affair

LD1504162495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1109 GMT 15 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] The UN, 15 April—Butrus Butrus-Ghali, the UN Secretary General said he was ready to help in the development of democracy in Russia. "The UN is ready to provide technical assistance in the area of democratic development," he said in an interview given to the ITAR-TASS correspondent in the New York headquarters of the international community on the eve of his visit to Moscow to take part in the festivities marking the 50th anniversary of victory over fascism.

"We did this for 46 countries which asked us to send observers to their elections. If our assistance is required anywhere else, we are ready to make it available."

The UN Secretary General emphasised that "where Chechnya is concerned, our position is very clear. Our view is that it is Russia's internal matter and I stated this frankly many times before. We did offer our help in three areas and it was accepted by Anatoliy Kozyrev, Russian foreign minister. In the first place it is asssistance to refugees. In the second place it is assistance in ensuring that human rights are observed. In the third place, we are ready to send a group of observers should it be decided to hold elections there to elect a new government. We are ready to assist in the areas which have been approved by the government. If we are asked to do anything else, we will consider the opportunities to do so."

Kozyrev Urges 'Systematic' Protection of Ethnic Russians

LD1804095295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0934 GMT 18 Apr 95

[By Valeriy Sevryukov and Andrey Urban]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 18 (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in his speech at a sitting of the Russian Foreign Policy Council described as unsatisfactory the status of Russian-speakers in "many CIS countries".

Kozyrev said the unceasing flow of migrants into Russia was a proof of that.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, 254,500 Russian-speakers had to come to Russia last year from the CIS states, mostly from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

"A paradoxical situation has emerged," Kozyrev said. "On the one hand, there are a fairly large mass of declarations of leaders of CIS states in favour of rights of the national minorities and a great number of signed documents. At the same time there are acute problems with practical observance of those rights." Kozyrev continued.

Kozyrev expressed the Foreign Ministry's concern about elusiveness of some CIS members about signing a CIS human rights declaration, with claims that by this stance they want to retain their sovereignty.

An effective mechanism need be set up to handle the humanitarian issues within the CIS, Kozyrev said, adding that "the sovereignty of its members will only benefit from it".

Kozyrev said Russia would press for finalisation of this important declaration.

Kozyrev cited as issues the limited use of the Russian language, narrow employment opportunities for Russian-speakers, and "administrative pressure".

Both systemic and "pinpoint" protection of the Russian population are required, Kozyrev said. He spelled the "pinpoint" protection as assistance to businesses, public groups, various organisations and specific groups of the Russian population.

Tajik-Afghan Combat Zone 'Expands'

MM1704103795 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Anatoliy Prokopyev of the Federal Border Service News Agency and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's

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Anatoliy Ladin and Vitaliy Strugovets: "Combat Zone on Tajik-Afghan Border Expands. Russia and CIS States Assist Tajikistan in Rebuffing Opposition Offensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, where the fighting is into its second week, remains tense.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin had meetings in Sochi 13 and 14 April with Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, director of the Russian Federal Border Service, in order to discuss the situation in detail. The head of state's press service reported that the Russian president deems it necessary to take a number of urgent steps to reduce the tension on the Tajik-Afghan border. At the same time he is suggesting that "maximum use be made of the facilities and forces which have been allocated to protect the border, where necessary enlisting the collective peacekeeping forces."

In addition Boris Yeltsin advocated providing the Republic of Tajikistan with the requisite technical and military aid. He also recommended that the question of the state of affairs on the Tajik-Afghan border be examined immediately by a combined session of the CIS foreign ministers, defense ministers, and border guard commanders with a view to formulating additional collective measures in accordance with the decisions adopted previously by the CIS heads of state. Similar decisions will most likely also be adopted by the heads of the three Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan—during their meeting in Chimkent.

Tajikistan and the Russian border guards safeguarding the security of its southern borders really need help since the combat zone is still expanding here.

The latest armed clash between Russian border guards and Islamic gunmen occurred near the village of Barchid north of Khorog. A single road runs along the border here, hemmed in by a cliff face on one side and the Pyandzh River on the other. You could not find a better place for an ambush. And Tajik opposition gunmen have already become pretty expert in these tactics. Their favorite method—right after promising not to harm border guards—is to carry out surprise attacks. Once again after giving assurances that convoys carrying food and essentials for the outposts would not be attacked, gunmen commanded by Mullo Umar lay in wait for one of these convoys near the village of Barchid. The fierce fighting lasted about three hours. The border guards routed the whole detachment of about 60 gunmen with the help of the reserves that were drawn up. Mullo Umar himself was killed.

Regrettably, the Russian border guards also sustained losses. Vladimir Ivanov, a Russian private on contract service and a native of Krasnoyarsk Kray, died along with five citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The situation in other sectors of the Khorog Border Detachment's area also remained difficult.

At 0855 hours 13 April snipers opened fire on the base of the detachment's First Outpost. "Tajik Islamic Revival Movement [TIRM]" people ceased their activity in this area at 1030 hours affter a rocket attack by four Mi-24 helicopters.

One of the gunmen's munitions dumps was discovered and destroyed during the afternoon of 13 April near the "Yazgulem" border post.

At 2200 hours 13 April two intruders were discovered crossing the border from Afghanistan near the population center of Pastkhuf opposite the detachment's No. 4 Outpost. The outpost's commander approached with a group of border guards and arrested the intruders along with four local accomplices. At 2220 hours around 20 armed gunmen arrived at the outpost and summoned Senior Lieutenant D. Khasanov, the outpost's commander, for a parley. During the talks they captured the officer and two border guards with their weapons and demanded the immediate release of the people captured crossing the border. A few minutes later they released the soldiers but kept the chief of the outpost and the three assault rifles.

As a result of the steps that were taken the commander of the outpost was released at 0130 hours 14 April and some time later the weapons were returned.

According to current information, the TIRM leadership is now taking active steps to build up the number of gunmen in Gornyy Badakhshan. Armed TIRM groups from the Pyandzh and Kulyab "fronts" are being moved to the Badakhshan sector to take part in combat operations against Russian Border Guard subunits.

As well as conducting combat operations the Tajik opposition reserves the right to maneuver on the diplomatic "front" too. According to information we have received, Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, the UN secretary general's personal representative, reached agreement with TIRM leader Said Abdullo Nuri that over the next few days—round about 17 April—he would meet with Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov. The meeting may take place in Moscow. But the opposition did in the process once again set out its terms, namely Russian border guards' recognition of the temporary cease-fire agreement, the withdrawal of Tajik government forces from Gornyy Badakhshan, and the suspension of combat operations in the Vanch-Yazgulem sector.

Let us point out that these terms are clearly not acceptable to Russia and the other CIS states since, if they are implemented, it will be impossible to speak of even the most elementary security for the Commonwealth's southern borders.

Tajik Border War's 'Domino' Effect Feared

LD1704201995

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1850 GMT on

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17 April carries the "Versions" program moderated by Sergey Dorenko. Dorenko interviews Andrey Nikolayev, director of Russia's Federal Border Service, on the eve of Tajik opposition leader Turajon Zoda's arrival in Moscow for talks.

Russia's position that the Tajik-Afghan border is also a Russian border is clear enough; any withdrawal from Central Asia and entrenchment in Siberia will cause an explosion in Asia, with a domino effect, notes Dorenko, and concludes: "There is no way out, other than to defend the borders of the former USSR."

Asked whether it is simpler to protect the Tajik-Afghan border or to organize normal border procedures along Russia's border with Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics, Andrey Nikolayev says: "One kilometer of the border is equal to 2 billion rubles. Our border with Kazakhstan is 7,593 km long. Do the multiplication for yourself."

Nikolayev adds: "From the viewpoint of the interests of the Russian state, its strategic interests, of ensuring our interests in this region generally, we must not withdraw from here under any circumstances."

The program's next interviewees are two young men said to be Russian deserters who are now fighting for Afghanistan. They describe the conditions when they joined the border patrols in 1994 as a shambles, with men and officers drunk and basic procedures not being observed.

Semen Bagdasarov, described only as an expert, says: "Russia's withdrawal from here would entail a collapse of the border with the most horrendous consequences—a change in Central Asia's internal and foreign borders, which means we would no longer be dealing with one Tajikistan, but millions of Russian and Russian-speaking refugees."

"This super hot spot, so to speak, right under Russia's very nose, would have grave consequences for stability in Russia itself," says Bagdasarov. He adds that with between 18 and 20 million Muslims in Russia, who are largely hostile to Russian policies following the war in Afghanistan, the Tajik skirmishes, and the war in Chechnya, Russia has to work out a clear policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Tajik Withdrawal Will Spread Conflict into Russia

LD1704185295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1607 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 17 (Interfax)—If the Russian border guards are withdrawn from Tajikistan, the conflict raging there is likely to spill over into Russia, State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin told journalists Monday.

This conflict will be fought in the Urals before one can say withdrawal, he warned.

Rybkin doubted that UN peacekeeping units would work in Tajikistan, because they had proved to be unable to manage the Yugoslav situation where the tension is less.

He said that a spring offensive by opposition forces was expected; and Andrey Nikolayev, director of the Federal Border Guard Service, had warned of it, in particular when he addressed the State Duma.

Rybkin said that the politicos and states are likely to regret their shortsightedness when aggressive fundamentalism and nationalism, which they encourage, turn against them.

Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin Discuss Ukraine, Tajikistan, CIS

LD1804115495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1040 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 18 April— Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin today discussed the preparations for celebrating the 50th anniversary of victory.

During the meeting, Boris Yeltsin's press service reports, there was also discussion of the implementation of presidential decrees on economic issues, and budget problems were also discussed, including how to ensure targeted use of budget resources. Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin focused particular attention on the preparations for the new stage of privatization.

There was also discussion of the banking consortium proposal to grant credits to the government using federally-owned shares as security.

Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin "also discussed problems relating to drawing up a broad-ranging Russian Federation-Ukrainian treaty, ways to settle the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and a number of aspects of interrelations between CIS countries", the press service release says.

Kozyrev Supports Black Sea Economic Cooperation

LD1404230095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1507 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Dmitriy Gorokhov, Yuriy Malinov, and Vladimir Malyshev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Athens, 14 April—Black Sea cooperation should not really be viewed separately from the efforts to work out a model of Pan-European security and cooperation in line with the OSCE meeting in Budapest, said Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Andrey Kozyrev, addressing the meeting of the foreign ministers of the countries of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) zone which opened here today.

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We, he continued, support the BSEC because we can see it as a link in the zone of good-neighborliness with which we would like to surround Russia. With our participation the Council of the Barents Sea and the Council of the Baltic States have been set up and are already operating. A mechanism of regional interaction is all the more necessary in the Black Sea region which, on the one hand, has centuries-old traditions of trade links and, on the other, sources of instability and conflicts which have not been eliminated.

The minister said it was necessary to attract the business community of the Black Sea countries to cooperation and expressed the hope that a business forum, which is being planned in Budapest and which the Romanian government agreed to sponsor, will be a start to fruitful communication between the Black Sea countries and countries outside the region which have free capital.

Kozyrev spoke about the importance of developing direct ties between border areas. He said that heads of administration of Territories and Regions in southern Russia had arrived in Athens as part of the Russian delegation who could find concrete cooperation projects quicker.

Kiev, Moscow Discuss Black Sea, Friendship Treaty

LD1804104595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0958 GMT 18 Apr 95

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 18 April—The problem of the Black Sea fleet is the focus of talks being held between Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and Ukrainian Acting Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, who arrived here today.

During the meeting with Soskovets, Marchuk declared that the "Ukrainian delegation intends to work constructively on the problems of the Black Sea fleet." "Both sides have made positive moves on this issue," he commented. Marchuk estimated that it would be possible to reach a "95 per cent solution" of the Black Sea fleet during the present visit.

Admiral Igor Kasatonov, first deputy commander in chief of the Russian naval fleet, does not share the optimism of the Ukrainian acting prime minister's optimism, however. Ukraine has so far "made only second-grade concessions," in his view. All in all, Kasatonov thinks, the Ukrainian approach is "discriminatory and unacceptable for Russia." The text of the declaration on the division of the Black Sea fleet, scheduled for signing during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's forthcoming visit to Ukraine, will be worked through in detail in the Russian Defense Ministry today.

At today's talks, other questions of Russian-Ukrainian relations were also touched upon. It was noted that the general political treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two states was practically ready. However, citizenship and border issues still remained a stumbling-block. The Ukrainian acting prime minister believes that signing this document "would help to resolve many issues, including the Crimean problem."

He also stressed that "problems of citizenship and borders between the two states will be taken out of context of the general political treaty and will be regulated by separate agreements".

To judge from what Oleg Soskovets said, the Russian Federation- Ukrainian document on citizenship which is in preparation will be similar to that which Russia signed earlier with Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Andrey Vavilov, Russian Federation deputy finance minister, who took part in the talks, noted that "Ukraine was fulfilling all the conditions in clearing off its debt to Russia." He remarked that this, in turn, allows Ukraine to obtain the IMF credit it needs.

Yevhen Marchuk put forward a proposal to sign within the framework of this visit a Russo-Ukrainian agreement "On legal aid." At the same time it is anticipated that the agreement on setting up joint financial-industrial groups will be initialed.

Poll on Crimean Situation

LD1404134695 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The all-Russian opinion poll foundation asked Russian citizens to answer the following question: Was Russia right to say that the abolition of the Crimean constitution and the post of president in the Republic of Crimea is Ukraine's internal affair?

The answers were as follows: 22 percent of those polled think this is the right policy, 39 percent say no, 16 percent are indifferent to this problem, and 23 percent gave no answer.

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Political Issues

Yeltsin Confirms Elections on Dates Set By Constitution

LD1704200195 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today Boris Yeltsin had a meeting with State Duma chairman Ivan Rybkin and head of the Russian government Viktor Chernomyrdin. [passage omitted]

In an interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent, Boris Yeltsin confirmed that the parliamentary and presidential elections prescribed by the Constitution will take place on the allocated dates.

Yeltsin Seen Still Capable of Winning Election

MK1504152995 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Viktor Bondarev under the "Persons and Roles" rubric: "Big Maneuvers on a Small Political Scene"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The presidential entourage is actively spreading rumors that not only will Yeltsin run for election, but that he will, undoubtedly, win it. This optimism, against the backdrop of opinion polls that surely guarantee a diametrically opposite outcome, appears to be the main source for theories about the cancellation of elections. A suspicion cannot but arise that government bureaucrats may know something that all others can only guess. Here, too, there is a possibility for a political game of sorts, however. Those who invent and circulate theories about coup scenarios enable Yeltsin—in their own way—to show his commitment to democracy and to score certain points; if no one were to spread rumors, the very fact of holding elections would be taken for granted. However, if everyone is saying that the elections may well not take place, but then the president finally agrees to hold them, this will look like an almost heroic deed. As a matter of fact, such tactics are already bearing fruit: A well-known critic of the government has already said that he will "forgive Yeltsin everything if elections take place."

Parliamentarians are not quite logical, either, in their attitude to Yeltsin's prospects. When a fairly large group of deputies emerged recently to give its backing to the executive authority, their opponents started saying that the president's new-found allies had been bought. But at a time when Yeltsin's opponents appear to be certain of his defeat, they should look at these supporters of a "dying regime" as suicidal cases, "rats" that, instead of leaving the sinking ship, are, on the contrary, rushing to come aboard. Instead of showing malicious joy or sympathy for their "misguided" colleagues, other deputies are expressing displeasure at the fact that members of the new pro-presidential bloc will receive positions and other rewards. Presumably, the opposition itself does not believe that the regime is weak.

A novelty in political life is an all-out offensive against Zhirinovskiy. The democrats, who have never liked the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] leader, have been joined by virtually all the main parties and factions. The Communists, after keeping an 18-month silence and dodging an unequivocal definition of their stance, have finally completely dissociated themselves from Zhirinovskiy. They appear to have concluded that he is what the Chinese call a "paper tiger" and that now is the time to divide up its skin. Patriotic movements of all kinds have also lashed out at the LDPR leader for his penchant for reckless adventures and actions that discredit the Russian idea. No one wants to cooperate with Vladimir Volfovich. Or, maybe, Russian politicians have correctly sized up the situation and it is not for nothing that they have joined forces in mounting an attack on the "son of a lawyer;" is his star about to set? [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Seen Likely To Run for President

MK1804093095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 18 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by Georgiy Bovt, Natalya Kalashnikova: "President Returns to Moscow. From Vacation to Celebration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin is back in Moscow from his vacation and is back to work in the Kremlin. His press service reported the start of his working day at 0915 yesterday. In order to fill in information gaps formed in public opinion while the president was resting, Yeltsin gave an interview to ITAR-TASS observer Tamara Zamyatina. The president set forth his position on the following sets of problems: on the upcoming elections in Russia, on the situation surrounding Crimea, on conscription, on relations with the United States, and, of course, on marking the 50th anniversary of Victory. The only fundamentally new thing concerns seditious Crimea.

It is clear today that the passions in the State Duma 14 April (when it was addressed by Crimean parliament speaker Sergey Tsekov) were not seething in vain: Duma members' sentiments rather echo those of the president. But only recently was it believed that the Russian-Ukrainian summit was to take place in the middle or the end of April. Today this summit is in very great doubt because Yeltsin has made its convocation dependent on Kiev's relations with Simferopol. No, that Crimea belongs to Ukraine is not being put in doubt, thank God. But the president of Russia serves a reminder: "Most of the population in Crimea are Russians, and Russia has considerable interests on the peninsula. Therefore we are not indifferent to Crimea's destinies. As for major political documents, I think it would be proper to sign them when we become convinced that relations between Simferopol and Kiev are shaping up without any harm being

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done to the interests of Crimeans and that they correspond to internationally recognized human rights standards." Thereby Yeltsin, as it were, indirectly supported Duma critics of Oleg Soskovets who was reproached precisely for going to Ukraine to prepare the summit and "to sign documents" at a very inopportune moment: at the height of the Simferopol-Kiev tug-of-war.

It was easier, however, for Boris Yeltsin to take a certain stand on Crimea than on conscription (in connection with the passing by the Duma of a [draft] law on extending the length of service and on drafting graduates from higher school students). On one hand, Yeltsin cannot speak unequivocally against the draft (even if he wished to)—support from the army is extremely important for him. Which is why the interview contained arguments for the innovations: "there is a catastrophic lack of conscripts," whereas "the most sophisticated combat equipment requires highly educated specialists." But there also were some reservations: "Specialists hardly should serve as privates. Their knowledge should be reflected in their rank." And one more thing: "The draft has not been considered in the Federation Council. Some corrections may yet be made to it, perhaps.... Therefore it is premature to speak about the passing of the law." One may presume Yeltsin would continue to evade taking a definite stand on this matter whereas the unavoidable maneuvering between the two extremes (the army and "soldiers' mothers") will be urging the executive branch to make some extralegal rules and low-profile actions in a bid to dilute the radical part of the law which is in the making.

Incidentally, as regards the elections. Despite expectations, Yeltsin returned from vacation without any clearly defined decision regarding his own role in them. As before, he "has not made the final decision at the present moment." At any rate, there has now appeared a concrete reason for which "it is too early to talk about this" because, he says, there is no law on elections. At the same time, the president confirmed that the elections for parliament and president will take place "on the dates specified by the constitution" and that he has no intention whatever of altering this position. Incidentally, his chief of staff Sergey Filatov hastened to expand on the president's elections stance, stating that as long as there is no law on elections for president, it is too early to discuss the subject of Yeltsin's probable participation in the election campaign. As for the attempts by other politicians to make their bids for the presidency, he described them as "unethical lobbying" which serves to distract from the main tasks at hand—the deepening of reforms and strengthening stability in society.

The impression, however, is that the main task at the moment is the marking of the 50th anniversary of Victory. It is in this regard, rather than in regard of the subject of "deepening reforms" (he did not say a word about them) that the president was especially voluble, giving a rebuff to "some figures in the opposition" who intend to use the celebrations "for provocative ends." Hence the conclusion: Yeltsin intends to use the observances for his own political advantages. He may all of a sudden decide to run after all....

Yeltsin's 'Roller-Coaster' Method of Rule Eyed

MK1504143295 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Veronica Kutsyllo, Viktor Melnikov under the "Psychology of Russian Politics" rubric: "Roller-Coaster Method of Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Political and psychological processes under way in the Kremlin and in its direct vicinity sometimes defy logical explanation. Time and again the ground begins to crumble first under one politician, then under another personality who seemed to have just recovered his balance. Some time later it turns out, however, that the seemingly moribund politician is once again in good graces. The zigzags of the president's human predilections have been reported more than once: This has already happened to Viktor Chernomyrdin, Sergey Shakhray, Pavel Grachev, Anatoliy Chubays, and so forth. The cyclical nature of powerful bureaucrats' ups and downs can be explained, among other things, by a hypothesis about an idiosyncrasy concerning the technology of power in Russia which was notionally called by KOMMERSANT-DAILY analysts "a roller-coaster." Veronica Kutsyllo and Viktor Melnikov comment.

In Politics, People Do Not Become Prodigal Sons of Their Own Accord

The crux of the hypothesis is that every politician, once he mounts a jingling political car, can no longer avoid highs and lows—of course if he wants to experience everything that may happen to people who find themselves too close to the source of authority. In a number of cases these ups and downs have occurred not spontaneously, but as a result of deliberate actions by the head of state. Terre is no denying the fact that the value of a top-echelon politician in Russia directly hinges on the president's attitude toward him. Of course, had outbursts of Yeltsin's sudden antipathy toward his erstwhile allies been isolated incidents, they could have been most accurately described as petty tyranny. The consistent sequence of ups and downs looks too much like a well-thought-out system, however. The "up-again-down-again" scheme helps one to picture the path of top Russian bureaucrats as a journey on what is known as "a roller-coaster."

More often than not a transition from love to antipathy happens suddenly and inexplicably. The president ignores thousands of reasons for disillusionment with his comrade-in-arms, hotly defends him from attacks, and when the "target" finally relaxes, he suddenly lashes out at him for a much less serious lapse. The reaction may be active (like banning Chubays from dealing with Moscow, for instance) or passive—the head of state simply keeps

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silent (as was the case in what now appears to be happily resolved tensions in his relations with Luzhkov), letting his other cronies tear the unfortunate politician apart and keeping the press guessing about his future fate. The mounting scandal is underpinned by rumors about ongoing interviews with possible successors (or even more than that: Last fall, for instance, rumors spread in government circles about a draft edict appointing Oleg Soskovets acting prime minister; the edict was never issued, but Chernomyrdin's stock fell for some time, while that of Soskovets shot up correspondingly). The cornered politician begins either snarling back or calling for help. Depending on this, the tide either does or does not turn. The president acts in his customary role of arbiter and clasps the until-now helpless outcast to his breast. The gratified politician is ready to give his life for the boss who has saved him from "blackmail." He should not forget, however, that this elevation does not insure him against further movement along the up-and-down curve.

Those unable to endure the downhill slide fall beyond the bounds of power's curved path. Owing to what the president sees as their "inadequate" reaction, not only are the "dropouts" dismissed from their posts, but they are stripped of the right to come close to their "father's home." The list goes on and on: Burbulis, Poltoranin, Petrov, Skokov, Kazannik, and even Rutskoy and Khasbulatov. According to another theory, however, some of the "dropouts" are not lost to the president completely—they are being groomed for the role of our men in Havana, metaphorically speaking, who create a background atmosphere of support for Yeltsin.

I Begot You, Will I Kill You?

Operation of this system only becomes possible if it draws on an authoritarian government model. Evidently there are few people ready to assert that the spirit of boundless democracy reigns in relations between Russian authorities. Authoritarian rule, as an objective prerequisite, gives rise to subjective ones—the leader's psychological readiness to require loyalty from his comrades-in-arms in any situation and the comrades-in-arms' psychological readiness to bend before their leader in a half-bow. This ability to be ready and willing to make it not only into the first, but also the second stage of the roller-coaster journey—so as to secure entry into the third one—is the key to success for top Russian politicians.

Since the cooling-off in relations with a specific politician happens as if against the president's will—the role of cold shower can be performed by somebody from his inner circle (let us recall the favorite expression of the politicians who have access to the Kremlin: "The president has been set up once again..."), and the "thaw" originates with the president himself, the latter appears to the unfortunate to be his sole protection and support. Thus, the target of examination does his utmost so that this support will exist as long as possible—which is very important on the eve of presidential elections. In short, this style in relations between the boss and his subordinates can be found in many a Western corporation. Constant uncertainty among politicians, who have to read the tea-leaves to guess whether or not they are in favor, creates a formidable spirit of competition among members of the president's entourage, vying for the right to be seen as the most loyal to the head of the group. The reason the roller- coaster is called "American hills" in Russian is that it gives everyone an opportunity to fall and to rise again, reaching the place of favorite at least for a short period of time.

It's All Dry Theory, My Friend...

This theory is, of course, not without shortcomings. In particular, the authors can be accused of both underestimating the "evergreen" political tree and of adopting an excessively anthropomorphic approach to power, that is, attributing to it human qualities it does not possess. Some analysts do not believe that Boris Yeltsin is cunning enough to play such games. Others doubt even the president's ability to act at all. Yet others, without denying the president the right to intelligence, think nevertheless that the roller-coaster phenomenon exists regardless of the president's will. In their view, the press plays a key part in this process owing to its objective fondness for sudden violent campaigns. The president, for his part, watches this process, assisting or destroying it depending on what benefits him more at a given moment. Another noteworthy school of thought has it that Boris Yeltsin uses politicians when he needs them and tosses them aside when the need subsides. At a certain stage a politician is taken out of a "settling tank" and used to plug yet another gap (a case in point is the astonishing spasmodic career of Sergey Shakhray, who has broken all records for coming back into the government). Under yet another opinion the president, on account of his excessive credulity, which is paradoxically intertwined with suspiciousness, often gives in to deliberately provoked conflicts, which enables certain malicious speculations about relations between top officials to become reality.

Assertions that Boris Yeltsin is incapable of action and dim-witted run counter to the fact that he managed to become Gorbachev's successor and had previously been first secretary of a CPSU oblast committee, then of the Moscow City Committee, and then a candidate Politburo member. He outplayed his democratic entourage, once it had been marginalized, and achieved virtually absolute power in the Kremlin. Yeltsin's inherent ability to achieve the desired result effectively in any situation makes one pay more attention to the interpretation being offered of the president's personality, who, for all his straightforwardness, appears to be a calculating politician who relies in his everyday practice—whether intuitively or not—on the ancient supranational principle of "divide and rule," or "elevate, drop, and rule" in its Russian version.

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Gaydar Comments on Changes in Yeltsin's Position

LD1704151095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1246 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 17 (Interfax)—Leader of the Democratic Choice of Russia party Yegor Gaydar told Interfax Monday [17 April] that the changes which have taken place in President Yeltsin's position over the past 18 months reflect "weak support for democracy in broad sections of the population."

Describing Yeltsin as a "politician who is able to feel the moods in society professionally", Gaydar said that the president has "rectified a great deal" after the parliamentary elections in December 1993 were unexpectedly won by "the adventurists who proclaimed a march to the south".

"The loss of popularity of the democratic idea due to economic problems made the president change his position," said Gaydar.

He noted at the same time that Yeltsin "did not opt for rigorous censorship or postponement of elections, as recommended by many after the beginning of the Chechen conflict," all of which "inspires optimism."

Speaking about the change of emphasis in favor of the federal troops in the press coverage of the Chechen events, Gaydar stated with regret that "this can be explained in part by the increased pressure on the press." The main thing is, however, that "the absolute majority of the Russian citizens perceive the Chechen events as something which is unpleasant but which has little to do with them."

In his opinion, Yeltsin "must have realized what a terrible mistake he made by starting the Chechen war."

Russian Democratic Reform Movement Prepares For Elections

LD1604140395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1320 GMT 16 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 16 TASS—The Russian Democratic Reform Movement is against moving the date of elections and will announce its election programme shortly, movement leader Gavriil Popov said on Sunday [16 April] as he opened a meeting of the central board of the movement, the supreme body between its congresses.

Representatives of more than 40 regional branches of the movement attended the meeting to work out its strategy for the upcoming elections.

Popov said the movement's election programme will cover all spheres of life, particularly topical economic and social issues confronting society.

He pointed out that the movement plans to run in the elections on its own. At the same time, he did not rule out the possibility of entering into negotiations and forging blocs with other movements which advocate similar views.

However, Popov stressed that the "new bureaucratic regime" in the country is not interested in holding elections within the established period of time.

The participants in the meeting adopted a statement in which they pointed out the inadmissibility of changing the date of elections determined by the Constitution and expressed concern about the attempts to disrupt parliamentary and presidential elections in order to "let the incumbents remain in power."

The movement urged the federal assembly to pass a legislation to ensure that the elections are held in accordance with the constitutional norms.

The meeting also called on President Boris Yeltsin and the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, to reject the law increasing the term of military service that has been passed by the State Duma. The law also allows enlistment offices to recruit the graduates of higher educational establishments.

The law "means a rejection of the planned military reform and leads to further militarisation of the country," the statement said.

Gaydar Warns on Underestimating Communists

LD1704181495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1607 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 17 (Interfax)—Leader of the Democratic Choice of Russia party Yegor Gaydar believes that the democratic forces "must not underestimate the danger of the communists' coming to power."

He told Interfax on Monday [17 April] that during the election campaign in the autumn of 1993 he warned the public about "the communists possibly coming to power if the democrats do not unite."

"Many told me then that this was nonsense and that the communists will never come back. However, the results of elections showed that such optimism is overexaggerated," said Gaydar.

He noted at the same time that no one should panic. Today the democrats are better aware of the communist and fascist danger than in 1993 and "have stronger motives for joint action."

In his opinion, the federal movement Yabloko is the Democratic Choice of Russia's potential partner at least during the election campaign. He also said that his party would maintain contacts with the Democratic Russia federal party and with the farmers' association AKKOR which he described as a potential ally.

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Gaydar said that the Democratic Choice of Russia is ready to maintain dialogue with political organizations which can hardly be qualified as democratic but which advocate radical restructuring. He said he meant the Party of Russian Unity and Concord led by Sergey Shakhray and the Forward Russia movement, led by Boris Fedorov.

LDP Calls for Referendum on Union of 4 CIS States

LD1704152795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1246 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 17 (Interfax)—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party became the first political party to join the Four Plus All campaign for a referendum on an economic, political and defense union of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, a coordinator of the international campaign Aleksandr Zharnikov told Interfax Monday.

The Russian group, set up in December 1994, includes such prominent Russian politicians as Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Anatoliy Dolgolaptev, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Artur Chilingarov and President of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Arkadiy Volskiy.

The campaign has organizing committees in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Members of 65 political parties from CIS countries came out with the initiative. The Baltic states act as observers.

Russians Polled on Party Preferences

MM1704102195 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Oleg Savelyev, sociologist with the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion: "Party of My Interests"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the course of a poll of approximately 2,000 inhabitants of Russia conducted between 10 March and 3 April by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion with a representative sample of the adult population of the Federation, the following question was asked: "In your view, which of the parties and organizations listed below best reflects the interests of people like you?" (The respondents were given a list of the political associations cited below and their leaders).

The distribution of answers to this question (as a percentage) was as follows:

Agrarian Party of Russia (Lapshin)	2
Yavlinskiy Bloc	8
Russia's Democratic Bloc (Gaydar)	4
Democratic Party of Russia (Glazyev)	0.5
Communist Party of Russian Federation (Zyuganov)	9
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Zhirinovskiy's party)	7
Party of Russian Unity and Accord (Shakhray)	2
Economic Freedom Party (Borovoy)	2
"Women of Russia" political movement (Lakhova)	6
"Democratic Russia" movement (Starovoytova)	0.5
"Derzhava" party (Rutskoy)	2
People's Self-Government Party (Sv. Fedorov)	4
Beer Lovers Party (Kalachev)	2
Other	0.5
Don't know of such a party	10
No such party	15
Difficult to say	25 (approx)

Yeltsin Issues Instructions on Victory Day Ceremonies

LD1604123795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1205 GMT 16 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 16 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin has issued an instruction to hold a ceremonial meeting and a gala concert in the Grand Kremlin palace on May 8, this year, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War.

The text of the instruction, made available to ITAR-TASS on Sunday, points out that World War II and labour veterans, the leaders of official delegations of foreign countries, members of the Russian Federation's executive, judicial and legislative bodies, representatives from religious, public and other organisations, and the heads of diplomatic missions will be invited to attend the functions.

According to another presidential instruction, a ceremonial reception is to be held in the Kremlin Palace on May 9 on the occasion of the victory anniversary.

[Moscow ITAR-TASS in English at 1051 GMT on 16 April reports: "President Boris Yeltsin is to meet with heroes of the Soviet Union, the recipients of the order of glory of all the three classes and with military leaders of World War Two days in the St. George Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace on April 28, according to a presidential announcement which was made available to ITAR-TASS on Sunday."]

Yeltsin Issues Directives on Repressed Peoples

LD1704172595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1653 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 17 Apr ITAR-TASS—As reported today by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's press service, Yeltsin had sent to the Russian State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin his conclusions on the federal draft law "On the budget of the Russian

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Social Insurance Fund for 1995," as well as a letter, the text of which follows below:

"On the strength of clause "g" of Article 84 of the Russian Constitution I submit for consideration by the State Duma the draft of the federal law "On extending the transitional period for the implementation of the territorial rehabilitation of the peoples who suffered from repressions."

The law must be adopted because on 1 July 1995 the moratorium on Article 6 of the law on "the Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples" expires and because there are no relevant laws regulating questions relating to the territorial rehabilitation of the repressed peoples.

Grachev: Danger of Outbreak of Regional Conflicts

LD1804104695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0944 GMT 18 Apr 95

[By Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 18 (ITAR-TASS)—Today there is a danger of the outbreak of regional conflicts which could sparkle off the flame of a big war, Russia's Defence Minister Pavel Grachev said in the opening address to the international scientific conference "Lessons of World War Two and Significance of Victory Over Nazism" here today.

The heads of delegations from all the member-countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, scholars from 20 countries, and war veterans are taking part in the conference.

The defence minister said it was necessary to strengthen and develop political and military cooperation between states interested in maintaining stability in the world.

He said an instructive historical lesson was to be learned from the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Another WW II lesson was that a strong army is needed to repel aggression, an army capable of accomplishing a wide range of strategic tasks, Grachev said.

At present, Russia is in a position to scrutinise the events of the Second World War and the significance of the victory unimpeded by ideological blinkers, the Russian minister said.

TU Leader on 12 Apr Action, Continuing Campaign

MM1804093795 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 15 Apr 95 pp 1-2

[Report by V. Ukolov: "Trade Union Protest. Certain Results"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The trade unions will be going the whole hog in their struggle for workers' rights, Mikhail Shmakov, chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia [FITUR], stated yesterday at a press conference devoted to the results of the protest. He announced that around 10 million people had taken part in it—not only at rallies and in processions, but at workers' meetings. Some 2 million trade union members had taken to the streets and squares of Russian cities 12 April. The form the protest took was decided locally by the primary organizations themselves and their associations.

The biggest demonstrations were in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Omsk, Vladivostok, Saratov, and Kemerovo. People everywhere stated that the time had come for an end to patience. We need to change the course of reform, gearing it more to working people.

But there is no longer any hope that this will happen. That is why there have been loud calls for the government to resign and for early presidential elections.

Mikhail Shmakov stated that although the government had promised to start paying off its salary backlog, there is no reason to consider the problem solved. Only when people have the money in their pockets will the trade unions stop pressuring the Finance Ministry and other power structures.

We need a major program to combat unemployment aimed primarily not at handing out benefits but at creating new jobs.

Working People's Solidarity Day—1 May—lies ahead. The trade unions will, of course, use it to demonstrate their will to the authorities and their desire to uphold working people's legitimate interests to the bitter end.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Question. How will FITUR act to implement the mandate from the protest participants? And what about the Social Accord Treaty, which bears your signature? A number of sector trade unions have recently withdrawn their own signatures....

Answer. Eight member organizations have withdrawn their signatures from the Treaty, but there are 40 such organizations within FITUR. When the majority does likewise, we will carry out their decision. But it is true that this document is clearly obsolete and nobody takes it seriously any more.

As for political demands, we believe that problems need to be resolved constitutionally. The trade unions' active participation in the elections will make it possible to bring to power those forces which truly cherish the needs and aspirations of the people.

The press conference was also addressed by Sergey Shuklin, chairman of the Defense Industry Workers Trade Union Central Committee. He announced that the assurances from Russian Federation First Deputy Premier Anatoliy Chubays that "money has been sent" to enterprises are false. The situation in the sector is critical and is hardly likely to be remedied by this

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government. The defense workers intend to bring 2,000-3,000 representatives of their collectives to Moscow from all parts of the country to picket the White House.

'10 Million' Take Part in Union Protests

MM1804110095 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by Luiza Gladysheva: "All-Russia Protest Action: Was Yerin Counting Night Sticks?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Internal Affairs Minister Yerin claimed during a television interview that 450,000 people took part in the all-Russia protest action. However, according to trade union organizations at local level, over 10 million Russians opposed the regime's policy.

Wise guys serving the ruling regime spent eight hours "counting" the number of people who took part in the mass protests organized by the trade unions. Television and radio commentators aired the following figure right after the event: They said that a total of 1.5 million people unhappy with their lives turned out onto the streets of Russia on the ill-starred day, 12 April. They said this in such a tone as if to say that this is the very figure, they whose voice is thinner than a reed, as the revolutionary poet Vladimir Mayakovskiy wrote. Then, as if by command, they began understating these "figures," citing communiques from the heads of the presidential staff at local level. The upshot was the emergence of Mr. Yerin's statistical revelation!

They seemed to be scared of giving the real figure: Over 10 million participants in the pickets, rallies, processions, meetings, and conferences rejected the policy pursued by the bankrupts!

I was very interested in these machinations. I telephoned several cities in Russia and took an ordinary calculator and began pressing its buttons, performing basic arithmetical operations: Palace Square, St. Petersburg saw 100,000 people involved in a rally; Omsk—60,000 and 8,000 at rallies in two rayon centers; Kostroma Oblast—80,000; Yaroslavl—18,000 and 15,000 at a rally in Rybinsk, 200,000 in total in the oblast; 10,000 took part in a procession in Tver; 750,000 in meetings in Moscow Oblast's labor collectives; 350,000 people were involved in Saratov Oblast protest actions; and 45,000 in the Republic of Tyva. That is just seven of Russia's territories out of the 78 regions taking part in the trade unions' united collective action day. This is the first mass demonstration of its kind by working people in our "new free life." And hundreds and thousands of cables and resolutions voicing demands poured in from the localities.

Perhaps in citing the figure of 450,000 the interior minister did not mean the number of people taking part in the protests but the number of militia nightsticks issued to the custodians of order that day?! In that case the figure is probably right! Fortunately, nightsticks were not required anywhere. But any satirist could have found amusing tales for short humorous sketches had he so desired. For instance, the Vladimir Oblast Administration urgently changed the start of its workday 12 April from 0830 to 0730 hours in order to slip into the building before working people posted pickets on the entrance. The head of the Sakhalin island administration on the eve of the trade union protest action wrote his resignation and left the island.

Yet some people doubt that they are afraid of pickets and rallies. They are afraid and it is no coincidence that they are "getting confused" when counting the number of their fellow citizens protesting at the horrifying decline in their standard of living. The figure does after all run into millions; permit to add a few more things Today over 34 million of our compatriots are surviving on incomes that are considerably lower than the minimum subsistence level. The minimum wage is so negligible that it only provides 12 percent of the minimum subsistence level and has long since ceased to perform its constitutional function as a state social guarantee of human life. Eight in 10 workers at budget-funded enterprises and organizations are paid at rates which do not even reach the beggarly subsistence minimum. Add to that the mass unemployment which has already enveloped one-third of Russia's population along with the families of the unemployed. And wage arrears stand at 4.2 trillion rubles....

One typical feature of their work style "benefits" the people. Last fall there was a protest action 27 October and the government began talks with the trade unions on the evening of 26 October. The next action was scheduled for 12 April, and 11 April saw talks and the long-awaited cables to the localities saying that 30 percent of the payments into enterprise accounts must be reserved for the payment of wages. Amazingly the unpaid wages shortfall has been "found" in the budget once again and a schedule for the repayment of debts in various sectors of the national economy even outlined. Did you notice how proud Chubays was to announce this?

What needs to be done to put an end to this national disgrace and human misery once and for all? Are the 10 million people who took part in the protests 12 April not enough? One hundred million will rise up, all working Russia will rise up if that will make it possible to change the antipeople course of reform. One is bound to realize now that the ruling regime will not give up its privileges of power and will not voluntarily resign. We can rest "content": The overwhelming majority of our incompetent rulers in central organs and at local level have learned to assess the situation in splendid fashion, flirt with the people. and only understand the language of pressure and force. Well then, that is the language which must be used with them.

But, first, let us note what one trade union collective action has given the working people's movement for their flouted rights.

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Russia's trade unions are capable of leading the working people and are ready for more serious protest actions. The people have recovered from the shock of October 1993 and have put their faith in their own powerful forces of good and justice. But the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia and other trade unions cooperating with it have a tremendous responsibility.

The situation in Russia is special because economic demands are closely linked with political demands. It is obvious that the people born mainly after October 1917, who have built a socialist society and lived under socialism, albeit very imperfect, and who have tasted the fruits of "democracy" and "reform," will never surrender their former hard-won gains at any price. They have learned a great deal, they have seen the light, and they realize that it is not the resignation of the government and the president that will now decide their personal destiny, the destiny of their homeland and that of future generations, but the early elections of the authorities for which the Constitution makes provision in this situation and the election of new authorities—their own people's authorities. They embarked on the road to this difficult objective 12 April. They will celebrate 1 May—Workers Solidarity Day—on the same hard road and will not stop.

The arrival of spring is not only rousing nature, it is freeing from apathy and lethargy people who despaired of and lost faith in the possibility of a better life. Whereas last fall almost two months was spent preparing for the protest action, in April there was no need to explain the objectives and tasks of the impending action.

The Maritime Kray miners on hunger strike were immediately backed by other enterprises in the kray. The strike by teachers and the personnel of children's preschool establishments that began in Orsk encompassed the whole of Orenburg Oblast. Teachers and workers in Altay Kray's villages are striking.

I would not like to draw an analogy with the hallowed 50th anniversary of Victory and apply the sacred Great Patriotic War songs to today's events, but let us remember "We did what we could to bring this day near"—we too, the new generation of campaigners for a happy Russia and normal life, will do the same. Some 10 million people said that two days ago at the top of their voices.

Chernomyrdin Denies Charges of Vast Wealth

954F2074A Moscow Public Russian Television First Program Network in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Apr 95

[News report on the All-Russia Peasants Assembly by reporters Konstantin Tochilin and Vladimir Golovnya; first paragraph is introduction by unidentified announcer; name of reporter posing questions is unspecified]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Probably no less acute a situation has also developed in agriculture—so acute that the prime minister cut short the meeting with the government delegation of Mongolia and went to the All-Russia Peasants Assembly. We know that immediately after the opening, the delegates, not seeing Viktor Chernomyrdin among the guests, sent him a repeat invitation. In the event he refused, the assembly decided to put on the agenda the question of the All-Russia Peasants Assembly's stand toward the government, whose agrarian policy was described by the speakers as destructive, anti-peasant, and anti-popular. Our duty team arrived at the assembly at the same time as the prime minister.

[Reporter] Besides Viktor Chernomyrdin, Minister of Finance Vladimir Panskov and Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha also were present at the peasants assembly. The gist of delegates' speeches boiled down to a contention that only an enemy of humanity could invent the reform in general, and the agrarian reform in particular. And anyway, who said we did not live well before? Most of the assembly's ire was directed at Vladimir Panskov.

[Panskov] You may boo me. You may do that. But I have to talk about things only as they are. Take the tax on profit; take the value-added tax. Who is exempt? The people who produce agricultural output, at least 70 percent are exempt....

[Reporter] He was not allowed to finish. Of course, one can understand him too. What the minister of finance was saying was not undisputable, which, by the way, was acknowledged by Chernomyrdin himself. However, as proposals kept coming: to close the foreign currency exchange, to ban selling of land, and to reintroduce the state monopoly on foreign trade. The prime minister's mood seemed to be sinking. There was also a proposal to raise custom duties on imports of agricultural products. That many of our producers are simply uncompetitive nobody bothered to mention. The prime minister himself had to bring up this subject.

[Chernomyrdin] Today we need to do everything possible to hold on. If we hold on through the 1995, things will improve. They will improve. I am not promising you. I have never yet made any promises anywhere, and I have not said that we will live differently by the end of the year. It will be better. Yes, it will be difficult. It will be difficult. But we have to go through these difficulties. We will get through them, we will hold on, and we will win."

[Reporter] Actually, the peasants were interested not only in the government's agrarian program, but also in the ministers' personal side. Chernomyrdin was asked point blank: Is it true that he is the richest man in Russia?

[Chernomyrdin] Is it written somewhere on me [points to his forehead] that I am the richest, or what? I have never had any additional sources of income, do not have them now, and have no right to have them now. The

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Gazprom stock, which... here, it says right here [points at the note]: "What Gazprom shares do you own?" As chairman of the government and member of the government I do not have the right to own this stock. And I do not have it.

[Reporter] The prime minister left, while assembly participants stayed—to work on an appeal to the president.

Korzhakov Deputy Rogozin Profiled

954F2057A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 95 pp 4-5

[Article by Afanasiy Brynochka: "Kremlin Secrets. How 'Our Man' Became the Gray Cardinal. Unfortunately, We Did Not Manage To Find a Portrait of a Secret General..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] We continue to familiarize our readers with the main figures in the Presidential Security Service of the Russian Federation: Major General Georgiy Rogozin, Aleksandr Korzhakov's right-hand man.

He has always remained in the shadows. He never gives an interview and never appears on the TV screen. His name does not appear in the ratings of the country's leading politicians, and the majority of the population have nothing to say about him. But those who need to know do know; he inspires fear in many of them, and it is probably not without reason that he, Aleksandr Korzhakov's right-hand man, has the reputation of the gray cardinal of the powerful Security Service of the president of the Russian Federation. Enlisting various sources, we tried at least to lift the veil of secrecy from this person.

From the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA files. Rogozin, Georgiy Georgiyevich. To his friends—Zhora. 51 years old. Russian. Major General. First deputy chief of the Security Service of the president of the Russian Federation. Candidate of jurisprudence. Almost 30 years in state security organs and enjoys a considerable amount of respect in them.

Rogozin's biography is generally typical of any operative of state security organs. It is noteworthy that he ended up in the KGB without having any kind of influence—he served a term in the Army, where his senior comrades noticed him. He has the proper pedigree; nothing compromising was noted, he is loyal to the authorities: "Our Man." Having served his term, Georgiy received an invitation to enter the Higher KGB School. Again, during five years of training, nothing special was noted, and Rogozin graduated from the faculty for training military counterintelligence workers and was sent to serve in a special division of a military unit. Then came a second unit, a third, a fourth... remaining on the sidelines, the young special agent gained experience and then was returned to Moscow. He soon decided to continue his Cheka studies—he entered the graduate school of the Higher KGB School, where he received a scholarly degree. Then came a scientific research institute, with the unremarkable name "Prognosis," where Rogozin studied the development of problems of protecting state security and state secrets. After that he was transferred to work in the central apparatus of the KGB as leader of a division of one of the departments of the Second Main KGB Directorate, that is, counterintelligence (in spite of rumors going around the Kremlin, Rogozin never worked in the Fifth Main Directorate, which is devoted to combating ideological sabotage and persecuting dissidents and individuals with different ideas).

In this time interval, there is record of two mysterious disappearances of the counterintelligence worker from Moscow. Traces of him were revealed in the Far East and in the Maritime Kray KGB Directorate.

One of the individuals who worked in the directorate at that time says: "We were somewhat surprised by Rogozin's appearance among us: It was apparent to anyone that he was far from being an operator, he was a pure theoretician. This seemed fairly strange, since we do not place theoreticians in operations work; it is usually the other way around. And then it was as though he had fallen out of the sky. But, being a person of striking social and communications skills, Georgiy Georgiyevich very quickly fit into the collective, and soon we felt as though he had always been with us. He was polite to everyone and intelligent. At first he wore the general troop uniform and then a naval uniform, of a captain second rank.

"Although he headed up the information-analytical department, we never found out what he actually did. I remember only that he was especially close to the chief of the directorate, Lieutenant General Konstantin Grigoryev, and the two of them frequently locked themselves up together and talked about something. It sticks in my memory that he mainly worked on promoting computerization and creating a unified information system; he was a big expert in this work. That was something new for us at the time, and he literally had to drum this idea into all of us, working long and hard to convince us. Well, time proved him right. And the second of Rogozin's 'fixations' I remembered the psychotropic business, he was simply fascinated by them, and he was very interested in questions related to psychology and the human psyche. Because of these two aspects, some people considered him a little eccentric, a crank.

"The reason for his two sudden appearances in Vladivostok (and equally sudden disappearances) were still a mystery to us. Some said that he had been sent from the center to gather material for a candidate's dissertation, and others explained it by family problems, while he himself said that his mother lived here, that she was very seriously ill, and she needed help. All that appeared to be true; he lived with his son, very quietly and unnoticed, but I always had the feeling that there was something he was not telling us, that he was saying one thing and doing

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something else and thinking a third thing. But in general he was liked—both by his subordinates and his superiors, he was not a bad guy."

....The Second Directorate, where Rogozin worked, engaged in conducting so-called active measures—recruiting agents from foreign special services, conducting comprehensive measures for disinforming intelligence services of the potential enemy regarding questions that constitute state secrets (the activity of the military industry, the condition of the Army, etc.). One state security worker called this work "high Cheka pilotage." According to responses from his co-workers, Rogozin brought to this work the application of nontraditional methods for verification of sources of information, taking modern achievements of psychology into account. It was at this time that he developed an interest in extrasensory perception and other mysterious things, which he has retained to this day (information on the existence of the corresponding subdivisions in the Security Service of the President of the Russian Federation has appeared in the foreign press and in ours). It was then that it was learned that similar research was being conducted by special services of Western countries. Rogozin devoted special attention to questions related to lie detectors, the acquisition of information from people under hypnosis, attempts at hypnotic and parapsychological influence on the individual, investigation and consequences of this influence, and also the search for means of counteraction when it came to high state leaders.

As democratic changes developed in the country, State Security Colonel Rogozin began to make contacts with certain deputies, first of the Union and then of the Russian parliament. Because of his pleasant manner and ability to communicate, this was fairly easy for him. It is noteworthy that he supported reforming the KGB, first in private discussion and then openly calling his department a "monster," which was fairly atypical of a Committee worker in those times. He participated in the development of a number of legislative acts pertaining to security organs, and certain of his ideas were taken into account in them. After August 1991, Rogozin was invited to take a management position in the KGB by its new chairman, Vadim Bakatin, but for unknown reasons he declined.

While working in the Supreme Soviet as an expert on security questions, Rogozin got to know Aleksandr Korzhakov and other highly place officials close to the president. Soon after this, he received an offer to head up one of the departments in the Main Protection Directorate (the end of 1991-the beginning of 1992) which Rogozin did not refuse. And in the division of the Security Service of the president from the Main Protection Directorate Rogozin became Aleksandr Korzhakov's deputy and then first deputy in charge of operational activity and questions of special significance. (The actual protection work was turned over to the second deputy, Colonel Vladimir Abramov.) In 1993, he received the rank of major general.

Rogozin's office is now located on the third floor of the 14th building in the Kremlin, where leaders of the Ninth Directorate of the USSR KGB used to sit. People who come to see him notice the immense number of books both in his office and in the reception room, which for today's inhabitants of the Kremlin is very rare, the more so since they say that Rogozin looks at them frequently. One may find him at work on Saturday and Sunday, and late in the evening.

Sources say that one of the results of the activity of the Security Service general is the creation of a powerful information-analytical service, in which he has managed to gather together quite a few officers—the best minds from the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service], GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate], MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR], and also civilian specialists and scholars for whom, through Rogozin's efforts, extremely decent material conditions have been created.

In addition to everything else, this service prepares the corresponding materials for Boris Yeltsin, and his workers assert that, as distinct from other departments, which are frequently afraid to report reliable information to the president, Rogozin's structure tries to report information that is as reliable and correct as possible. It is worth noting that Rogozin, like, incidentally, Korzhakov as well, was in favor of resolving the Chechen question through political means and not hastening to apply force, but no attention was paid to their arguments.

After becoming a general, Rogozin maintained his emphatically modest way of life. He puts on a tunic with shoulder boards rather rarely and for the most part comes to work in civilian clothes, in order not to stand out. As distinct from many lower-level Kremlin bureaucrats, he does not drive a Mercedes but an ordinary black Volga with a number with two zeros. The general is indifferent to alcohol, although you would not call him a teetotaler. There have been cases when people have tried to "show their gratitude" to him with money and costly gifts, but the consequences of this have been pathetic. They say that the very word "bribe" has the effect on Rogozin that a red flag has on a bull. On his initiative the Presidential Security Service has conducted a scrupulous investigation of a number of reports about dishonest workers both in their own ranks and in the president's administration, and many of these reports have been confirmed. He has gotten rid of such people in his own ranks, and information on similar affairs in the administration has been reported to Boris Yeltsin. But because of the protection of Sergey Filatov, who accused the leaders of the Presidential Security Service of provocation and fact-juggling, far from all were punished and a number of bureaucrats from Rogozin's "black list" are still in their positions. Because of these and certain other circumstances, Korzhakov and Rogozin's relations with the chief of the president's administration are, to put it mildly, strained. The same thing can be said about

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relations with a number of former workers of the Fifth KGB Directorate, who are now working in the structures of Vladimir Gusinskiy: One can clearly see no friendship among former colleagues.

Today Rogozin has extremely extensive contacts in political and business circles of Russia, and the range of his communications is fairly broad—from businessmen and the military to scholars and artists. And he himself, incidentally, has an artistic nature—his soft voice can change in a flash to metallic notes. It is no accident that many highly placed bureaucrats fear him, thinking, and possibly not without justification, that he is "working" on them. But sources in the Security Service of the president of the Russian Federation assert that their boss reports "to the higher-ups" only strictly verified information, the appearance of which, unfortunately for the Presidential Security Service, certainly does not always mean that the proper conclusions will follow immediately—in this sense the degree of Rogozin's influence, as distinct from that of Korzhakov, is somewhat exaggerated. He is not invited to meetings of the Security Council, and he is not someone with access to the president, although his workers are convinced that "B.N. is aware of their boss's ideas."

Today Rogozin is one of the organizers of the opposition to the creation of a Federal Security Service, on which a law was originated in the State Duma by a group of deputies led by the Communist Ilyukhin, but so far it has not been signed by the president. According to certain information, in conjunction with Korzhakov and Barsukov, Rogozin is doing everything possible if not to bury the law, at least to postpone its signing for as long as possible and to make corrections to it. He himself explains this by his desire not to allow the rebirth of a new KGB—a monster that is not under the control of the law or the public, that is capable of quickly becoming an uncontrollable self-sufficient structure. But his opponents assert that the generals from the Presidential Security Service and the Main Protection Directorate are afraid of the appearance of a Federal Security Service because it will make the existence of the structure they head simply unnecessary.

President Yeltsin Signs Law Regulating Energy Prices

LD1504180595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1805 GMT 15 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 15 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the federal law "On state regulation of tariffs on electric and thermal power in the Russian Federation," the Presidential Press Service said on saturday.

The law was adopted by the State Duma on March 10, 1995.

Military Issues

Navy Commander Arrives in Kaliningrad

LD1704224495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1956 GMT 17 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Biryukov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kaliningrad, 17 Apr—Feliks Gromov, commander in chief of the Russian Navy, sees no link between NATO expansion plans and the increasingly frequent trips to Kaliningrad by top leaders of the Russian Defense Ministry and Navy. He said he arrived here today "to conduct the planned inspection of the Baltic Fleet's combat readiness." During the week command and staff exercises will be held here, warships will take part in sea exercises, and firing training will be done. "Of course, we are worried by the plans for Russia's closes neighbors to be included in NATO; however, this will not affect the planned process of reducing the numerical strength of the Baltic Fleet's forces," the naval commander in chief said. "It will go ahead until the defense sufficiency limits are attained, although not at the high speed as that after Russian troops were pulled out of the Baltic countries."

Arzamas-16 Research Center Dismantling Nuclear Ammunition

LD1504162595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0444 GMT 15 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Arzamas-16, 15 April—There is practically no assembling of new nuclear ammunition at Arzamas-16. On the contrary, there is much dismantling of outdated "items" and of those being withdrawn from military use in accordance with Russia's international agreements, Yuriy Zavalishin, director of the "Avant-garde" electromechanical plant [part of Arzamas-16] told an ITAR-TASS correspondent. [passage omitted]

The process for dismantling is even more complicated than that for assembling. Zavalishin said that the dismantling of one piece of ammunition took on average several days. First, the nuclear charge is removed from the bomb or warhead, then the explosive is separated from the fissionable material, the uranium or plutonium, which are sent in special containers to the producer factories at Chelyabinsk-65, Krasnoyarsk-26, and Tomsk-7 for storage. The uranium and plutonium left from the dismantling process may in the future be used as fuel in nuclear power stations. [passage omitted]

Zavalishin said that everything is going "to plan" at "Avant-garde," despite the multi-billion debt [currency not given] owed by the Defense Ministry for work carried out. New personnel are continually being trained at the plant and there is even a line of people wanting to

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work there. But a very rigorous selection process is applied, and not everyone gets in. [passage omitted]

Federal Assembly

'Abridged Transcript' of Tsekhov Duma Speech

MM1804093395 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Apr 95 pp 1, 3

["Slightly abridged transcript" of 14 April speech by S. Tsekhov, chairman of the Republic of Crimea Supreme Council, in the Russian State Duma: "Disrespect to Crimea Is Disrespect to Russia"—first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's State Duma session effectively began with a speech by S. Tsekhov, chairman of the Republic of Crimea Supreme Council, the majority of parliamentarians, including communist deputies, having urged that he be given the floor. We publish a slightly abridged transcript.

As an ordinary person unencumbered by any posts I want to shout from the rooftops about the injustice being committed in Crimea, to talk about the perfidy and the unprincipled and unscrupulous behavior, and to curse those who are permitting this in the roundest terms.

But, as chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council, I must at all times, however hard it may be for me, restrain myself and remember one thing: Do not harm Crimea. Crimea, which is attached heart and soul to Russia. Crimea, which constantly keeps this desire in check, for fear of causing a quarrel between Ukraine and Russia, and which is expecting the proclaimed rapprochement between the two fraternal peoples to happen any time now.

Instead of this there is an attack on the republic's minimal rights and virtually zero protection from the world community. And, sad to say, from the quarter from which we were all the time expecting help, from Russia.

"As of today you are on your own"—Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma stated, talking about this in the context that the Russian Federation will not protect us....

The Crimean problem has many aspects. It is closely linked to the problems of Sevastopol, the Black Sea Fleet, and Russian-Ukrainian mutual relations, which have changed at various stages of the establishment of Ukrainian independence. As Ukraine's statehood has become stronger, Ukraine's position on all the problems mentioned has become increasingly tough and its position on Crimea has hardened.

It is not irrelevant to recall that the republic which was abolished in 1945 was restored on the basis of the results of a Crimea-wide referendum, held 20 January 1991, in which 81.3 percent of Crimeans took part, of whom 93 percent (three-fourths of those entitled to vote) answered affirmatively when asked "Are you in favor of the recreation of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a USSR component and a party to the Union Treaty?" The need to restore the republic was also supported by the former Ukrainian leadership. When he was in Crimea three months before the referendum was held Leonid Kravchuk stated: "Of course there will be a republic!" He argued that there was not even a need to hold a referendum for this. Fortunately we did not agree with that.

The referendum results were also recognized by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, which on 12 February 1991 adopted the law "On the Restoration of the Republic" without any provisos regarding the essence of the question raised. But at that time Ukraine was not an independent state and was making compromises with Crimea, realizing that the disintegration process gathering momentum in the Union would not only lead to Ukraine's independence but could also lead to Crimea's secession from Ukraine. Bearing in mind that the vast majority of Crimeans, despite the ill-starred year of 1954, always felt themselves to be first and foremost part of the USSR, above all of Russia, and only then of Ukraine.

Four years have passed since then—four years of unrealized hopes, empty promises, and constant deceit. Deceit by Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean politicians. As Ukraine's independence became stronger, the attack on the level of Crimean statehood reached in the first half of 1992 intensified. The level recognized and enshrined by Ukraine in a number of laws and the constitution.

The attack on the republic effectively began in the second half of 1992 but it has constantly intensified since May 1994, when pro- Russian forces came to power in Crimea: the republic president and the Supreme Council. This was helped by the completely limp position of the Russian Federation, primarily the executive branch. For the sake of what is to this day a doubtful strategic partnership between Russia and Ukraine and against the background of constant declarations of friendship and cooperation between the two fraternal peoples, Crimea, including, of course, Sevastopol, was effectively thrown to the wolves.

For the sake of objectivity it must be acknowledged that the current Crimean leadership has also made a considerable number of mistakes in its work. The main reason is lack of experience. But if we are talking about the Crimean Supreme Council, it has genuinely tried to implement the program on which deputies ran. In doing so it believed that both Ukrainian President Kuchma and the newly elected Ukrainian Supreme Council would also fulfill their preelection promises. And there were many of them which were extremely agreeable to Crimeans. For example, it was promised that Russian would be the second state language in Ukraine, that relations with Crimea would be treaty-based....

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They believed this, and 90 percent of Crimeans voted for the current Ukrainian president. That is a very high indicator for Ukraine. It seems surprising now, but even deputies from the "Russia" faction in the Crimean Supreme Council urged Crimeans to vote for Ukrainian presidential candidate Kuchma.

Thus the erosion of Crimea's powers, hardly conceivable in 1992, has been on the increase since May 1994. Accompanied by Russia's constant statements that Crimea is Ukraine's internal affair....

The Ukrainian Supreme Council's 17 March decision, unprecedented in terms of the adoption procedure and its content, and then the Ukrainian president's 31 March edict have now brought Crimea down not even to the level of an oblast but much lower—the Ukrainian president's rule has effectively been introduced in Crimea.

Judge for yourselves: The republic constitution has been abolished as well as two Ukrainian laws—the law "On the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" and the law "On the Demarcation of Powers Between the Organs of State Power of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea".... The Crimean Supreme Council does not now have the right to adopt autonomously a constitution or corrections, amendments, and additions to it, everything must be approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Council. The law "On the Republic of Crimea President" and the law "On the Election of the President" have been repealed as not conforming to the legislation or constitution of Ukraine. Nevertheless, there were no objections either during the presidential election or during the adoption of these laws....

The republic has been stripped of the right to own land and natural resources, it has been territorially dismembered. Sevastopol has been separated from Crimea, the state status of the Russian and Crimean Tatar languages has been abolished, now there is only one state language—Ukrainian....

Citizenship of the Republic of Crimea has been excluded—previously it was recognized. The Crimean Government has been transferred to the control of the central organs of the Ukrainian executive branch.

The government members in whom the Crimean Supreme Council entirely objectively expressed no confidence on 22 March have been reinstated.

Even the actual name of our republic—the Republic of Crimea—elicits marked nonacceptance in Kiev, although the name was recognized too....

Having eliminated the republic's self-government, the Ukrainian leadership has barred access by representatives of the Russian and Russian-speaking community to the Crimean parliament and to television and radio.

A situation whereby the Crimean Supreme Council chairman cannot appear freely on Crimean television and radio (they too are directly subordinate to Crimea) indicates the violation of elementary human rights. Broadcasts of the Crimean Supreme Council session have been banned to prevent the Crimean public from finding out about the events that are taking place. In order to justify Kiev's actions the Ukrainian mass media have carried a claim regarding the Crimean leadership's inability to get on top of the situation in the republic. This is just another lie. Furthermore, the level of the republic's statehood cannot depend on how bad or good the leadership of Crimea is, just as Ukraine's statehood cannot depend on bad or good leadership.

The dismissal of officials from state posts according to the principle of ethnic origin is becoming the rule. On the eve of 17 March 1995 there was a virtual purge of the Crimean police. The vast majority of "unreliable" representatives of Russian nationality were dismissed.

We now have two options. One is to hold out until the end, hoping for help from the world community. The second is to fall to our knees and suffer all the excesses being committed against Crimea.

I have no right, esteemed deputies, to give recommendations as to how Crimea can really be helped and at the same time observe the norms of international law. Russia has everything needed to do this, which we do not: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for CIS Affairs, law academies and institutes, information analysis centers. If only there was a real desire to help and at the same time to know that Crimea has not given grounds for the adoption of such harsh decisions against the republic.

There are no illegal armed formations in Crimea, we have not formed our own police force or security service. Finally, the Crimean leadership did not adopt a decision to secede from Ukraine, although such disinformation was shamelessly circulated among Ukrainian Supreme Council deputies on the eve of the adoption of decisions 17 March.

The root of these illegal decisions goes much deeper. Maybe it began back with the proposal which Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz made to Crimean Supreme Council deputies in June 1994—the proposal to abolish the republic and become a Ukrainian oblast. From the viewpoint of history, national composition, and international law the Crimean situation cannot be for Russia only Ukraine's internal affair.

It must be remembered that 65 percent of Crimean inhabitants are Russian and around 85 percent consider the Russian language and culture to be their own. Because of this the disrespect shown to Crimea is, in my view, above all disrespect to Russia.

When in 1954 Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR to mark the 300th anniversary of the reunification of two fraternal peoples, nobody could have imagined that 40 years later Crimeans would be cut off from their homeland—Russia.

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Report on Tsekov News Conference

MM1804113495 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Nikolay Musiyenko: "Sergey Tsekov: 'Crimea No Longer Has Anything To Lose'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A press conference held by the chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council in the Russian Federation State Duma began with a tragic piece of news: Vladimir Ivanov, chief editor of the city newspaper SLAVA SEVASTOPOLYA, has been seriously wounded in Sevastopol. A remote-controlled bomb hidden in a trash can exploded as he was leaving his house in the morning to go to work. The journalist is in hospital, and both of his legs have been amputated; his condition remains critical. Staffers of the newspaper believe that the reason for the attempt was a series of items on the corruption of local officials, the squandering of the property of the Black Sea Fleet, illegal operations involving the purchase and sale of apartments, the privatization of land, and the construction of private dachas in a unique corner of the Crimean natural world—the Baydarskaya Valley.

If you recall that another journalist has already been killed in Sevastopol—Captain First Rank Andrey Lazebnikov, chief of the Black Sea Fleet press center, and that a whole wave of reprisals against eminent politicians has recently swept over Crimea, you can easily agree with the opinion of K. Zatulin, chairman of the Duma Committee for CIS Matters, who said that Tsekov's arrival in Moscow despite all the threats made by Kiev and his speeches at the Duma plenary sitting and the briefing are actions which required great personal courage.

From what the head of the Crimean parliament said, the leadership of the autonomous formation has always tried to find compromises in mutual relations with Ukraine. The relevant proposals are being made even now. Sergey Tsekov interrupted his visit to Moscow to visit the Ukrainian capital together with State Duma Vice Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev in order to inform the Kiev authorities of these proposals. However, the compromise was rejected there once again, and the discussion with Ukrainian representatives basically boiled down to persuading Tsekov not to address the State Duma. "Obviously I did not agree to this, as I have had an official invitation from the Duma, and my address is perfectly normal from the point of view of international law," he stated. "And if after this Ukraine takes any action in respect of the Crimean Supreme Council, this will confirm once again that it has embarked on the path of complete lawlessness in respect of Crimea. And in theory, Crimea no longer has anything to lose except perhaps the Supreme Council. Essentially, direct rule by the Ukrainian president has already been established here. But Crimea has not provided any reason for such decisions: We have no illegal armed formations, we have always asked our fellow citizens to observe law and order..."

Crimea's problems cannot just be Ukraine's internal matter, since human rights that come within the sphere of regulation by international law are being violated here, S. Tsekov believes. Until the present, he said, we have tried to cope with these problems by ourselves, but we have now realized that we will not get anywhere without Russia's help. Various ways in which Russia can give support to Crimea have been discussed during meetings with Russian officials, Tsekov reported, but it is still too early to talk about this in specific terms.

Kiev's latest decisions on Crimea are directly impacting on the state of interethnic relations on the peninsula, S. Tsekov noted. A "purge" was carried out in the Crimean militia before 17 March—and mainly Russians were dismissed. The picture in the organs of executive power is the same. Furthermore, from now on there is only one state language—Ukrainian—in Russian-speaking Crimea. Or another alarming fact: In the past four years, the numerical strength of Ukrainian military subunits in Crimea has increased from 2,000 to 68,000 men.

Despite the complexity of the situation, S. Tsekov is not losing optimism, as he said, because he knows that the majority of Russian citizens "support the Crimeans." And this means that the Russian Federation leadership cannot fail to react to these moods or turn a blind eye to the mass violations of human rights in Crimea.

Rybkin Creates Duma Advisory National Security Council

MK1504142295 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 3

[Unattributed report in the "Facts" column: "An Expert-Consultative Council on Security Has Been Created"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Analysis and appraisal of proposals on problems of Russia's national security in the interests of the State Duma's law-making activity." This is how the main task of the expert-consultative security council of the lower house's analysis center has been defined. It was created yesterday on Ivan Rybkin's directive.

Federation Council Chairman Abdulatipov Interviewed

LD1704224295

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1800 GMT on 17 April, on the "Moment of Truth" program, carries a 50-minute interview of Ramazan Abdulatipov, deputy chairman of the Federation Council, by Correspondent Andrey Karaulov. A caption indicates the program was filmed in Moscow on 11 April 1995.

Karaulov first asks Abdulatipov whether his telephone is bugged. Abdulatipov says: "I think I am being bugged, and I have been bugged for a long time." He adds that he has come across it on more than one occasion. "Lately,

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in connection with my becoming more active and in connection with the events in the Chechen Republic, it is not just me who is being bugged. I wanted to phone Sergey Vladimirovich Stepashin today. Even my friends in Moscow Region are being asked about my connections. It may be done without him knowing. I don't know who does it."

Karaulov then raises the question of Usman Imayev, the Chechen procurator general and justice minister, who is part of Dudayev's circle and who was released by Stepashin and allowed to meet Chernomyrdin, and of fraudulent visas, weapons, and drug operations. Karaulov claims that Russian leaders were behind all these, and that military operations against Chechnya were also needed to eliminate the evidence. Abdulatipov says: "Recently, I have visited mountainous regions, and an old man asked me how Dudayev manages to survive for so long. I told him that he sells oil. The person, who lives very far away, asked how Dudayev can sell oil if he is in the center of Russia. It is true that I wrote on more than one occasion that it is not a question of the Chechens or of Chechnya—it is a question of a Russian official standing by every telegraph pole and selling Russia's interests and Russia itself. How could he transfer over 10 million tonnes of oil from Tyumen to oil refineries, and no-one deal with it, though, I stress, numerous questions were posed to the government. It is clear that without the support and relevant licences and quotas from Russian government officials, Dudayev could not have been engaged in this business for such a long time."

Abdulatipov mentions that Dudayev has also succeeded in obtaining over 200 planes and over 100 armored vehicles weapons for his troops.

On the question of the war spreading to Dagestan, Abdulatipov says: "There is a great deal of truth in these words." He recalls that in December, he tried to organize interparliamentary talks, but at a sitting of the Security Council he was accused of trying to hold separatist talks. Abdulatipov says that in reality, "not just Abdulatipov's powers, but the powers of parliament have been reduced to zero." He goes on to describe the present parliament as "a parliament incapable of doing work."

Abdulatipov stresses that the people who are now complaining about parliament's lack of activity are the ones who wrote the Constitution currently in force. "They wrote this Constitution for a specific person, for the president, rendering a disservice to the president himself. I feel sorry for this person today. How could one place so much responsibility on him alone? Even for this war in Chechnya, the parliament has no opportunity to share responsibility with the president. Naturally, the Constitution was written by the people who wanted to harm first of all the president."

He goes on to explain that he did everything he could within the framework of the present Constitution: "I have already submitted several amendments to this Constitution." He complains that today, there is no mechanism to amend the Constitution.

On the question of a possible outcome of the forthcoming presidential elections, if they take place, Abdulatipov says: "I think that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin will win the presidential elections." He then explains that instead of the so-called middle class, a criminal corrupted bourgeoisie has emerged which is not interested in any change in the situation. He agrees with Karaulov's description of the president as a weak man. Later, he explains why Yeltsin may head the country again: "I am saying this because I proceed from the mass consciousness and not from my or someone else's wish."

Concluding the interview, Abdulatipov questions the role Russian soldiers are playing on the Tajik-Afghan border and why Russian troops are deployed outside Russia without the Federation Council's permission.

Govorukhin Replaces Glazyev as Leader of Democratic Party

LD1804093295 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 0800 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy and film director Stanislav Govorukhin has been elected the new leader of the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR] faction at a meeting in the State Duma.

[Unidentified correspondent] The old chairman, Sergey Glazyev, was released from his post also by a decision of the faction. DPR members in the State Duma are not making a link between the reshuffle and political intrigues. In their opinion, the current situation is such that more attention should be paid to economic policy. Therefore Stanislav Govorukhin will become the sole political leader of the DPR while Sergey Glazyev concentrates on the economy.

Apart from a new leader, the DPR faction in the State Duma has gained two new members: Konstantin Zatulin, earlier expelled from the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, and Stepan Sulakshin, who left Russia's Choice. Thus the total strength of the faction is now ten. Ivan Treskunov, Moscow Echo, the State Duma.

Duma Committees Reject Chubays as Member of Financial Body

LD1404200195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1815 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 14 (INTERFAX)—The State Duma's budget and international affairs committees held a joint meeting Thursday [13 April] to consider the government proposal to appoint First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays, Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov and Economics Minister Yevgeniy Yasin as new members of the Russian managing director's councils of international financial institutions.

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The new appointments were necessitated by the recall of Russia's previous representatives, former Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin and Central Bank Chairman Viktor Geraschenko.

The budget committee press service said it supported all the three candidates proposed by the government. At the same time, the International Affairs Committee approved only Panskov and Yasin in this capacity, rejecting Chubays as such.

The chairman of the Budget Committee, Mikhail Zadornov of the Yabloko faction, said the rejection "was caused by the intention of a number of LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] and Communist deputies to give the discussion of this, basically procedural issue an unnecessary and somewhat personal touch."

According to Zadornov, the government can formally appoint Panskov and Yasin basing on the two committees' decision, while "ultimate clarity on Chubays's candidacy will be brought about after Federation Council profile committees consider the issue."

Factors in Senate Rejection of Duma Election Law Viewed

MM1404154495 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 14 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by Lyubov Tsukanova under "Position" rubric: "Party of the Regions Wants To Control Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By rejecting the law on elections of State Duma deputies adopted by the Federal Assembly's lower chamber, the Federation Council has fully justified the expectations of that section of the political elite which has at the very least a skeptical attitude toward the tradition developing in Russia of forming the legislative branch on the basis of party representation. Regional leaders' traditional dislike of party leaders has played its part. But gain still prevails as the basis of shrewd people's decisions. So what is the gain to the "party of the regions" when it proposes that the representation of parties in the Duma be reduced to 150 seats or that absolutely everybody be elected via majority districts?

The words "gain" and "advantage" are not, of course, heard. What are heard are entirely respectable arguments. Senators say that 250 votes for parties in the Duma is too many because "the party structuralization of society has not taken place," parties are weak, and they do not represent anybody on a broad scale. At first glance the argument is very strong. Parties are indeed weak. But if we are thinking of strengthening them (not as an end in itself but to clearly structuralize society and to unite the interests of large groups of the population), then it must be the other way around—at the very least there should be no reduction of their opportunities to participate in elections, which test party associations' true weight and the their programs' compatibility with public interests. After all, we cannot fail to recognize that it is party representation in the Duma that has strengthened the parties which have gotten into parliament. That is the case whether we like it or not. Therefore it turns out that people are counting on something entirely different: By limiting the number of seats for parties in the lower chamber and by increasing their Duma "entry threshold" (this proposal has also been floated), they are counting on reducing the potential for party influence in the legislative organ and making deputies more dependent—not on party discipline but on the influence of the regions where they were elected in majority districts. It is known that majority elections are more manageable and that they give local bosses more potential to support "useful" candidates.

The proposal by a number of deputies that the election campaign should be entirely financed from the budget is aimed at strengthening local authorities' influence on the outcome of elections. We will not talk about the viability of this option because once again people are counting on something else: reducing the potential for parties in election campaigning and for the party support of majority candidates, and cutting off financial and industrial structures from representation in parliament (precisely because they are /structures/ with their own clearly defined interests). Finally, people are counting on gaining a wonderful opportunity to influence the outcome of elections /financially/. Because there is always too little state money and there is not enough for everybody, advantages in the election struggle can be gained by the parties and candidates who are kinder to the people who are allocating the money.

Deputy Stroyev very accurately expressed the ruling regional elite's interests in the upcoming elections in his joke, relayed [ozvuchennaya] by Vladimir Shumeyko: He said that the ratio in the Duma could be left at "50:50" but only two parties—the party of power and the party of the regions—should be allowed to enter elections. A successful joke, it must be acknowledged, because there is a large grain of truth in it.

Duma Approves Amendment to Faith Law Banning Some Sects

LD1404193795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1526 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 14 (INTERFAX)—The Russian State Duma (lower house) on Friday passed an amendment to the freedom of faith law to ban the creation or activities by religious sects posing threat to national security and public order or inflicting physical or moral damage to their members or forcing them to perpetrate crimes.

The amendment was approved in its first reading by a vote of 264 for and two abstentions.

The measure follows numerous pleas to the Duma that criminal proceedings in Moscow against members of the Japanese Aum Shinri Kyo sect operating throughout

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Russia are blocked because of a lack of legislation, Vitaliy Savitskiy of the Duma commission for public and religious groups said.

The second reading of the bill is expected in May.

Confusion Over Status of Military Bill in Senate Explained

MM1704092395 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 15 Apr 95 Saturday Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Will Soldiers Serve Two Years?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The generals are unanimously in favor of this idea [reference to headline]. What about deputies? Here things start getting interesting. Issue No. 68 of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI published the article "Generals and Deputies Trying To Strengthen Army Without Military Reform," which stated that the Federation Council had approved a new federal law (changes and additions to the law "On the Military Draft and Military Service") adopted by State Duma deputies adding an extra six months of Army life to every draftee. The author obtained information on this from the Federation Council Press Center. But when the article was published it was followed by an immediate denial...from the same press center. What is going on?

The fact is that the Federation Council Committee for Security and Defense Issues is entitled, when approving certain laws passed by the State Duma, to send them for signing by the Russian Federation president without their having been put to the full chamber. This is what happened with this law. But after a "revolt" by a number of factions the Federation Council was forced to return to its examination of the "subject of the Army." Well, these days it is hard to pass decisions that are doomed to failure beforehand. Perhaps it was no accident that the Federation Council suddenly lacked a quorum on the evening of 13 April. The "Army nut" is a tough one to crack....

Victory Day Anniversary Amnesty To Free 300,000

LD1704115795 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] About 300,000 people are to be freed during the amnesty being granted in connection with the 50th anniversary of Victory Day, Viktor Mironov, deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee for Security, told INTERFAX. He said this amnesty will be one of the biggest and that the draft resolution on it has already been prepared in the Duma. The amnesty is supported by the Russian president.

Duma Passes Law on Pensions for War Veterans, Widows

LD1404135295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1322 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 14 TASS— The federal law "on higher pensions for veterans of the great patriotic war and widows of servicemen killed during the great patriotic war" was passed by the State Duma as a whole on Friday [14 April].

Under the law, participants in the great patriotic war receiving pensions in accordance with the law "on state pensions in the Russian Federation" will receive a bonus. The bonus for those who reached the age of 80 or are severely or moderately handicapped by an illness will amount to two minimum old-age pensions. Other participants in the great patriotic war will be receiving a bonus of one minimum old-age pension.

Widows of servicemen fallen in the great patriotic war who did not remarry now have a right simultaneously to different pensions in accordance with the law "on state pensions in the Russian Federation". They will now be drawing two pensions, one of which will be the pension for the loss of the breadwinner, the deceased husband.

People disable at war will continue to draw two pension.

Regional Affairs

Communists Campaign Before Half a Million in Far East

MK1304114395 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 13 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Oleg Kryuchek under the "Agitation" rubric: "Trade Union Meetings in Far East Turn Into Communist Election Action"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minutes after the trade union leaders made their introductory remarks, the meetings held on central squares of all cities in the Far East on 12 April in the framework of the all-Russia trade union protest action turned into communist rallies with the slogans "Prosecute the government and the president, power to the Communist Party!" The trade union chiefs in Khabarovsk, who were desperately urging those gathered not to turn the event with its economic demands into an anti-government and anti-president meeting, had to leave the platform and dissociate themselves from what was happening. After that, everything happened in accordance with a ten-year-old scenario: The communists who took over the microphones reminded the people under the red banners about the USSR's disintegration, the shootout at the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and Boris Yeltsin's pledge to lie down on the rails, following which all were asked to vote only for the Communist Party and its representatives in the coming elections. All in all, according to a rough estimate, the meetings were attended by nearly half a million Far Easterners and, local newspapers write, it is unlikely that any of the democrats can rally as many people to their banners.

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Government To Destroy Chemical Weapons in Udmurtia

LD1704190395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1659 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] IZHEVSK, April 17 (Interfax-Eurasia)—The Russian government has decided to destroy stocks of lewisite, a vesicant chemical warfare agent, stored in the Kambarka District, Udmurtia, a republic incorporated in Russia, Izhevsk newspapers reported Monday [17 April].

The 15.5 billion program covers the period until the year 2000. Before lewisite can be destroyed, the engineering and social infrastructure has to be built. The program will be financed by the Defense Industry.

Sources told Interfax that the technology to be used to destroy the lewisite has not been defined.

The Udmurtian government is drafting amendments to federal bills on destruction of chemical weapons. The amendments will provide for social protection measures for people engaged in the destruction of chemical weapons and for the population in the vicinity of installations where the agent is stored and will be destroyed.

Reportage, Commentary on Situation in Chechnya

Deputy Commander on Russian Troop Losses

LD1604125795 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 16 Apr 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Stanislav Kovun, deputy commander of the Russian interior troops, who arrived in Syktyvkar from Chechnya on a inspection visit of an interior troops' division stationed in Syktyvkar, held a news conference on 14 April.

According to him, the war in Chechnya has taken the lives of 128 soldiers and officers of the interior troops, and 608 have been wounded there. Federal forces have lost 1,320 killed and 215 are missing in action. The deputy commander refrained from assessing the character of the Russian armed forces' actions in the area of the village of Samashki, and said only that it was a special fortified area of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Replying to a "Vesti" question about how long the war in Chechnya will continue, Stanislav Kovun said:

[Begin Kovun recording] Our opinion, our prediction, is that with the fall of Bamut there will be no more large scale military operations. This can be said unequivocally since the borders are well protected. It is almost impossible to move heavy weapons over the border [into Chechnya]. [end recording]

OSCE's Gyarmati Hopes For Chechnya Elections

MK1804110095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Apr 95 p 1, 2

[Interview with Istvan Gyarmati, head of the OSCE mission, by Dmitriy Gornostayev, "after the diplomat had returned from his trip to Chechnya," place not given, under the "At First Hand" rubric: "The Russian Army Is Advancing Deeper Into Chechnya. Peaceful Settlement Is Impossible as Long as the Population Perceives Federal Troops as Alien"—first paragraph is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Gornostayev] You have been to Chechnya several times before. How do you estimate the readiness of the sides for a political dialogue at present?

[Gyarmati] I think that as long as military operations are as active as they are now, any negotiations will hardly be successful. Some dialogue—not only with Dudayev's representatives, but also with other Chechen groups—is already under way. This is very important: One should not forget that there are many more than just two conflicting sides to this crisis. This dialogue, however, could hardly be termed as negotiations. It would be equally hard to persuade people that, after the war ends, they will have to live peacefully side by side with those who have bombarded their villages. This aspect further complicates the process of reconciliation. I think that after military actions stop, some time will have to be allowed for additional negotiations until people—not forgetting about what has happened—could, nevertheless, settle their problems peacefully, being aware of the fact that they will have to live together anyway. Then, political decisions will have to be sought in order to restore democratic institutions in Chechnya. Finally, we shall try to create the conditions for holding free elections, after which a legitimate Chechen government and parliament would be able to come to an agreement with the federal authorities.

[Gornostayev] Can you suggest any definite, or at least tentative, date which, in your opinion, could be appropriate for holding the election in Chechnya?

[Gyarmati] Such a date does exist, and I hope it will not change. This is the date of the federal election. Before that, conditions must be created for Chechen citizens to participate in it. My logic is as follows: If the situation permits the federal election to be held, it will be possible to hold the local one, too. We would like very much that on 12 December, an election could take place in Chechnya as well.

[Gornostayev] There are contradictory reports now about casualties in Chechnya. What is your information in this respect?

[Gyarmati] There is no reliable information: All figures being given are not very credible. I am confident, however, that the final figure for casualties will be much greater than we think it is now—because the methods that the federal troops are currently using certainly lead to heavy casualties. In Groznyy alone, the death toll among the peaceful population amounts to thousands—not hundreds—of people. Paradoxically, to my mind, the majority of them are Russians. [passage omitted]

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[Gornostayev] After your last trip to Groznyy, your judgment about the activities of local authorities was not very favorable. How do you assess them now?

[Gyarmati] My impression is more favorable at present. When I was there three weeks ago, it seemed that they were just starting to fulfill their functions. Now, restoration of the city is already under way. Of course, the first step is just to clean up the ruins. The city looks much more alive than three weeks ago: There are more people in the streets; food markets are open. To my mind, there have been some positive shifts in this respect. [passage omitted]

[Gornostayev] What is your prognosis as to the prospects of ceasing the military operation in Chechnya?

[Gyarmati] I think that large-scale operations will stop soon. But I am sure that, in this war, it is impossible to win using purely military means. And the longer military actions continue, the less chance of winning there would be, and the greater part of the population would be hostile to those who are waging war against it. It is impossible to make war on a nation. A nation can be exterminated, but I am sure that, among the Russian leadership, there are no people who want this.

Certainly, the army will declare its victory and the settlement of all the problems by it. It is clear to everybody, however, that the end of this large-scale operation will not mean the end of the war. It is necessary not only to stop the war, but also to settle the situation in Chechnya.

Shakhray: Chechnya To Hold Elections This Year

LD1704140795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1246 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 17 (Interfax)—Chechnya will have local elections late this year, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray told Interfax Monday [17 April].

The elections "can be prepared and held" in eight out of the eleven Chechen regions, he said. At the same time, the elections of the Chechen parliament and Chechen deputies of the Russian Federal Assembly belong to the future. They can be organized in 1996, believes Shakhray.

Chechnya 'Rebirth' Leader on Election Plans

LD1704154295 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 1354 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Elections must be held in Chechnya this year for certain—that is the opinion of Salambek Khadzhiyev, head of the Chechen Republic's Government for National Rebirth. According to him, the first elections of heads of administrations in the settlements of the republic will be held in four or five months, and republican elections—at the end of this year. During the elections, all the federal troops will be moved to special barracks in Chechen territory, and local law-enforcement bodies will keep order.

At his meeting with journalists, Salambek Khadzhiyev said that it is necessary to abolish the post of president in the republic because unlimited power only corrupts. Dzhokhar Dudayev is a good example—in the three years of his rule, he in fact created a fascist regime in the republic, and all dissidents were blacklisted.

Answering the question why Dudayev has not been killed yet, though many people know where he is hiding, Khadzhiyev said that until Dudayev commits a crime, he cannot be arrested or executed.

Today, preparations are underway in Groznyy for victory celebrations. Salambek Khadzhiyev assured the journalists that by 9 May, the city will be relatively clean. Practically all the basements in Groznyy have been cleared out and the dead bodies taken away. Mobile public baths and laundries are working. Eighty percent of the gas and water mains have been restored. But this does not solve all the problems. According to Khadzhiyev, there is still a great danger of a cholera epidemic and epidemics of other mortal diseases.

[Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 1500 GMT adds the following: "The Government for National Rebirth of the Chechen Republic, headed by Salambek Khadzhiyev, expects to make use of groups of peacemakers and mediators in order to create conditions for reconciliation in the republic. According to Khadzhiyev, who spoke to journalists in Moscow today, representatives of the Human Rights Commission under Russia's president, and also of the federal parliament, might be located in Chechen villages, while Chechen intermediaries could be put in places where federal troops are stationed. In addition, the Government for National Rebirth supports the idea of forming a permanent OSCE observer post in Groznyy."]

Dudayev Left Bamut 'Before Shelling Started'

AU1804123095 Paris AFP in English 1213 GMT 18 Apr 95

[By Sebastian Smith]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Moscow, April 18 (AFP)—Chechen military commanders said their forces had repulsed a second Russian assault on the village of Bamut in western Chechnya on Tuesday [18 April].

But a spokesman at the Russian Interior Ministry, whose troops are attempting to seize the village, told AFP there had been "no attack on Bamut during the night, only localized firefights."

The rebels' press office, CHECHENPRESS, said the Russians lost "48 armoured cars and at least 20 tanks and many men in the attack."

Chechen separatists frequently exaggerate Russian losses.

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The guerrillas are holed up in a disused Soviet nuclear missile base in Bamut, the last major point of anti-Russian resistance in the lowlands of Chechnya, a tiny Moslem republic in the south of the Russian Federation.

CHECHENPRESS said in a statement sent to AFP that Russian forces opened artillery fire on Bamut at 10:00 p.m. (1900 GMT) and continued for three hours, before beginning a ground attack.

As many as 4,000 Russian soldiers took part in the attempt to storm Bamut, then withdrew at 5:00 a.m. (0200 GMT), INTERFAX news agency said, quoting Chechen commanders.

Russian planes and helicopters attacked after the ground troops pulled back, the Chechens said.

Separatist President Dzhokhar Dudayev and his military commander Aslan Maskhadov visited the guerrillas in Bamut on Monday and left shortly before the shelling started, CHECHENPRESS said.

On Sunday, Russian forces called off an assault on Bamut, 50 kilometres (30 miles) south-west of Groznyy, due to intense resistance, but said they would launch another attack.

Russian soldiers, who entered Chechnya on December 11 to crush Dudayev's independence drive, control all the major towns in the republic and the guerrillas only operate freely in the mountains.

However, minor clashes take place daily in the major towns already captured by the Russians.

Earlier Tuesday, Russian officials said two of their soldiers were killed and five wounded when their armoured personnel carrier hit a mine in western Chechnya, about 10 kilometres (6 miles) north of Bamut. [passage omitted]

Federal Troops Prepare 'Final Phase' for Bamut

LD1704175395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1607 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOZDOK (North Ossetia), April 17 (Interfax)—The federal troops' spokesman has denied reports by Chechen sources about the federal troops' failure to seize the high-mountain village of Bamut, on the border with Ingushetia, on Monday [17 April].

He told Interfax that "the final phase of the operation to seize this village has not begun yet." He also said that the federal troops "have been completing the preparatory phase and movement to basic positions over the past few days."

Our on-site correspondent, also said that the federal troops did not attempt to storm Bamut on Monday.

The spokesman said that in the west of Chechnya, where Bamut and Samashki are located, the operation to disarm the illegal armed groupings was carried out by the Russian Interior Ministry's interior troops. "The federal aviation supports the movement of the interior troops and is carrying out reconnaissance operations," he said.

Further on Operation Against Bamut

LD1704162495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1553 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 17 (ITAR-TASS)—The operation to dislodge Chechen rebel fighters from one of their major strongholds, the village of Bamut, was suspended following the offer by its aldermen to mop up the village themselves, according to the mobile information centre in Chechnya.

At the moment, the Chechen Republic is busy making arrangements for a conference of Chechen people representatives, which is scheduled to be held this Friday under the auspices of Chechnya's Committee for National Accord, headed by former opposition leader Umar Avturkhanov, the government's press service said in a press release on Monday [17 April].

By now, representation quotas have been fixed for every region of the republic. The total number of delegates to the forthcoming conference will be 350 people. Delegates are nominated at gatherings of Chechen citizens or at the request of residents in the regions where such gatherings cannot be arranged. The list of delegates is to be approved by the Committee for National Accord.

Life in the towns of Gudermes, Shali and Argun, liberated from Chechen rebel fighters, is returning to normal. Bodies of local government have almost been formed, and Chechnya's executive representatives have been appointed. Prefectures, commandant's offices, local agencies and committees for national accord are already operating.

Gudermes and Shali have survived the military campaign with minimal damage, according to expert assessments. At present, regional authorities take measures to ensure regular deliveries of humanitarian aid, including foodstuffs, to these localities.

Russian Troops Continue Shelling Bamut

LD1704193495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1848 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NAZRAN, April 17 (Interfax)—The command of Russian troops involved in operations aimed at disarming the militants entrenched in the village of Bamut is ready to open talks with Chechen rebels if they accept the previous Russian ultimatum of weapon surrender, a military source in the Western Group of Federal Forces in Chechnya told Interfax.

"We have enough ammunition to wipe out Bamut in a matter of 30 minutes, but we do not want any unnecessary casualties or destruction," a high-ranking army official said referring to the Russian military command.

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Our correspondent meanwhile reports from the scene about continued shelling of Bamut on Monday. According to Chechen sources, federal troops have resorted to all types of artillery weapons, including rocket launchers.

More than 20 percent of houses in Bamut have been destroyed, but there are no casualties among the rebels, according to Chechen fighters.

Our correspondent says that village Elders and the Bamut administrator sheltering in the nearby village of Arshty (3-4 kilometers away from Bamut - IF) are expected to meet the rebels to agree on the terms of talks with the Russian command.

The militants can be persuaded to leave Bamut but not to surrender themselves, one of the negotiators told our corespondent on condition of anonymity.

Media Cited on Russians Losing 40 Tanks

LD1804095795 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 0900 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Nazran [dateline as received]—An IPRINDA correspondent has been told at the CHECHENPRESS news agency that, after preliminary shelling involving bombs and illumination rockets, two Russian motor-rifle regiments, supported by 100 tanks, launched a three-pronged attack on the villages of Orekhovo and Bamut in the early hours of 18 April. After four hours of fighting the Russians retreated, having lost 40 tanks and 17 units of other armored equipment.

On the morning of 18 April, the Russian air force started shelling these villages from helicopter gunships and also with antitank guided missiles. [passage omitted]

CHECHENPRESS also says that despite claims in the Russian media that the situation in Groznyy has stabilized completely, Oktyabrskiy District in the Chechen capital is still controlled by Shamil Basayev. CHECHENPRESS has also reported that measures are being taken to physically eliminate Salambek Khadzhiyev. However, because of the well-organized security provided by Russian special services, Dudayev's supporters have so far failed to do this.

Chechen Command: No Frontline Changes

LD1704173595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1607 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHECHNYA, April 17 (Interfax)—No positional changes along the frontline in Chechnya were registered Monday [17 April], a spokesman for the Chechen command told Interfax.

According to the officer, exchange of fire, rather than intensive operations took place near the villages Chiri-Yurt, Alkhazurovo, Duba-Yurt, Dachu-Borzoi and Chishki.

Exchange of gunfire and mortar attacks left six pro-Dudayev militants dead along the frontline Shali-Tankodrom-Agishty 30 kilometers away from Groznyy, the source added.

Chechen sources report a Russian air strike on the Chechen militants' positions near the border with Dagestan near the villages Yalkhoi-Mohk, Zandaki and Dechik-Gala.

The spokesman also reported "night shooting sometimes growing into short clashes" in such cities as Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali and the villages Chechenaul and Akhan-Yurt located several kilometers away from Groznyy.

Fighters Surrender in Gudermes, Urus-Martan

LD1704203795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1943 GMT 17 Apr 95

[By Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, April 17 (ITAR-TASS)—Over the past few days, 29 Chechen rebel fighters have voluntarily laid down arms in the republic's Gudermes and Urus-Martan regions.

Federal troop command in Chechnya promised that they would not be subjected to criminal penalties. Some of these fighters offered to try to pursuade their former comrades-in-arms to surrender, a spokesman for the federal troop command told TASS on Monday.

Movement for Peace Proposes Settlement Plan

LD1704195895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1948 GMT 17 Apr 95

[By Nadezhda Chaikova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 17 (ITAR-TASS)—Chechnya's Movement for Peace and Unity has proposed a programme of the cessation of fighting and a stage-by-stage settlement of relations between Russia and Chechnya.

The programme provides for "halting military actions, searching for a peaceful solution to the conflict, settling relations between Chechnya's various political forces and holding general elections and a referendum to determine the status of the Chechen Republic," a Moscow spokesman for the movement told TASS on Monday [17 April].

The founding conference of the Movement for Peace and Unity was held at the Chechen village of Goity last Saturday. The movement's principal objectives are "to stop the bloodshed, to investigate into the causes of the Chechen crisis and to restore the unity of the Chechen people."

The movement's leader is Yusup Soslambekov, 38, a former Dudayev's supporter. Since the outset of his

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political career, Soslambekov has criticised Dudayev's actions. Later he switched to the open opposition to the Dudayev regime.

'Crime Against Humanity' Seen in Samashki

MM1804083895 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Valeriy Yakov: "Samashki: Deterrent Action"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On learning of the Samashki tragedy, State Duma Deputies Anatoliy Shabad and Boris Titenko flew from Moscow and attempted 11 April to drive to the village, which was encircled by federal troops. They were detained at an internal troops post, and a colonel, who refused to give his name, declared that he would let no one through to anywhere without a personal order from Commander A. Kulikov. This was not the first day that "Red Cross" vehicles had been standing outside the same post, also seeking to reach the village in order to assist the casualties.

After long and unsuccessful altercations with the military, the deputies returned to Sernovodsk and from there briefed by telephone their Moscow colleagues in the "Russia's Choice" faction, asking them to influence Kulikov.

The next day they decided to make their way to the village in two ways. B. Titenko continued the official conferring, while Anatoliy Shabad together with Lyudmila Vakhnina, cochairman of the Academy of Sciences voters' club, set out by roundabout routes and were soon in Samashki. Toward midday Titenko also managed to get there with Aleksandr Guryanov, representing the "Memorial" Society and S. Kovalev's group.

They walked from one street to the next and from one yard to the next and listened to local residents, each of whom endeavored to pull them into his own home to show them the results of the federals' "liberation operation." But the deputies wrote down in their notepads only what they were able to see for themselves. Shabad counted seven bodies of peaceful residents who had still not been buried—he wrote it down. He saw two old men—war veterans—who had been killed and burned. According to neighbors, they had been dealt with in this way by an OMON [special purpose militia detachment] which had come along their street—he wrote this down too. He stood in silence over 10 fresh burial mounds in the truck gardens of private houses, where the shot owners were buried, and added this too to his tragic list. Along with these details given him by a housewife: From the time the cannonade got under way the family did not peep out of the basement, praying only that fate not let some shell hit their home. The cannonade was still continuing, but the roar of engines, firing by assault rifles and machine guns, and explosions could already be heard in the street. This terrible wave was gradually getting nearer when the basement door suddenly burst open, and a fighter appeared in the doorway with a grenade in his hand. The women cried out in terror, begging him not to throw the grenade. They were spared, but they were all required to come out. When the family with children and with a woman neighbor made their way out into the yard, the fighters at once pulled out from the frightened group the only man—the house owner—pushed him to one side, and shot him before the children's eyes.

The deputies heard similar tales in many yards off Samashki's scorched streets. On going through part of the village—they simply did not have enough time for all of it—they saw for themselves that there was no trace of destruction by bombs or shells, at least not on the territory they inspected. Consequently, the firing really was conducted around the perimeter of Samashki, pursuing the aim of frightening the local residents and taking away their desire to resist. Nevertheless, in individual yards residents belonging to the local militia did start to fire back, and then a squall of fire rained down upon these centers of resistance.

The majority of the houses in the village remained intact, but only on those streets along which the federals did not pass. Punitive detachments moved along Proletarskaya, Sharipova, Vygonnaya, and Rabochaya Streets. According to the deputies' estimates, almost every other house along the length of these streets was burned down. The operating technique was simple—first a house was inundated with fire from armored personnel carriers, grenades were thrown into basements and extensions, everything of any value at all was removed, and then flamethrowers were used to set things on fire. Men discovered in the yards were either shot straight away or carted off somewhere. I now have on my desk, incidentally, a list submitted by the Ingush president's mission in Moscow. It contains 181 names of men, residents of Samashki, who were detained by the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops after the village's capture and carted off to an unknown destination. The ages of those detained, who were not carrying weapons, range between 15 and 73 years. Even today, 10 days on, none of their relatives knows anything about their fate.

Anatoliy Shabad also went into the burned-out shell of a still smoking school. According to the chief physician of the local hospital, prior to the goons' arrival injured people from the whole neighborhood had been accommodated there. The federals shot and burned those whom the physicians had not managed to move out before the start of the assault. But the deputy was unable to discover any confirmation of that episode.

In A. Shabad's opinion, the operation conducted by the joint federal forces in Samashki represents a totally new type of operation by troops in the Chechen war, a type not used hitherto. The deputy encountered a similar tactic several years ago in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russian troops were also conducting deterrent actions, with annihilation of peaceful residents, but skillfully

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blamed this on the Azeris. Now there is no one to blame. Incidentally, the commander in Karabakh was the same general who calls himself Antonov at Samashki.

In terms of its nature and methods the Samashki operation was a typical punitive action against a defenseless population, conducted for the purpose of frightening not so much Samashki itself, which had already capitulated, as those neighboring population centers—Achkhoy-Martan, Bamut, and others—which still had to be "liberated." The cynical nature of the federals' actions was obvious from the outset. The ultimatum which they put to the elders—immediately to surrender over 200 assault rifles—was virtually unrealizable because Dudayev's gunmen had left the village several days before the assault, taking all the weapons with them. But the troops did not even keep to the ridiculously short time named in the ultimatum—90 minutes—but violated it, as had happened repeatedly before in this war. Fire was opened with all kinds of weapons ahead of schedule, depriving the residents of Samashki of the possibility of leaving the village.

The information put about by official propaganda that Dudayev's men had executed some elders who participated in talks with the federals proved to be one more lie. The deputies met with the elders and saw for themselves that no one had shot them, although the press went on puffing up this lie for a long time after. In just the same way, after leaving the village, the deputies heard at the airport the official information on the television news that shooting was continuing in Samashki and snipers were being flushed out, although nothing of the kind was happening there. The machinery of lies, set going at the start of the campaign, was continuing its tireless work.

Comparing the tragedy of Samashki with the tragedy of the burned village of Song My, Khatyn, and Lidice, Anatoliy Shabad acknowledges that the scale of these tragedies is different. But they have equal ranking in terms of their inner essence, because in each of the said cases the goons' victims were peaceful and defenseless people, annihilated along with their homes without any reason and in violation of all existing international norms and rules of warfare.

In the deputy's opinion, in the future criminal trial relating to the fact of the unleashing and conduct of the criminal Chechen war - - a war against our own people—the punitive action in the village of Samashki must be especially singled out. Each organizer of it and each participant in it will have to answer for a crime against humanity.

Economic Issues

Davydov On Trade With West, Debt Rescheduling

MK1504081895 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Bekker in the "Expansion" column: "Oleg Davydov Is for Equality in Trade With the West"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Shortly before his departure for negotiations with the United States Vice Premier Oleg Davydov met with journalists of the British newspaper THE TIMES and with SEGODNYA's correspondent. Davydov described the current state of trade and economic relations with the West as "complex," noting that European and U.S. partners continue to discriminate against Russia: Quantity limitations have been imposed on exports of goods to Western markets; there are 13 antidumping actions in progress. Annual losses from customs barriers are $2.5 billion. "It will not be right away, but we shall have these restrictions lifted," the vice premier promised. For this to happen it is necessary for the U.S. Congress and the Europarliament to legalize Russia's status as an economy in transition. "This is a political matter," Davydov said, "and it has been raised at the appropriate level."

The West's protectionist measures, nonetheless, will not prompt the Russian leadership to act on a tit for tat basis. The vice premier regards Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization as a necessary step toward civilizing trade relations. "After this it will no longer be possible to unilaterally discriminate against Russia," he observed. This will create a normal environment for the development of a market economy in Russia, for raising the competitiveness of its goods, and for ensuring their penetration of developed markets. According to the vice premier, the government will place special emphasis on stimulating machinebuilding exports and correcting the current imbalance in favor of raw materials. Oleg Davydov stated that in the past three years, Russian-U.S. trade has been expanding for the most part in increased exports of raw materials from Russia. In 1994 trade turnover between the two countries reached $4.5 billion, growing by more than $1 billion compared to 1993. Moreover, Russia for the first time in a long time has had a surplus in trade with the United States, of $1.4 billion.

Davydov's position on the issue of Russia's debt to the West is as follows: "We are not a bankrupt country, and we are obliged to fulfill our obligations." But it is impossible to fulfill all the obligations at once because otherwise the economy will collapse. Therefore a golden mean will be chosen, allowing the economy to develop and to repay its debts. Davydov said he hopes for successful debt rescheduling negotiations with the West and on Russia's joining the Paris Club. According to him, "we have already been supported in this by the United States, Germany, and Britain." If this happens, Davydov hopes that part of Russia's indebtedness will be written off.

Moscow, Korea Start Talks on Debt Payments

LD1504170995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1652 GMT 15 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Seoul April 15 TASS—Russian and Korean experts began working consultations in

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Seoul on Saturday [15 April] to discuss the payment of Moscow's debt to Seoul estimated at 1.47 billion U.S. dollars.

The experts will particularly focus on the implementation of the September 1994 agreement which obligates moscow to pay 387.5 million U.S. dollars in interest on the credit granted to Russia by South Korea. The agreement allows Russia to pay half of this sum in the form of raw materials supplies and the other half in the form of manufactured goods, including military equipment and helicopters.

In 1991, Seoul promised Moscow a three billion dollar loan for a period of three years. However, only 1.47 billion U.S. dollars have been contributed because Moscow has failed to pay interest on time.

The loan included 1 billion U.S. dollars in cash and 470 million dollars to buy South Korean goods. Moscow has paid only 51 million U.S. dollars and its debt to South Korea totalled 792.7 million U.S. dollars as of the year of 1994. This amount also includes the Soviet debt to South Korea.

On March 29, 1995, Russia delivered four helicopters to South Korea as part of its debt payments. It is expected to deliver several more craft.

The South Korean and Russian delegations intend to sign intergovernmental agreements and interbank documents concerning the payment of Russia's debt, as well as contracts to deliver raw materials and goods.

Government Officials Seen Obstructing Sugar Deal With Cuba

MM1704084895 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by economist Petr Podgornov: "What Is It That Yeltsin's Aide Doesn't Know but Vice Premier Davydov Does?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The highest-ranking forces, including B.N. Yeltsin, have joined in the struggle for the signing of a Russian-Cuban protocol on trade exchange and payments, as PRAVDA has already written. This struggle is being continuously followed by 80,000 workers in the sugar refining industry and millions of Russian tea-drinkers, who are being hit in the pocket by the nonsigning of the protocol. Everyone would seem to be in favor—the Duma, the president, the foreign minister, the Security Council, the Ministry of Economics....

I'm not going to go on again about Russia's strategic and economic interests in Cuba. This article was triggered by a letter from A.Ya. Livshits, economic aide to the Russian Federation president, to O.V. Davydov, vice premier and minister of foreign economic relations. Let me quote: "I request information on the progress of the fulfillment of the assignment from the Russian Federation president (No. PR-285 of 27 February 1995) and the first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government (No. OS-053669 of 22 February 1995) and also on the situation which has developed in terms of the signing of a protocol on trade turnover and payments between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Cuba for 1995. This question was raised at the president's meeting with industrial enterprise leaders on 22 March 1995."

Aleksandr Livshits concludes his message with the sentence: "If somebody is deliberately retarding a positive solution, I would like to know about this in more detail."

So who is this invisible and all-powerful figure who is not known to the president's staff but might be known to O. Davydov? Whereas it is well known that (to the gratification of ordinary Russians) there are no intermediaries in the sugar contract with Cuba and it is very advantageous for international sugar trading houses to prevent the signing of the protocol.

As Sergey Glazyev said at a news conference following his visit to Cuba, "the most recent history of Russia's mutual relations with Cuba graphically shows that federal government officials, whose wages are paid by Russian taxpayers, are serving the interests of foreign firms."

Most likely Aleksandr Livshits was suggesting very delicately to Mr. Davydov that the situation is becoming intolerable. In a month or six weeks the question of signing of a protocol will be a dead letter, and Russia will be forced to turn to the world sugar market and buy at three times the price.

Yeltsin Adviser: Russia Can Beat Inflation This Year

MS1804101095 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 18 Apr 95 p 25

[Report by Marcus Warren: "Russia Bears Down on Inflation"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow—This is the year Russia can at last beat inflation and stabilise its shell-shocked economy, according to one of president Boris Yeltsin's top advisers.

Aleksandre Livshits, the president's economic adviser, says everything is in place for a dramatic improvement in the nation's prospects—new political willpower, consensus among the mainstream political players, and what is, by Russian standards, a tight budget and a commitment to sticking by it.

Monthly inflation will be down to 4 percent or 5 percent by June and will continue falling, said Mr Livshits.

However, he gave no forecasts for later in the year, although some government economists are predicting that monthly inflation could be as low as 1 percent by the year-end.

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Inflation, which reached 800 percent in 1993 and was 200 percent last year, has been the bane of the country since price liberalisation in 1992 aggravated Russia's already serious political instability and deterred desperately needed investment.

But, after two years in which the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin appeared to be on the verge of economic stabilisation before losing its nerve at the last minute, Mr Livshits is convinced that 1995 is the year Russia can put the era of chronic inflation behind it.

"We have achieved some very low increases in the money supply," he said. "The budget was adopted on time and we have succeeded in keeping the deficit down. There is no-one in the political establishment who is half-hearted or inconsistent about inflation. We have the full support of the president, we fully intend to do it this year, and I assure you we will succeed."

Past attempts to achieve stabilisation have been undermined by successfull lobbying for cheap credits by the powerful agricultural and energy sectors and by the military industrial complex. But optimists now argue that even the huge expenses incurred in fighting the war in Chechnya will not prolong high rates of inflation.

Mr Livshits said: "1995 is the last year for decline in output in Russia. What we are seriously discussing now is how to limit an economic depression, when we have neither growth nor decline."

According to official figures, Russia's gross domestic product has declined 40 percent since the end of 1991, although analysts say that such statistics are misleading because they fail to take account of the emergence of a booming services sector and an extensive black economy.

Chubays: Close to 'Profound Economic Improvement'

LD1504134195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1233 GMT 15 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 15 (Interfax)—The first quarter of this year posed a "deep and crucial" turning point in Russia's economy, First Deputy Premier Anatoliy Chubays told an economic conference in Moscow on Saturday [15 April].

"In the entire history of its reforms Russia has never been so close to profound economic improvement and financial stabilization," he pointed out.

The present period was preceded by a hard economic situation; in January inflation ran at 20 percent, he said. In the currency market the state of affairs was "on the brink of catastrophe." In early January the Central Bank's foreign currency reserve shrank so much, that "at those rates of expenditure it could last for only three days," he noted. However the government took radical measures to change the country's economic model, Chubays pointed out.

For instance, it abolished foreign trade quotas, liquidated the institution of special exporters, reduced the list of regulated prices, and eliminated the privileges, which had cost Russia's budget six trillion rubles last year, in foreign trade.

As Chubays said, a crucial measure was to give up Central Bank credits for economic facilities legislatively.

According to Chubays, the decision to confine the growth of money supply to 3 percent in a quarter yielded fantastic results, which predetermined the further curbing of inflation in the months to come.

As he said, in early February the Central Bank's foreign currency reserves began to grow. By April 1 they exceeded the amount envisaged for this year by 30 percent, he stressed. Chubays qualified as important the circumstance that industrial production became stable and that a sharp rise in social tensions was averted.

Nevertheless, he said, a number of problems, such as greater unemployment and bank bankruptcies, will inevitably aggravate.

A top priority for the government is to implement social programs, Chubays declared. According to him, the second half of this year, when usual problems will aggravate on the eve of parliamentary elections, will be the most complicated for Russia.

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International Affairs

EC Officials Say Power Law Will Promote Membership

WS1704112395 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0800 GMT 17 Apr 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev [no date as received]—On April 13, during a meeting between the chairman of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Czech Parliament Jiri Peine and his Ukrainian colleague Borys Oliynyk, Oliynyk said that if the Czech Republic helps Ukraine to join the European Council, Ukraine will support the Czech Republic in its joining NATO. On the same day Oliynyk met with speakers of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council who are on an official visit to Ukraine. During this meeting representatives of the European Council said that absence of the Ukrainian Constitution will not be treated as an obstacle to Ukraine's becoming a member of this international organization. However, they emphasized the desirability of ratifying a number of European conventions by Ukraine. In particular, this concerns the law on local government. During a meeting with Ukrainian president members of the European Council's delegation said that the adoption of the Law on Central and Local Government will positively influence the process of Ukraine's joining the European Council. They believe that the existence of this law will partially fill the constitutional vacuum in Ukraine.

EC Credit Hopes After Decision To Close Chernobyl

LD1704191395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1607 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 17, (Interfax-Ukraine)—Ukraine hopes that now that it has decided in principle to close down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant by the year 2000, it has met the last condition for the getting of 85 million ECU ($106 million) in credit from the European Union, Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Mityukov said at a briefing. Mityukov led the Ukrainian delegation in London at the annual meeting in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and held talks with an EC delegation on the issue.

Mityukov called the talks very tough and dramatic. Partners put certain pressure on us and linked the future credit for compensating the trade balance with the demand for presenting a specific time-table for the closure of reactors.

Mityukov said Ukraine argued the demand was incompatible with the goals for which Ukraine was planning to use the credit, because the lessening or elimination of the trade deficit was geared to implementing economic reforms. If the reforms fail to take place, we shall never be able to close down the Chernobyl plant anyway, Mityukov said.

Mityukov says that Ukraine has now met all the terms for receiving the credit. It has paid off the debt for the 1993 credit from the EC to purchase medicines and an agreement on a stand-by loan to Ukraine has been signed.

Kuchma, Yeltsin To Step Up Efforts on Friendship Treaty

LD1704195395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1727 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 17 (Interfax-Ukraine)—The Ukrainian and Russian presidents intend to step up efforts to iron out remaining differences so that a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty can be signed between the two countries. This was the subject of a telephone talk between President Leonid Kuchma and President Boris Yeltsin on April 17, officials in the Ukrainian president's press service said.

On April 15 Yeltsin said that normalization of relations between Kiev and Simferopol was a prerequisite for signing bilateral documents with Ukraine.

In Yeltsin's words, it will be proper to sign important political documents between Russia and Ukraine when we are sure that relations between Simferopol and Kiev are such that the interests of the Crimean residents are not harmed and that internationally-recognized human rights standards are observed.

Yeltsin and Kuchma also agreed that Yeltsin will meet with acting Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk, head of the Ukrainian delegation, in Moscow on March 18.

Russian FSK Planning 'Subversive Action' in Armenia, Crimea

LD1704203195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1740 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—"Officers of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service [FSK] held prisoner in Chechnya told us that several Russian military units were training special five-man groups for subversive action in Armenia and Crimea," Ukrainian parliament deputies Taras Protsevyat and Roman Krutsyk told UNIAN. The deputies returned from Chechnya on 16 April after delivering 41 tonnes of humanitarian aid worth $250,000 on a Ukrainian army cargo plane. They said they had a videotaped interview with the Russian prisoners.

The deputies accused Russia of putting enormous obstacles in the way of humanitarian aid shipments to Chechnya. "We saw most of the aid cargo go to the Russian army, but not to the soldiers who have not had hot food for two months. Part of it disappears through commercial agents," they said.

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According to the Chechen minister of trade, the Ukrainian aid cargo was the first to reach its destination.

Black Sea Fleet Council Protests Units' Transfer

WS1704120195 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0800 GMT 17 Apr 95

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As reported by UKRINFORM's correspondent in Sevastopol, the Military Council of the Black Sea Navy Fleet convened a session on Friday, April 14 after which it issued a press statement.

The members of the military council, headed by Naval Admiral Eduard Baltin, made a direct call on Russia to clarify its stand concerning the fleet's future.

They also expressed disagreement with the Russian Navy's General Headquarters which continues to issue orders on transferring some units and sub-divisions of the Black Sea Navy Fleet to the Ukrainian Navy. The statement pointed out that no measures aimed at guaranteeing servicemen's social security were being taken.

They also expressed concern at the continuing talks on dividing the fleet after the Russian Gosduma announced a moratorium on unilateral reduction of the Russian fleet. They expressed fear that the fleet might cease to exist as an operational and strategic installation.

According to them, the statement was issued because they could no longer remain silent since they do not believe that the measures being taken to resolve the issues surrounding the fleet are fair and reasonable.

Local analysts point out the fact that the issuance of the statement coincided with Crimean Supreme Soviet Chairman Sergei Tsekov's address to the Russian Gosduma.

Izmail Garrison Transfered to Ukrainian Navy

LD1704190895 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1530 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sevastopol [no date as received]—The river ships of the former Black Sea Fleet's Izmail garrison have raised Ukrainian flags, the Ukrainian Navy press center reports.

Warrant and commissioned officers of the Ukrainian Navy river ship brigade, which is being formed in Izmail swore allegiance to Ukraine on 14 April. On the same day, artillery boats and control ships raised Ukrainian Navy flags. Izmail is the second garrison after Ochakov to be transferred by the Black Sea Fleet to the Ukrainian Navy.

'About 40 Percent' of Nuclear Arms Transferred to Russia

LD1704195795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1840 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 17 (Interfax-Ukraine)—Ukraine has taken about 40 percent of its nuclear arms to Russia in line with the trilateral agreement between the Ukrainian, Russian and U.S. presidents, the head of the center for the administrative handling of strategic nuclear forces, Aleksandr Seredyuk, told a briefing in the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Monday.

Under the agreement signed on January 14, 1994, Ukraine is to withdraw all strategic nuclear ammunitions located on its territory to Russia for dismantling in exchange for fuel for its nuclear power stations. The U.S. partially finances Russian enterprises to process spent nuclear fuel. The agreement also confirmed Ukraine's security after the withdrawal.

According to Seredyuk, 40 out of 130 SS-19 missiles were dismantled by the start of 1995 and another 20 will be dismantled by the end of this month.

On the whole, Ukraine had 179 missiles with about 1,300 nuclear warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles and over 600 ones for air-to-surface cruise missiles.

Colonel Seredyuk emphasized that Ukraine's disarmament on the whole has been consistent with the trilateral U.S.-Ukrainian-Russian agreement.

"In the implementation of this agreement there are virtually no problems. We seek to ensure that parity is observed in sending out nuclear ammunitions and receiving heat-emanating rods from Russia in exchange for the nuclear ammunitions. If the Russian Federation complies with its obligations, we will have no problems in taking nuclear ammunitions from Ukrainian territory according to schedule," Seredyuk said.

Seredyuk added that consultations were underway on training for this process as well as on receiving special equipment and documentation.

Cooperation Protocol Signed With Czech Defense Ministry

LD1704200995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2125 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 17 (Interfax-Ukraine)—The Ukrainian and Czech Defense Ministries signed a protocol on headquarters talks and a plan for cooperation for 1995.

According to a Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's press release, the documents were signed by the head of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry delegation, Chief of Staff Korkishko.

The ministry emphasized that the headquarters talks became the first meeting between the two countries' military on this level.

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National Affairs

Supreme Soviet Message to Crimean Parliament on Tsekov

LD1704213995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1955 GMT 17 Apr 95

[By UKRINFORM-TASS]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 17 Apr—The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium today sent the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea a message with the following content:

"On 14 April 1995, S.P. Tsekov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, addressed a plenary sitting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

"In his speech, he permitted himself a deliberate distortion of the decisions adopted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the president of Ukraine; attempted to misinform not only the deputies of the State Duma, but also the world community; and called on the deputies of this legislative body and on the executive authorities of a neighboring state to interfere in Ukraine's internal affairs.

"The Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet asks the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to examine and pronounce an opinion from a legal point of view on the speech by S.P. Tsekov referred to above and the state of the observance by the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine.

"We suggest to the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to determine once and for all whether or not they wish to be guided in their activities by the legitimate demands of our state's highest legislative and executive authorities.

"We once again wish to draw the attention of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and its deputies to the necessity of acting in keeping with the Ukrainian Constitution and laws."

Tsekov Speech May Force Crimean Parliament Dissolution

WS1804101495 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0040 GMT 17 Apr 95

["Special to Intelnews" by Svetlana Seliutina and Viktoria Kulakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev/Simferopol, April 17—Ukraine may be forced to dissolve the Crimean Parliament unless it takes action to distance itself from the speech its speaker made to the Russian Duma on Friday [14 April], Volodymyr Stretovych, who heads the Ukrainian Parliament's Committee on Legal Policy, said Monday.

In a related development, the Crimean Parliament inexplicably canceled a Monday session of its Presidium, and sources close to the peninsula's legislature indicated that a session of the full body scheduled for Wednesday may also be canceled.

Saying that "(Crimean parliament Speaker Serhiy) Tsekov's speech discouraged us by its malicious slander," Stretovych accused the Crimean leader of trying to push Russia into direct conflict with Ukraine.

"The speech of Tsekov cannot lead to the radical actions from the side of the Ukrainian parliament. We don't know whether he spoke as an individual or a parliamentary speaker," said Stretovych. "We are waiting for the Crimean parliament's reaction—whether it will separate itself from the position of Tsekov or it won't," Stretovych added.

Stretovych said that if the Crimean parliament doesn't react to Tsekov's actions, the parliament of Ukraine "will have to act adequately."

The parliamentary deputy called Tsekov's speech—in which he accused Ukrainian leaders of violating human rights in Crimea and called for Russian economic sanctions against Ukraine—a provocation and appeal for direct interference into the internal situation in Ukraine, quoting remarks by Tsekov upon his return from Moscow that Crimea is "supported by Moscow and any concessions from the side of the Crimean parliament are beyond discussion."

Crimean Tatar Majles Deputy leader Refat Chubarov, flanking Stretovych at a Monday press conference, said that one action that Ukraine's parliament may take in the wake of the Tsekov speech could be the immediate dissolution of the Crimean parliament. Stretovych, responding to a journalist's question, said that such a proposal was already being prepared.

According to the other option mentioned by the Tatar leader, who also sits on the Crimean parliament's Presidium, Crimean deputies will have to separate their position from Tsekov's and express the desire to organize the activity of their parliament according to the Ukrainian law. In addition, they will have to accept the Ukrainian parliament's laws on abolition of the Crimean presidency, constitution and election law.

Chubarov said that 40 deputies of the Crimean parliament have already addressed the Kiev parliament with an appeal not to consider the Tsekov speech as the point of view of their parliament as a whole.

Meanwhile, Tsekov, upon his return to Simferopol from Moscow, seemed in no mood to retract any of his words. "(President) Leonid Kuchma was exaggerating when he said that we would be left alone and Russia would not help us. It will, but how? I think we have to arm ourselves with patience and await."

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"If lawlessness and disgrace occur in the country which tries to be law-governed and democratic, reaction should follow not only from the side of the Russian Federation but all countries," he added.

One Third of Crimean MPs Denounce Tsekov's Duma Address

LD1704165095 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1530 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kiev [no date as received]—Speaking at a news conference on Crimean problems, Volodymyr Stretovych, chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Legal Policy and Judicial Reform and Refat Chubarov, deputy chairman of the Crimean-Tatar People's Majles both denounced Crimean Parliament Speaker Serhiy Tsekov's address in the Russian State Duma. Stretovych described the statement as a provocation since the Duma had nothing to do with the situation in Crimea.

He told journalists the first draft of the Crimean constitution had already been submitted to the commission. [passage omitted]

According to Chubarov, four of the Crimean Parliament's factions have officially disassociated themselves from Tsekov's speech in the Duma. These make up a total of 36 deputies in the 98-seat parliament: 14 of the Kurultay faction, six of Agrarians, 10 of Reform, and six of the Krym faction.

Communists Concerned Over Russian Interest in Crimea

LD1704190495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1607 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 17 (Interfax-Ukraine)—The Ukrainian parliament's Communist faction and the secretariat of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee have announced their concern about "the poorly-thought-through actions of some politicians concerning the recent events in Crimea."

The Communist leaders circulated a statement in Kiev today saying they were concerned about "the statements of the Russian president on Russia's significant interests in Crimea."

The Ukrainian Communists said they disapproved of the statement Crimean Parliament Chairman Serhiy Tsekov made in the Russian State Duma. They urged the two countries' statesmen to refrain from any actions which could produce a negative impact on developments in Crimea.

The Communists said they demanded that the Ukrainian and Russian leaders make efforts for completing work on the bilateral wide-scale treaty and for its earliest signing.

Earlier, on April 15, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said major Ukrainian-Russian political documents could not be signed until the legal conflict between Kiev and Simferopol was resolved.

On April 14 the Crimean parliament's chairman spoke in the Russian State Duma urging Moscow to provide support to Crimea for preserving Crimean statehood.

Moroz Retention Shows Weakness of Center

954F2078A Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by VEDOMOSTI correspondents Larisa Zhalovaga and Sergey Rakhmanin: "Political Dilettantes Played Into the Speaker's Hands in His Bid for the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The frequently postponed report of the Ukrainian parliament presidium has finally been delivered, with an easily predicted result. The matter did not reach the point of the resignation of the leadership of the nation's highest legislative body. Deputy groups that had insisted on the presidium's report in order to get Moroz and Tkachenko out under rotation provisions only helped the speaker and his first deputy reinforce their positions. The radical draft, presented by the Reform group, which proposed to appraise the presidium's work as unsatisfactory, retire the Supreme Council leadership, and conduct within three days a reorganization of the parliament's structure and its apparat, was doomed. A basically toothless decree (the report is taken under advisement, and the proposals presented in the course of discussion are to be studied and summarized) was supported by 234 deputies. This figure registered the dominating role of the left. This is not to say that everyone who voted for preservation of the status quo is a supporter of the leftist idea. The point is that the left still holds levers of influence in decisionmaking. Seeing that the idea of forcing resignations was hopeless, a score of deputies, primarily of centrist leanings, found it prudent to register their loyalty. An important role in the relative consolidation was also played by the sense of threat emanating, in the opinion of many deputies of different orientations, from Bankovskaya.

Having sensed this, in his speech from the Supreme Council rostrum the parliament leader could not refrain from a certain pathos in proclaiming his innocence before the people and the parliament. He even went so far as to state that his adviser on foreign economic issues, who is currently in a Ukrainian Security Service preliminary detention facility, is innocent before the law.

As to the speech itself, in the opinion of presidium member Petr Sheyko, Aleksandr Moroz "attempted to characterize matters that are not in his competence." In his speech he claimed the role of one of the leaders of the state, which is not envisaged either by the Constitution or by the rules. By shifting the emphasis onto the grave situation in the economy, he "not quite seriously, in my

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opinion, described the work of the presidium itself, which is what he should have been talking about 90 percent of the time." Sheyko believes that the result of the discussion of the presidium's report is not so much evidence of the increasing influence of the left as a statement of the weakness of the right and the center. Petr Vladimirovich thinks that the 7 April events are just the first test of strength. He believes that the fight will resume after a certain length of time.

Meanwhile, the left has got carte blanche at a time when principally important issues are coming up for consideration, first of all the law on authority, which is tentatively scheduled to be put on the agenda next Thursday. Which means the question of forming the government, too. A quite confident Petr Simonenko told journalists in the hallway that for the communists it is important now to have influence on the principle of forming the main executive body. Personalities will come into the picture later.

Volodymyr Stretovich, head of the Commission on Questions of Legal Policy and Judicial-Legal Reform, expressed the hope that structural changes within the parliament will nevertheless take place, and that the number, functions, and composition of commissions will be revised. He agreed with the principal points of the brillian speech of the Reform group leader Sergey Sobolev, who insisted on fundamentally reorganizing the work of the apparat. Which, in the opinion of many, lives a life separate from the people's elected representatives. A dilettante approach to the extremely delicate operation of removing Moroz played into Aleksandr Aleksandrovich's hands in the political bid for the future.

Bomb Scare in Crimean Parliament Blamed On Ukraine

LD1804093995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0913 GMT 18 Apr 95

[By Lev Ryabchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol, April 18 (ITAR-TASS)—An anonymous telephone call warning about an explosive device planted in the building of the Crimean Parliament proved to be a false alarm. No explosives have been found inside the building. Having barred lawmakers from the building for several hours, the policemen opened the doors to the building of the parliament of the autonomous republic.

The Crimean leadership jumped at conclusions, assessing the incident as a political provocation. The Crimean president Yuriy Meshkov declared in his statement for the press that the incident "was a rehearsal, if not the beginning of the blockade of the Crimean Parliament with the aim of ousting lawfully elected representatives of the people and stripping them of their mandates." Earlier, Speaker of the Crimean Parliament Sergey Tsekov in an interview with ITAR-TASS had described the incident "as another provocative act masterminded by the Kiev authorities seeking to disrupt the work of the Crimean Parliament." Tsekov also pointed out that "this act should be assessed in the context of attempts to deprive the Crimea of its autonomous status."

The incident in the building of the Crimean Parliament diverted attention from another incident in which a group of people attempted to prevent the Ukrainian state flag from being hoisted in front of the building of the Simferopol City Council. The group of protesters had barred the access to the flagstaff until the police forced them away.

Minister Details Planned Chernobyl Shut-Down

WS1704114895 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0800 GMT 17 Apr 95

[Interview with Yuriy Kostenko, Ukrainian environmental protection minister, identified as "Y.K.," by VYBIR correspondent identified as "UPressA"; place and date not given—from the "Ukrainian News" feature No. 15]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] UPressA: What do you think of the latest government's and president's decisions concerning the Chernobyl NPP [Chernobyl nuclear power plant]? Y.K.: First of all, both the president and government proceed from the real situation we are having today. The West wants us to withdraw the Chernobyl NPP from service, but there exists the real economic situation in Ukraine testifying to the fact that without the Western aid we would neither be able to conduct economic reforms nor to solve most of the problems connected with Chernobyl. I mean here the problems of sarcophagus (reactor's cover) and raising the safety of the functioning NPP's. So the government's decision is based on a detailed study of the situation, it also includes solution of other related problems like social protection and employment of Chernobyl NPP personnel. The West promised to provide us with adequate financial aid. Given this, Ukraine will be able to discontinue Chernobyl NPP's operation by the year 2000. UPressA: How are you going to use such aid? Y.K.: On April 14, in order to create vacancies for Chernobyl personnel, the president proposed to construct a heat and power plant either in Chernobyl site proper or near the town of Slavutych. The plant's capacity will be 3 MW. It will supply energy to the whole Chernobyl zone and Kiev, since today the NPP mainly works for Kiev. M. Bernie, nature conservation minister of France, who has recently visited Kiev, confirmed that the "G-7 countries" are ready to consider all variants advanced by Ukraine in order to reach the main goal—to close Chernobyl NPP. UPressA: Are there "pro" and "anti"-nuclear lobbies in Ukraine? Y.K.: There are the forces that are categorically against the nuclear power industry as such. They are mainly represented by the Green party. However, given the energy crisis and energy dependence on Russia, most

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political parties and movements have "softened" their anti-nuclear sentiments. On the other hand, the pro-nuclear lobby involves not only local scientists and politicians. We feel the pressure on the part of Russia and other countries like Germany, France, Sweden, Switzerland which have powerful nuclear power industries. Many big power producing businesses try to promote this industry. People with big capital usually have big political influence. I'd like to underscore that our "pro-nuclear" position has two distinct and different aspects depending on the fact whether we want to have our own Ukrainian nuclear power industry or to be part of "external" nuclear power complex. Many experts hold that Ukraine should remain within the sphere of Russian interests in this domain, others insist that Ukraine must have its own relatively independent energy system. These lobbies don't even try to reach compromise. UPressA: Does the West have the single approach to Chernobyl problem? Y.K.: More or less so. The United States displays a bit smaller interest to Chernobyl since she is located far from Ukraine but still it supports the "G-7" approach in this sphere. As far as Western European countries are concerned, all of them want to have Chernobyl NPP removed from service. First and foremost, they are governed by purely economic interests since Chernobyl tragedy in 1986 led to curtailment of energy programs the world over, including Europe. Power generating companies suffered huge losses. I've just come back from Germany where I saw by myself that an NPP, operating on the fast neutron principle, had not been put into operation since the local Green party had used Chernobyl as a relevant example. UPressA: Is it a real possibility to close Chernobyl NPP by the year 2000? What to do with radioactive wastes? Y.K.: In Chernobyl zone we have 90 percent of the radioactive wastes available in Ukraine. Even if we close not only Chernobyl but all Ukrainian NPP's the problem of such wastes would remain. Therefore, it is necessary to find the place for burying the wastes. There are different types of waste storages: the storages for hot wastes—they are designed for thousands of years. There are the storages for cold and medium-level wastes. The problem of wastes should be solved by ourselves regardless of the fact whether we close Chernobyl NPP or temporarily stop its reactors. Now a few words about the year 2000. The first Chernobyl reactor can function till the year 1996, maximum till 1997, the third—till the year 1999-2000. After that, the NPP should be retooled and redesigned. To do this, the NPP should be temporarily shut down. Such operation needs much time and money. For instance, the units in Leningrad NPP were retooled for 3-4 years. Thus, in any case, all Chernobyl units will have to be closed. After that, they could be either put into operation again or never function again. Everything will depend on many factors, in particular, on the Western aid and our ability to use it. Of course, our ministry may issue the license on redesigning the units but here we should strictly observe the law on the use of nuclear energy. The law says that it is prohibited to issue such license prior to completion of certain works essential for safe operation of an NPP. So, in this case, it does not actually matter who the environment minister is—I or even M.Umanets, head of the state committee for nuclear engineering. The process of removing the NPP from service involves the following steps: first the nuclear fuel is discharged, second the NPP is shut down. After that, there remains a few employees to control the NPP condition for 30-40 years. Then reactors and all service lines are discharged. The whole process takes some 50 years. Today there are about 40 NPP's in the world whose operation has been discontinued. In Chernobyl there are already 800 burial grounds for medium-level wastes and other 300 grounds about which only a few people know. In the future, we badly need a stationary national storage. This is a huge problem whose solution requires dozens of years. Even the United States has no storage of such kind. There they have only temporary storages. We are going to take similar approach, that is, we will construct the storages whose service life will be 30-50 years. When we have money, we will build the stationary storage like in Sweden, Germany and France. UPressA: Thank you.

Third Energy Block of Chernobyl Plant Turned Off

LD1704203295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1853 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 17 (Interfax-Ukraine)—The third energy block of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station was shut off today for planned repairs, the Ukrainian State Nuclear Energy Committee told Interfax-Ukraine today.

Repairs are scheduled to take 53 days.

Only the first energy block is currently functioning at the nuclear plant.

As was earlier reported, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, EU and G-7 delegations met on April 13. They agreed that the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station must be closed by 2000. Two steam and gas plants will be constructed near the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station to compensate for the plant's closure.

Nuclear power stations produce about a third of Ukraine's electricity.

To Disband 2 Nuclear Regiments By End of April

LD1204195195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1740 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [No dateline as received] Two more strategic nuclear regiments will be taken off duty by the end of April, Oleksandr Serdyuk, head of the Ukrainian strategic nuclear forces control center, told a news conference on 17 April. This will complete the dismantling of the first 60 nuclear missile launch silos out of a total of 176 that Ukraine possessed prior to the signing of the START treaty.

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Serdyuk said that three silos will be eliminated by explosion. Under a recent agreement, the German Government will provide 1 million German marks to help with the elimination of silos situated near populated areas.

Struggle To Maintain Space Program Viewed

WS1704133095 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0047 GMT 17 Apr 95

[Report by Natalia Olynec and Andriy Chirva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The end of the Cold War left Ukraine with only part of the broader Soviet space program—a high-tech industry missing components critical to an independent functioning system. Missing parts, low budgets and fleeing space researchers challenge the three-year-old Ukrainian National Space Agency [UNSA]. But today it continues to survive by expanding international space cooperation, particularly with Russia and the United States.

During the Soviet era, the Ukrainian space industry performed specific functions such as producing high-performance control and navigation modules for Soviet satellites, space stations and missiles. The situation now in Ukraine is like a disrupted assembly line, says Yaroslava Johnson, an American lawyer and space expert. Thus it would be almost impossible for Ukraine to now develop a comprehensive national space program without close cooperation with Russia.

For Ukraine to implement an independent space research program the nation would need missiles, satellites and a developed ground infrastructure including launching sites, a space control center and communication facilities, according to Yaroslav Yatskiv, head of the National Space Research Council. But an independent space program is out of reach for recession-gripped Ukraine.

What Ukraine does have is a strong technological foundation, including 398 satellites produced during the past 30 years by the Pivdenne design bureau in cooperation with PivdenMash.

Disillusioned Researchers

But Ukraine's highly qualified scientists are disenchanted after receiving meager salaries for sophisticated work. The average monthly salary of a UNSA staff member is 6 million karbovantsi [KBV] (US$40). "Scientists and technicians who have been working on major space-related projects must stay employed and earn money to maintain their expertise. Ukraine does have some very competent people, but many are working their regular space jobs and trying to work one or two part-time jobs. When they're well paid in Ukraine, it's quite low by U.S. or Western European standards," says one Western diplomat.

Vladyslav Honcharuk, director of the Kiev Institute of Colloidal and Water Chemistry, shares this concern. "If this situation does not improve soon, we will lose our scientific potential. Today our best scientists are leaving Ukraine for Western countries to work there. They have to do this because the salary they get in this country is not enough to make ends meet," says Honcharuk.

Parliament allocated 0.25 percent of the budget this year for a national space program. "We cannot say that we were given very little because right now Ukraine has a very large task to restructure the economy," says Valeriy Komarov, UNSA deputy director general. "What was given shows that we have not been forgotten and are considered important."

UNSA is preparing a presidential decree trimming the space program to meet post-independence needs. "Before Ukraine launched more that 100 strategic defense rockets a year, that's no longer a strategic secret. It is completely different now when we need to produce a few space launchers a year. We cannot now guarantee every former space researcher a job," says Komarov. "We are no longer preparing for Star Wars."

Officials hope to eliminate expensive unnecessary programs. Space-related institutions are not subject to privatization, but they will probably be redirected to other fields. "Ukraine is now an independent country and must reorient institutions to answer to our own national interests," says Oleh Uruskiy, head of the UNSA transport systems department.

Going Global in Space

International cooperation in space is increasing because of the high cost of maintaining individual, manned space programs. The world scientific community is focused on the long-planned construction of the International Space Station Alpha which should begin in November 1997. The US$19 billion project—largely financed by the United States—will unite researchers from the United States, Canada, Japan, the European Union, and Russia.

Ukrainian researchers are deeply involved in the production of Russian equipment for the station. "There is a global trend towards the internationalization of space programs," says Komarov. Russia is responsible for the development of a basic power unit, a docking control system, a scapulae orientation system and a cargo transportation system, but many of these systems were designed in Ukraine. The orientation system and the power unit of the space station were designed at the Khartron factory in Kharkov. Kiev's radio factory is developing a docking control system for the space station, and control systems for Russian Proton, and Soyuz rocket launchers are expected to be used as cargo transportation systems.

Although both sides have squabbled over the extent of Ukraine's contributions to the project, officials say the

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conflicts are not serious. "In our field there are practically no misunderstandings," says Komarov. Western officials see the this as a normal negotiating process. "Ukrainians are a minor partner (in the project), but a major partner of Russia," said a Western diplomat. "When you have a major partner and a minor partner a certain amount of conflict is normal."

Ukraine is seeking greater cooperation with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. UNSA became part of a CIS international space program in 1993 and sees Russia as its main partner in space, according to Komarov. A Ukrainian delegation next week will negotiate with Russian officials concerning greater cooperation. In addition to Ukraine's contributions to Russian projects, Russia manufactures engines for Ukrainian Cyclone and Zenith rocket launchers.

There are several other Ukrainian projects with international applications. The Crimean astrophysical laboratory Spektr project is developing an ultraviolet telescope with a 170-centimeter reflector. Scientists conducting several solar research projects (Korona, Korona-F and Photon) are studying the relationship between earthquakes and ionosphere conditions and the effect of low levels of gravity on biological cell germination.

But these projects demand special satellites designed specifically for technical, biological and communication research, according to Volodymyr Dranovskiy, Pivdenne bureau's chief designer. "Although it is feasible for Ukrainian designers to develop such satellites, this work requires huge financing, which would never make a rapid, say in a year, return on investment. But we continue to work on the multi-functional satellite Sich-1," says Dranovskiy.

The Sich-1 satellite is almost complete—only a compact module developed by Chilean researchers needs to be installed, according to Dranovskiy. It is innovative because it has a unique control and navigation system and a wide-range radar that is indispensable for the environment monitoring. The agreement to install this satellite-within-a-satellite was reached between Ukrainian and British specialists from the company SSTL which commissioned the Chilean module.

The Sich-1 satellite is the first Ukrainian-produced space product after independence. It is designed to work in space for approximately one year. Afterwards it will be replaced by a more powerful satellite, the Sich-2. The Sich-1 is expected to be launched from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Russia by a Cyclone rocket in June, while the Sich-2 is expected to be launched from Baikonur by a Zenith-type missile.

Ukraine also plans to launch this year the Lybid communication satellite to improve national telecommunications. The satellite will broadcast government communication, Defense Ministry projects and television and radio shows.

Ukraine, however, is far from becoming an independent force in space. Even if more funding was available for UNSA, Ukraine lacks a permanent launching site and an astronaut training program. Experts say Ukrainian territory is too heavily populated to build a national launching site.

Officials plan to lease Russia's Baikonur Cosmodrome launching site, according to Yatskiv. Moscow leased the site for 20 years from Kazakhstan. Other possibilities include setting up launching sites in Australia, special floating platforms in the ocean, or even launching a missile from an airplane—a project called Svitiaz. UNSA will support the most commercially viable projects, says Yatskiv.

Seeking U.S. Contracts

Increasing cooperation with the United States, the largest investor in space research, is giving Ukrainian scientists hopes for greater funding. President Leonid Kuchma signed a space-cooperation agreement with the United States during his trip to Washington last November. The most tangible result of the agreement is U.S. financial support for a Ukrainain space welding experiment. The Paton Institute in Kiev has a US$500,000 contract from the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration to conduct an experiment on space welding. The new technology might be tested by a Ukrainian payload specialist on the U.S. space shuttle in 1997.

UNSA is already selecting a Ukrainian astronaut to conduct biological experiments on the shuttle. The project will take three years of planning, including 18 months of language and flight training at the Johnson Space Center in Texas and at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida.

UNSA is seeking methods to adapt Ukrainian space technology for a profitable commercial market to fuel the entire industry. As a first step, NASA's Administrator Daniel Goldin in March sent a team to Ukraine to study the prospects of commercializing Ukraine's space technology. The group should present its recommendations to UNSA within a few months.

The Pivdenniy design bureau and the PivdenMash missile factory in Dnipropetrovsk are competing in an international tender to launch a series of low-orbit communication satellites in the first phase of the U.S. Global Star program, according to UNSA officials.

Ukraine's participation awaits official confirmation by the United States Department of Trade. If Ukrainian contractors are granted an export license, Ukraine will launch two Zenith commercial missiles, earning US$50 million and access to further participation in the program. "This would be a serious first step to less talking and greater real cooperation," says Komarov. "But we need patience and time."

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Relatively low production costs are a market advantage for Ukraine. Some foreign specialists estimated the potential demand for Zenith commercial launches at 10-12 takeoffs a year, bringing in significant hard currency earnings and creating more jobs.

A U.S. Department of Trade delegation will visit Ukraine April 26-27 to study the possible commercial use of Ukrainian rocket launchers. Although the United States produces its own launchers, the demand is increasing and Ukrainian production is cheaper. "The demand for launchers until 2000 may become greater and perhaps the United States will not be able to produce them all," says Komarov. To date only Russia has purchased Ukrainian launchers.

Communication Leads to Partnership

Although Ukrainian scientists conduct sophisticated research, they are often unable to put it to use because scientific institutions can barely afford to keep their hallways well lit, let alone explore the commercial applications of individual experiments. Researchers lack the resources to find interested Western partners or sponsors.

Officials at the International Science Foundation [ISF], which is funded by philanthropist and financier George Soros, believe the free, rapid exchange of information will lead to greater international understanding and cooperation. The ISF specializes in the development of the basic sciences in the former Soviet Union.

The ISF and NASA last week signed a Memorandum of Understanding creating a framework for the ISF telecommunications program. By year's end the ISF will establish the Kiev Institutional Network linking hospitals, universities, observatories and research centers to similar American institutions on the Internet communications superhighway. NASA will fund the network's satellite channel while the ISF will install and provide equipment, as well as training for Internet users. Organizers expect Ukrainian-U.S. cooperation will increase beyond space programs, creating joint projects in earth science and telemedicine, according to Vyacheslav Shkarupin, director of the ISF telecommunications program. The Foundation is establishing similar networks in Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Yaroslavl.

These programs should help Ukraine fulfill its high technological potential, despite economic concerns. "Ukraine can have an important role to play in international space endeavors, be it scientific or commercial," says a Western diplomat. "Sometimes they just need equipment and guidance from the United States, and that is starting in a small way. There is a need to adapt Soviet technology to Western needs."

Economic Issues

EBRD Grant for Development of Small Business

WS1804084695 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0710 GMT 18 Apr 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On April 17, during a press conference held at the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister, Ihor Mityukov, reported that in the near future the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will make a decision regarding the opening of a credit line to Ukraine for the sum of 50 million USD. These funds will be used as a contribution of the European Bank to statutory capitals of Ukrainian businesses. Mityukov added that last week during the negotiations between a Ukrainian delegation and the management of the European Bank in London, the latter expressed a desire to considerably increase the amount of its financial aid to Ukraine. Currently the Bank supports four projects to be implemented in Ukraine. These are the support of Ukrainian small and medium-size businesses, the reconstruction of the Borispol airport, the development of telecommunications between Ukraine and Italy, and the establishment of a wholesale vegetable and fruits market in Ukraine. According to Mityukov, a delegation of the European Bank is expected to visit Kiev in the near future in order to discuss another two projects regarding the reforming of agricultural and energy sectors. The latter, in particular, foresees the reconstruction of the Darnytsya thermo-electric power plant near Kiev.

Joint Venture With Canada To Develop Oil, Gas Field

WS1704121595 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0800 GMT 17 Apr 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A source in the Ukrainian State Committee for Oil, Gas and the Oil Processing Industry informed an INFOBANK correspondent that Ukraine Oil International Inc. of Canada and the UKRNAFTA joint stock company of Ukraine decided to establish the KASHTAN-Petroleum Ltd., a joint venture to complete the development of the Leliakhiv oil and gas field in the oil-rich Pryluky region of the Chernihiv Oblast. The Ukrainian party owns 55 percent of shares in the venture and the Canadian party 45 percent. The State Geology Committee and State Property Fund of Ukraine have already issued a license to develop the field for a period of twenty years. The joint venture plans to develop 24 wells and 3 pressured wells. Experts assess that up to 3,335 thousand tons of oil can be extracted from the Leliakhiv oil and gas field.

Currency Stabilized Anticipating International Assistance

WS1704132995 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0047 GMT 17 Apr 95

[Report by Oleh Borsuk]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Ukrainian currency last week stabilized on the nation's official money market in

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anticipation of international credits to be received by the National Bank of Ukraine [NBU] to support the karbovanets [KBV].

The Ukrainian Interbank Currency Exchange [UICE] closed Friday [14 April] at KBV132,900/USD, with the karbovanets remaining stable for more than a week. The stability follows the previous week's uncertainty, when the karbovanets lost 2.15 percent, after the parliament ousted the entire Cabinet of Ministers.

Anticipating a bailout for the karbovanets, currency traders on the cash market were more confident in the local currency, with the karbovanets gaining more than 1.3 percent for buys and more than 1.6 percent for sells in seven days. The cash market rates were KBV148,500/USD for buys and KBV153,000/USD for sells.

However, despite its stability against the U.S. currency, the karbovanets lost more than 2.5 percent against the German currency last week, which indicates the Deutsche mark's [DM] strong worldwide performance against the dollar, rather than the karbovanets' weakness. The German mark closed at KBV97,400/DM last week at the UICE, now yielding a better cross exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the German currency at DM1.36/USD, down from nearly DM1.4/USD the previous week.

The karbovanets also depreciated by 3 percent against the Russian ruble last week, which still did not offset the karbovanets previous week's 7.1 percent gains.

The brokers' optimism concerning the karbovanets is fueled by massive credits which are supposed to bail out both the nation's economy and the currency. The credits, recently approved by the International Monetary Fund, include a US$1.5 billion standby loan and the second tranche of the System Transformation Facility [STF] worth about US$370 million.

Another standby loan might be negotiated during the first quarter of 1996, according to IMF representatives in Kiev.

The NBU used the first part of the STF, received by Ukraine late last year, for currency interventions at the UICE to bail out the karbovanets. The loan was worth US$371 million and brought stability to the currency market in Ukraine.

In the wake of recent support from international financial authorities, some officials say Ukraine may be able to introduce the hryvnya, the country's supposedly new currency, by the end of the year. Government officials said the hryvnya may be introduced after the country reduces its monthly inflation to between 2 and 5 percent.

According to the government's statistics, there was 11 percent inflation in March, compared with 18 percent in February and 26 percent in January. Last year Ukraine managed to reduce the monthly inflation to 3.9 percent in June, down from nearly 20 percent in January. In July there was the lowest monthly inflation in 1994—2.1 percent.

Kuchma said earlier this year that the hryvnia will be definitely introduced in 1995, while the NBU Governor Viktor Yushchenko said the hryvnya will "probably" be launched in the first half of 1995.

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Belarus

Agreement With International Atomic Energy Agency Signed

WS1704121795 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0800 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On 14 April, a signing ceremony of an agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on the application of guarantees took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The agreement was signed by Ivan Kenik, minister for emergency situations and protection of people from consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and IAEA General Director H. Blix. The agreement was concluded in accordance with Clause 3 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], which Belarus joined in July 1993. Having signed the agreement, the Republic of Belarus pledged to grant the IAEA the right to control its nuclear activity. The main aim of the guarantees that are applied by the IAEA is the ensuring of the world community's certitude that a state will not reorientate its nuclear activity to military ends. Of particular importance is the fact that Belarus signed the agreement on the eve of a conference on the prolongation of the NPT, which will begin on 17 April in New York.

Independent Trade Unions To Picket Government

WS1704121895 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0800 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Association of Independent Industrial Trade Unions of Belarus will picket the house of government for two weeks. The picketing will start on 18 April and will be held daily from 0900 to 1100 until 30 April on Independence Square. The picketers' demands will include: not to allow wages to be frozen, to regard wages as the most important form of payment, to launch a monetary-credit policy stimulating production and export, to repeal the VAT. Analogous demands were included in an appeal to the president from the industrial trade unions that are members of the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus, which was sent on 13 April. In the appeal it is pointed out that enterprises are being shut down, because of the one-sided realization of the government anti-crisis program, an acute shortage of working capital, nonpayments, and the critical situation in the market.

The industrial trade unions consider the current socio-economic situation to be fraught with social disturbances and propose to take urgent measures to create conditions for the rise in production, the stimulation of the market, and the replenishment of enterprises' working assets.

Moldova

PDAM 'Dominated' 16 Apr Local Election

AU1704142195 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Agrarian Party [PDAM], a grouping that holds the power in the Republic of Moldova, dominated yesterday's [16 April] local elections. Our special envoy Constantin Mihai reports that, according to the preliminary data issued by the rayonal electoral commissions, the Agrarians are in the lead—45 percent—for the positions of councillors in Vulcanesti, Liova, and Cantemir Rayons, followed by the opposition bloc the Alliance of Democratic Forces and the Communist Party, which totalled some 25-31 percent of the vote. According to the same preliminary data, the representatives of the ruling party are leading in the Soldanesti, Octina, Sangerei, Edinet, and Bricheni rayons, situated in the northern part of the Republic, as well as in the central rayons.

Further on Local Elections

LD1704174095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1506 GMT 17 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, and edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to preliminary results, the ruling Agrarian Democratic Party collected the majority of votes in the Sunday local elections, the Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Vasiliy Paskar told Interfax Monday [17 April].

According to him, the left-wing alliance of Socialists, Communists and the Unity movement came second.

He said it was hard to tell for sure at this stage which of the eight parties participating in the elections got the greatest number of votes.

He spoke of the low average turnout of 60 percent: 1,430,000 out of 2,370,210 registered voters cast their ballots.

The commission chairman said that in several towns elections were invalid. For instance, less than 35 percent of voters came to polling stations in Chisinau. The turnout in Belts (a major industrial center in the north of the country with a population of 130,000) was 48 percent. IF Note: A second round of voting will be held in the districts where elections returns are invalid. If the turnout is insufficient again, the president will have to appoint the heads of local government bodies by decree.

Paskar spoke of the activeness of rural residents, especially in the north of the country: 70 percent to 80 percent of voters.

On election day President Mircea Snegur described the situation in the country as stable. In his opinion a month of students' actions was another indication of growing democracy.

Snegur said it would have been better to find a compromise in the conflict with students at once, but in the final account the students returned to classes and the minor cause of tension was removed. He hoped the tension would not recur because the government tries to resolve

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the key problems of the students and fulfil their demands. IF Note: The school and university students who rallied in the capital since March 18 stopped their protest action on election day. On the eve they removed their tent camp. The chairman of the national strike committee Anatoliy Petrenko told Interfax that the committee decided to interrupt the action after the presidential decree on a moratorium on changes in Romanian language and history courses, not because of the elections.

Petrenko said the protest was suspended till May 4, not stopped. He said the government and parliament have been given time to study and carry out students' demands. The strike committee will meet regularly and if it is not satisfied with the results of talks with the authorities, the action will resume, he said.

Students Suspend Strike Until 4 May

AU1704181695 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 15 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 15/4/1995—The students and teachers strike was suspended today until May 4. Making public this decision at the rally in Piata Marii Adunari Nationale Anatol Petrencu, strike committee chairman, said that by May 4 President Snegur will have to fulfill his promise and submit the draft law on amendments to Constitutional Article 13 to the Parliament, and the presidential commission will have to satisfy the demands forwarded by the strikers. Otherwise, the Strike Committee will resume the protest actions. Meanwhile, the talks with authorities will continue. According to Petrencu, Parliamentary Assembly chairman Miguel Angel Martinez was handed a letter in which the strikers favour Moldova's admittance into the Council of Europe. This afternoon, the protesters began to remove the tents. On Monday, teachers and students will begin attending classes. Yesterday, Strike Committee leaders were alerted that Oleg Cernei, Students League chairman, was missing. He was found today sleeping in dormitories after several nights without sleep.

Gagauz Battalion Rebels Over Unpaid Wages

AU1704153395 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 14/4/1995—Gagauz President Stepan Topal called the demands forwarded by "Bugeac" battalion "an attempt of coup d'etat." On April 12, Bugeac battalion guardians and representatives of other Gagauz military formations of Comrat, Ceadar Lunga and Vulcanesti encircled the Comrat District Executive Council building which is the headquarters of Stepan Topal and demanded payment of salary arrears. The protesters detained the presidential car and another one of a Comrat government member. The "Bugeac" battalion is subordinated under the Gagauz parliamentary presidium. Ivan Burguji of the Comrat parliamentary presidium told BASA that "the guardians had no political claims; they only demanded payment of salaries for the last nine months." He said this incident "coincides by chance and regrettably" with the campaign of collecting signatures for Mikhail Kendigelyan and Stepan Topal's candidatures for Gagauz Yeri governor. "Currently we are seeking means to pay off salary arrears," said Burguji. Sources from the Comrat government told BASA that "the tendencies of certain dignitaries to become governor by any illegal or anti-democratic means is too obvious." Today, Stepan Topal summoned all Comrat economic entities to find funds to pay the salary arrears.

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Kazakhstan

Prime Minister Talks With U.S. Energy Officials

LD1704171395 Almaty Kazakh Television First Program Network in Russian 1100 GMT 17 Apr 95

[Unidentified correspondent video report]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kazakh Prime Minister Akezhan Magzhanuly Qazhygeldin met William White, deputy secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, today.

[Correspondent] Only two weeks have passed since our prime minister's visit to the United States, where both the power industry and cooperation in this area were among the issues discussed. Now we have the return visit, the mission of which is to put into concrete terms the results of the talks on the problems of the power industry.

While in the United States, our delegation put forward seven issues, to which Kazakhstan is expecting answers. Today Mr. White, who did not come to Almaaty alone, but with congressmen and a director of one of the departments of the National Security Council and other officials, gave positive answers in the areas of the defense industry, the problems of using wind energy, and in the form of presenting Kazakhstan with computers for monitoring nuclear processes.

The United States of America is in favor of cooperation with Kazakhstan, they said; this is definite. There is a prospect of great work between our countries. The results of Akezhan Kazhegeldin's visit to the United States and the present one of William White to Kazakhstan convince us more and more that the new government may achieve many things, because many thing are already being achieved. [passage omitted]

Nazarbayev Signs Baykonur Lease Documents

LD1804090495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0621 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Almaty, 18 Apr—Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, using the extra powers he has been granted, today signed a decree on ratification of the lease contract for the Baykonur complex between the governments of Kazakhstan and Russia, which was concluded in Moscow on 10 December 1994.

According to the contract, the Baykonur complex is leased to the Russian Federation for 20 years, with a subsequent extension of 10 years if neither side states an intention to dissolve it. The rental is $115 million a year.

The contract says that the Russian Federation's laws apply to Russian citizens and that its competent bodies are operative on the territory of the complex. The constitutional rights of Kazakhstan's citizens are guaranteed by the republic's competent bodies in accordance with its own legislation.

The Baykonur complex has not become a Russian military base on Kazakhstan's territory, as was once proposed by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. It will be used on terms of mutually beneficial cooperation for space exploration in the interests of the peoples of the two countries.

Oil Ministry Signs Agreement With Russian Company

LD1704120295 Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p2

[FBIS Translated Text] An agreement has been signed between the Oil and Gas Industry Ministry and the Kazakh-Russian oil company LUKoil [as received]. The agreement envisages the parties' cooperation in extracting and refining hydrocarbon resources on the territory of Kazakhstan. It was signed by Oil and Gas Industry Minister Nurlan Balgimbayev, on the Kazakh side, and the company's president, V. Alekperov.

Under the agreement it is planned to create a transnational company, which will deal mainly with developing the oil and gas complex, ensuring stable and effective work on extracting and processing raw phosphates from the Karatau basin, raising export potential and competitiveness, as well as attracting foreign investments and advanced technology.

A joint venture is to be established on Kazakh territory with the aim of developing the Kumkol deposit. The Russian partner has undertaken to maintain supplies of west Siberian oil, which is to be mixed with the Kumkol oil and refined at the Chimkent oil refinery. In return, the Kazakh side has granted the Russians an opportunity to buy shares in the plant. As for the joint venture itself, it will have the right to market products made from the mixture of Kumkol and west Siberian oil.

The sides will consider and make a decision on providing the LUKoil refinery with oil from the Kalamkas and Karazhanbas fields from the port of Aktau. An opportunity to carry out joint geological prospecting work in Caspian Sea waters is also to be discussed. LUKoil is to participate in repairing oil wells at the Kumkol, Uzen, and other deposits, while our side is to consider the possibility of the duty-free import of Russian equipment for conducting repairs on the wells, and exporting the oil, which will be payment for the completed work.

The agreement also envisages setting up, on the basis of the Atyrau refinery, a joint venture with an equal contribution from both sides, which is to produce 50,000 tonnes of motor oil a year. It is planned that raw material for the venture will be provided by the Volgograd refinery. After the company puts gas deposits on Uzbekistan's territory on stream, another joint venture is to be set up for delivering gas from the deposits to Kazakhstan.

The Russian side has accepted a proposal made by the Kazakh side on the republic's participation in constructing and running the Yuzhnyy plant in the city of

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Novorossiysk, with a five percent share, which may be increased later. The sides agreed to form a working group within a two-week period after the signing of the agreement to coordinate actions and organize an efficient exchange of information about the course of implementation of the actual points of the agreement.

Government Signs Oil Deal With Mobil

LD1704193795 Almaty Kazakh Television First Program Network in Russian 1400 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An agreement on the development of hydrocarbon extraction was signed today in Almaty between the Kazakhstani Government and the American oil company Mobil.

Opening the signing ceremony, Kazakh Prime Minister Akezhan Qazhygeldin said that for Kazakhstan this April was the real month of oil and gas. He meant both the recently signed agreement with the Russian LUKoil and today's accord with the U.S. Mobil, which envisages oil and gas exploration on the territories of the two western regions of the Republic of Kazakhstan—the Aktyube and the Atyrau regions, with the subsequent development of the reserves that are discovered.

Here is the answer to your question, he told journalists, of what we did recently in the United States. Now one more experienced, authoritative and wealthy American will work in Kazakhstan, alongside Chevron, which has already invested over $700 million. Should oilfields with reserves of 140 million tonnes be found approximately $9 billion will be invested in this work, including extraction and transportation. They will give a return in 13 years and the investment will pay for itself.

Meanwhile, the expected net profit of the state is over $8 billion. There is also a second option, which is on a larger scale and thus more desirable.

The agreement was signed on the Kazakh side by the republic's First Deputy Prime Minister Vitaliy Mette and Serikbek Daukeyev, the minister of geology and protection of underground resources, and on the American side by William White, the deputy secretary of the Department of Energy, and the Mobil President Lucio Noto.

At the news conference, which was held immediately after the signing, the parties noted the major significance attributed by the American Government to the cooperation between the American company and Kazakhstan. Qazhygeldin noted that an important step had been taken, and that this step would not be the last.

Security Committee Uncovers Suspected Foreign Agents

LD1704153795 Almaty PANORAMA in Russian 15 Apr 95 p 6

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the beginning of the year the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan has uncovered several agents from foreign intelligence services, who had attempted to cause economic and political damage to Kazakhstan.

The National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan has been authorized to announce the following: "The National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan announces that, in spite of the fact that the international climate is getting remarkably warmer and the processes of integration are expanding, the intelligence services of some states are making attempts to use the openness of our society for reconnaissance purposes.

"The case of the National Security organizations of the republic uncovering the agents, from non-former Soviet countries, who had concrete tasks—the fulfillment of which could have caused economic and political damage to Kazakhstan—is confirmation of that.

"An investigation is under way."

[Signed] Press Secretary K. Beknazarov

Tajikistan

U.S. Firm Seeks Contract To Bury Nuclear Waste

MK1804094095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Oleg Rish in the "Situation" column: "Tajikistan Could Become a Nuclear Waste Dump. Dushanbe Is Being Offered $50 Million"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Several weeks ago a man who did not introduce himself phoned NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA and said that the Tajikistan Government intends to conclude a contract with a certain Arkadiy Kuks, a former Soviet citizen now living in the United States. The anonymous caller also said that the contract provided for burying nuclear waste on Tajikistan territory. It also mentioned the sum offered for Tajikistan's accepting radioactive material: $50 million.

A few days ago Svyatoslav Zabelin, a member of the board of the international organization "Socio-Ecological Union," told NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent that this fact is being confirmed by reports not only from Dushanbe but also from the United States. Indeed, a group of people representing a private U.S. firm visited Dushanbe. They held negotiations with the government on the subject of burying waste on the territory of Leninabad Oblast, in the republic's north. After it made queries through its channels, on 6 April the Socio-Ecological Union received confirmation from Washington that such negotiations have indeed taken place. This information originates from Bill Jackson, U.S. State Department coordinator on Tajikistan, who said that he knows about these negotiations and that the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe

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also has information about the participants in the negotiations, and the aims of their trip. He denies that U.S. government circles are involved in these negotiations, however.

Svyatoslav Zabelin also told NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent that the Socio-Ecological Union will monitor the negotiating process. In the recent period U.S. firms have been conducting similar negotiations about the possibility of burying radioactive waste also with Dagestan.

In Tajikistan, nuclear waste can be buried in Leninabad Oblast possibly because there are many abandoned old mines, where, starting with the 1940's, radioactive ore containing radium and uranium has been extracted.

The Tajikistan authorities will hardly be able to appreciate to what extent such a contract is dangerous to the population. In all likelihood, Dushanbe wants to get the "easy" $50 million because the republic is in the most difficult economic situation. As Svyatoslav Zabelin promised, however, the attempt to make Tajikistan a nuclear waste dump will be a center of attention by international ecological organizations.

Karimov: Russia To Supply 'Concrete Military Aid'

LD1704170195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1620 GMT 17 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dushanbe, 17 Apr—"We are firmly in favor of a close alliance with the Russian Federation, and the results of the talks in Moscow show that our interests fully coincide," Tajik Prime Minister Jamshed Karimov said in an interview with Tajik TV today, while commenting on his talks with the Russian Government in Moscow. He held them at the instruction of Emomali Rakhmanov.

Karimov also said that the Russian Government supports the Tajik leadership's efforts to reach economical and political stability in the country and guaranteed that the Russian border troops and Russia's 201st motor rifle division would stay in the country along with the armed subunits of other countries of the CIS, to protect the border with Afghanistan in the framework of the collective security treaty.

The prime minister said that during the talks a decision was made to provide the republic with concrete military aid. The question of credit in the amount of 60 billion rubles has also been resolved and the provision of goods at this amount will start soon. There are plans to sign a number of fundamental concrete agreements, above all on deepening of economic and military integration.

Reason Rakhmanov Asked For Military Assistance

LD1704163695 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Last Friday [14 April] a meeting of the Central Asian heads of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan took place in the Kazakh town of Chimkent. This meeting had a (?connection) to a solution to Tajikistan's problems. [passage omitted]

Without leaving this issue, I would like to mention that Tajik President Rakhmanov has asked for more military assistance to wipe out his own people. This demonstrates that though Rakhmanov talks about philanthropy and justice in his private conversations and in other conversations, and claims that he advocates a political resolution to the problem, we can see that he shows a different side of himself to his masters. That is to say, he shows them another face and wants military assistance from them.

This assistance, that is, Rakhmanov's request, was approved after conversations between General Nikolayev, commander of the Russian Border Troops, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the North Caucasus. Boris Yeltsin agreed to send additional forces.

Rakhmanov had sent what seemed to be a sincere message to Professor Nuri, leader of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, in a private conversation, requesting with heartfelt entreaties the earliest possible end to the clashes, stressing that we Tajiks [words indistinct] must solve our problems without outside interference.

This again makes it clear that he can [words indistinct] have several faces and shows a different face to different people. But the leadership of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan knows what Rakhmanov's aim is in this. What he says and what he thinks—everything that he says—does not bear out his truthfulness and philanthropy.

The Islamic Movement of Tajikistan has said that it will make every effort to achieve the positive desires of Tajikistan's nation generally and all the residents of Tajikistan as a whole.

Rakhmanov: Border Must Be Protected Jointly

LD1704174895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1506 GMT 17 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, and edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Russia and Tajikistan must protect the Tajik-Afghan border jointly, President Rakhmanov stated in Dushanbe on Sunday [16 April] during talks with Chairman of the Federation Council's Committee for Security and Defense, Major-General Petr Shirshov.

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"One must talk about the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, the southern frontier of the CIS, rather than about the situation in Tajikistan, which is normal and is the affair of the Tajik leaders," stated Rakhmanov.

Shirshov, who is leading the delegation of the Federation Council, told Interfax that "everything must be done to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border." "We shall do what we have planned in this respect, shortly," he said.

Meanwhile, on Monday, Dushanbe is to shape a Tajik government delegation to consultations with the Tajik opposition. The Tajik parliament's first vice chairman Abdulmajid Dostiyev who will be shaping the delegation on commission from President Rakhmanov, said that the delegation will consist of 5-6 members. He refused to name the delegates, however, saying only that he was ready to lead the delegation if he received such instructions.

The inter-Tajik summit consultations to be held in Moscow on April 17 are expected to bring together First Vice-Chairman of the Islamic Revival Movement Akbar Turajonzoda and Vice-Chairman of this opposition organization Mukhammad Sharif Khimatzoda.

The consultations were initiated by the U.N. secretary-general's special envoy in charge of Tajik settlement Ramiro Piriz-Ballon.

Earlier, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Chernyshev told Interfax that the main goal of the meeting was "to organize the 4th round of the inter-Tajik talks" which had been put off several times.

"We do not rule out that if the meeting goes successfully, it will evolve into the 4th round," he said.

Situation 'Very Alarming' on Tajik-Afghan Border

LD1804081395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0740 GMT 18 Apr 95

[By Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe, April 18 (ITAR-TASS)—The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border continues to be very alarming, but it is being kept under control by Russian frontier guards, a spokesman for the command of the Russian frontier guard troops in Tajikistan told ITAR-TASS today.

He said Tajik opposition fighters continued their attempts to penetrate into Tajikistan from Afghanistan by small groups. The fire opened by Russian frontier guards stops them. The concentration and regrouping of enemy forces are going on at the Pamir direction, which, in the opinion of the command, is evidence of the intention of Tajik opposition fighters to provoke more armed clashes with Russian and Tajik frontier guard troops, deployed there.

Delegation Leaves for Moscow Talks With Opposition

LD1804080195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0633 GMT 18 Apr 95

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dushanbe, 18 April—An official Tajik Government delegation left by plane for Moscow this morning where consultations with leaders of the Tajik opposition are due to begin on 19 April.

"We leave with a certain sense of optimism and in the hope that the consultations with our opponents will yield positive results," First Deputy Premier of Tajikistan Mahmadsaid Ubaydullayev, who leads the government delegation, said in an interview with the ITAR- TASS correspondent before leaving. According to him, issues linked to the operational situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, the problem of both sides' observance of the Teheran cease-fire agreement, and the matter of fixing a time and a place for holding the fourth round of the inter-Tajik talks will be discussed during the consultations.

"During the talks, we will be putting forward the firm view of Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov which, I am sure, is in keeping with the interests of the Tajik people and peace and stability in Tajikistan," the deputy premier stressed.

As for the location of the fourth round of the inter-Tajik dialogue, Mahmadsaid Ubaydullayev stressed that his delegation would insist on Moscow in accordance with the agreement reached during the previous, third round which was held in Islamabad.

The delegation includes the heads of the republic's security ministries and public figures.

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Armenia

Premier Meets IAEA Officials on Nuclear Plant Safety

NC1704211095 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1900 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The problems of ensuring safe operation of the Armenian nuclear plant were discussed at a high-level meeting held today between Armenian Prime Minister Hrand Bagratian and an International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, delegation.

The Armenian government press service reports that (Morris Rosen), head of the delegation and head of the IAEA's nuclear safety department, has on the whole expressed satisfaction with the ongoing work to ensure the safety of the nuclear plant. He said: Your specialists are of the opinion that there is no reason not to operate the nuclear plant, and we concur with them.

Next, Mr. Rosen expressed his observations as regards safety measures, stressing the necessity for close cooperation with the international nuclear safety agencies.

Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan noted that more than anyone else Armenia and its authorities are interested in the safety of the nuclear plant. Therefore, safety issues will always be kept in mind before and during the operation of the plant.

Present at the meeting were Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Vigen Chitechyan, Energy and Fuel Minister Miron Shishmanyan; Ashot Martirosyan, head of Haybetatomhskoghutyun [Armenian state control over nuclear plant] enterprise; [name indistinct], head of the IAEA safety standards department; and specialists Bilboa and [name indistinct].

Turkmenistan Resumes Gas Supplies to Yerevan, Georgia

LD1804051595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0015 GMT 18 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yerevan, 18 April—Gas supplies along a main pipeline from Turkmenistan to Transcaucasia resumed on Monday [17 April] after a five-day break. Gas supplies were cut off on 12 April owing to a financial discord between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on whose territory the pipeline is laid, Roland Adonz, president of the Armgazprom [Armenian gas industry] state concern told ITAR-TASS. He noted that gas had already reached the territory of Georgia and would reach Armenia tonight.

Owing to gas cuts and, hence, power cuts, electricity is supplied only for one hour a day to residential areas in Yerevan and other towns and areas of Armenia. This abridged schedule is valid for today as well. [passage omitted]

Speaker Thanks Russian Duma for Genocide Denunciation

NC1704205895 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1900 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Chairman of the Armenian Supreme Council Babken Araktsyan sent a message to Chairman of the Lower House of the Russian Parliament Ivan Rybkin in connection with Russian State Duma's adoption of a statement condemning the genocide of the Armenians in 1915-1922, and expressing deep gratitude over the matter.

Babken Araktsyan's message says in particular: The Armenian people, who emerged from the ashes and reconstructed their sovereign state, understand that the best guarantee against a repetition of genocide is to keep the memory of the victims of the genocide alive and to condemn it no matter its form. It is noteworthy that the Russian State Duma is one of the first to condemn the genocide perpetrated against the Armenian people. This is a manifestation of humanism and lofty morality on the part the Russian parliament.

In underlining this point, Chairman of the Supreme Council Babken Araktsyan specifically noted that this decision is the outcome of the friendly relations based on the great principles of trust and morality that characterizes Armenian-Russian ties. The blood of the millions of innocent victims shed on the vast Armenian plateau 80 years ago appeals to the conscience of the living, and it is noteworthy that that appeal has not remained unheard.

Babken Araktsyan also sent a message to Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and Ties With Compatriots, in which he expressed gratitude to him and the committee for their efforts in the adoption of the statement condemning the genocide of the Armenians in 1915.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev Leaves for Brussels Talks With EU Officials

NC1704153695 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1250 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev left for the Belgian capital, Brussels, today. He will meet with the President of the European Commission Jacques Santer and External Relations Commissioner (Jean Debru).

[Begin recording] [Off-screen reporter] The close and solid ties between Azerbaijan and the EU over the past year is helping solve a number of food-related problems in the republic. The aim of Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev's second visit to Brussels is to visit the EU headquarters and clarify the new direction and level of future cooperation.

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Before the start of the visit the Azerbaijani president made a statement for our program:

[Unidentified reporter] What opportunities would be created by Azerbaijan joining the EU, and are the conditions conducive for it? The Azerbaijani president's foreign visits mostly aim at gaining political support. What would you say?

[Aliyev] It will create enormous opportunities for Azerbaijan. The EU's activity in all fields, both economic and political, is now widely spread all over Europe and the world. Therefore, the development of our relations with the EU is beneficial for our republic in every way. The EU and its economic commission are already providing substantial humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan; in particular, they are sending grain products and other foodstuffs. They are helping us to extricate ourselves from our crisis situation. They have also an extensive program for the future. Therefore, we are using this visit to consolidate Azerbaijan's position in the world, to solve all our problems—the political problems, including the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict—and to secure increased assistance from the EU, from the economic commission. [end recording]

[Announcer] Acting Prime Minister Fuad Guliyev also left for Brussels as part of the delegation.

Chairman of republic's Supreme Soviet Rasul Guliyev, head of the Presidential Executive Staff Ramiz Mehtiyev, First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Arif Rehimzade, Deputy Prime Minister Tofik Azizov, and heads of ministries, committees, and enterprises saw off the Azerbaijani delegation at Baku's Bina airport.

Ciller Apologizes For Involvement of Rightist Coup Attempt

NC1704180295 Ankara TURKISH DAILY NEWS in English 14 Apr 95 p 1

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prime Minister Ciller, in talks with Azeri President Aliyev, apologized for the involvement of "an uncontrollable Turkish right-wing group" in the coup attempt, sources told the TDN [TURKISH DAILY NEWS]. Ciller acknowledged that this group of "some few Turks" were understood to have been behind the revolt but denied allegations suggesting that the Turkish government or some state bodies were involved. Ciller also said the "uncontrollable rightwing" group was not linked to nationalist opposition leader Alparslan Turkes—who has close ties with the opposition Popular Front. Sources said the Turkish right-wing group had acted against Aliyev since it assessed that the Azeri president, a former Soviet Politburo member, "was not pro-Turkish enough."

Oil Cooperation Proposal To Be Made to Iran

LD1704183995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1520 GMT 17 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, April 17 (Interfax)—Azerbaijan is planning to make a "profitable proposal" to Iran, a source at the Azeri foreign ministry told Interfax in Baku Monday [17 April].

In his words, "Baku will offer Teheran bilateral cooperation in the development of Caspian oil deposits that were not included in the Caspian oil consortium. An official initiative to the effect will be put forward during the Iranian visit of an Azeri delegation in mid-May. The delegation is expected to be headed by parliament speaker Rasul Guliyev."

The diplomat described as "absolutely ungrounded" media reports claiming that the U.S. made Azerbaijan abstain from cooperation with Iran in the development of Caspian oil deposits.

Late last year Baku had serious problems with buyers of part of its shares in the Caspian oil consortium. "Iran was the first to respond, and we are grateful to it," said the diplomat.

However, when leading Western companies made interesting proposals, "Baku analyzed the applications objectively and attentively and gave preference to the most profitable," said the source.

The preference was finally given to the U.S. Exxon company. It received five percent of the share of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) in the Caspian consortium, which was first expected to be given to Iran.

The same source said that when making the final decision the Azerbaijani authorities had taken into consideration not only economic but also political reasons. The same source said Baku was going to receive not only financial but also political dividends which, "as Azerbaijan believes, Iran cannot afford at present."

The same source said that an optimum way out of the hard situation had been found. "Azerbaijan hopes that fraternal Iran will understand our difficulties," the same source added.

Foreign Ministry Welcomes Armenian Peace Offer

NC1804104995 Paris AFP in English 0955 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, April 18 (AFP)—The foreign ministry of Azerbaijan welcomed on Tuesday [18 April] a proposal by Armenia to withdraw its troops from a disputed territory inside Azerbaijan in exchange for an end to the Azeri blockade of Armenia.

Azerbaijan "positively views this move and is ready to consider the possibility of such a resolution of the crisis and after having considered it," a foreign ministry statement said.

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The proposal, made recently by Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, would swap an Armenian withdrawal from the Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh enclave in Azerbaijan, for a lifting of Azerbaijan's blockade against Armenia.

The ministry statement added that Azerbaijan would like Armenia to enter an unconditional prisoner and hostage exchange before any troop withdrawals.

On Monday, Azerbaijan's councillor of state for external policy, Vafa Gulizade, said that the longer the dispute dragged on, the worse it was for Armenia. "It's particularly detrimental to Armenia and not to Azerbaijan," he said.

Armenian separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh signed a ceasefire with the Azeris last May as a precursor to a political settlement of the status of the mountainous, 4,000 square-kilometre (1,250 square-mile) enclave.

The ceasefire has been sporadically violated.

Baku has said it is ready to grant Nagorno-Karabakh self rule within Azerbaijan but Armenian separatists are demanding full independence.

So far the only tangible result of the negotiations has been an agreement in principle to send in peacekeeping troops from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The conflict cost 20,000 lives between February 1988 and May 1994.

Russian-Armenian War Games Scored

954F2071A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 5

[Article by Nurani: "Combined Exercises: What Is Going On Behind the Scenes? Open Declaration on Military and Political Union Between Moscow and Yerevan Could Lead to a Global Increase in Tensions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The ink of the signatures had not even dried on the treaty concerning the establishment of Russian military bases on the territory of Armenia when Moscow arranged an impressive demonstration of its military power (and simultaneously also of Armenia's) near the Armenian-Turkish border and of the seriousness of its intentions in the Transcaucasus.

Of course, military exercises are only one of the stages of the restoration of Russian influence in the Transcaucasus. But nevertheless, at least three conclusions can be drawn from the very fact that they were conducted:

1. Russia is trying everything within its power to regain its control over the Transcaucasus.

2. The Russian-Armenian military maneuvers (the first in the history of the CIS) were an open declaration of a military-political union between Moscow and Yerevan—a fact that Moscow previously preferred to hush up.

3. Such a demonstration of military power near NATO borders is evidence of the worsening rivalry between Russia and the United States, which is gradually shifting into a military-political confrontation whose center is not in Eastern Europe, but in the southwest of the continent. Today, out of all of the "discrepancies" that exist between Russia and the United States, most attention is being given to the question about expanding NATO in the east. The old sickness of "Eurocentrism" has still not been overcome either by politicians or journalists, and it essentially concealed an indisputable fact: After the dissolution of the USSR, the first serious differences between Russia and the United States appeared in the Balkans, a region that, like the Transcaucasus also, is key from the standpoint of control over the Bosporus straits and the Dardanelles. But their strategic importance grew immeasurably after Israel was transformed into one of the main characters in the Near East, and the Turkish straits remain the only route for Russian ships to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

In addition, it is also not difficult to penetrate the Persian Gulf ("the world's gas tank") from the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal. Thus, the interest of Russia in strengthening its military power at the Turkish borders is understandable. Especially now, when the role of Turkey in the world has grown significantly, as a result of which this country is being called a "regional superpower." Azerbaijan and the states of Central Asia are orienting themselves on Ankara today, and its authority is great in many Russian components of the Federation. The question lies elsewhere: What consequences can such a sharply growing activeness of Russia in this explosive region have?

First of all, the combined Russian-Armenian maneuvers have decisively destroyed the illusion regarding Russia's "neutrality" in Karabakh, and this means also its ability to play the role of mediator here. Now, when V. Kazimirov has become one of the cochairmen of the Minsk "nine," and the mediation missions of the OSCE and Russia, in fact, are combined, a similar undermining of the trust in Russia could inflict significant damage to the authority of the OSCE as well. Especially as the actions of the cease-fire regime for the peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict have not had particular success for more than a year and a half: The seized lands have not been liberated, the refugees have not returned to their homes, and the Shusha and Lachin question has not been resolved. Even the Budapest summit decision on sending peacekeeping forces of the OSCE to the zone of conflict has remained on paper.

Added to all of this is that such an open demonstration both of military power and political union with Armenia could fully push the latter to take "harsh measures," and, putting it more simply, into a renewal of military operations. Especially since a violation of the cease-fire in Kazakhskiy and Tauzskiy Rayons has not brought about an adequate reaction from the world community. And, indeed, the hopes of making Azerbaijan more tractable

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in negotiations, we will say frankly, have a place, given the help of new territorial seizures in Yerevan corridors and offices of authority. Especially also since not everyone, by far, in Russia wants a quick cessation of military operations and a normalization of the situation in Karabakh. A stabilization of the situation will lead to an increase in investments in the Azerbaijani economy and to the formation of the economic independence of Azerbaijan, and this means to a still greater distancing from Moscow. Moreover, a settlement in Karabakh will deprive the Russian VPK [military-industrial complex] of an enormous and uncontrolled arms market, and the Russian politicians of an ideal lever of pressure on Azerbaijan (and at the same time on Armenia also) with the assistance of military deliveries that are "measured out in doses."

There is no denying that such a sharp activation of Russia, which intends to bring "constitutional order" to Chechnya "with iron and blood," in order to untie its hands in the Transcaucasus, and which is sometimes established by means of open pressure—its own military bases near the Turkish borders—cannot help but evoke retaliatory actions. The open support of Turkish operations in northern Iraq on the part of the United States was hardly accidental, especially since the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] has long-standing and strong ties with Russian "power structures." The proposal that was heard from the lips of Dzh. Presel to begin direct negotiations of representatives of the belligerents in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict without the participation of mediators can be considered partly a reply to Russia's activation. This looks a bit too much like an attempt to exclude the OSCE together with Russia from the negotiating process, by turning the process of the "Karabakh settlement" over "to the complete control" of secret diplomacy.

However, it cannot be ruled out that after the rejection of the OSCE mediation mission and the absence of particular successes in direct negotiations, that a new mediator will appear on the proscenium. In any case, if the Western countries are inclined to give preference to NATO in the future European security system (which automatically means pushing Russia into a secondary role), then Moscow places its hopes on the OSCE, where it and its allies have the right of veto. Under these conditions, Russia is very interested in the trump card appearing in the hands of the OSCE, in the form of a major diplomatic and peacekeeping success. And although the United States is radically interested in the very quick normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it would like very much not to let Russia gain political capital for itself on this.

It is also not difficult to foresee the future course of events. Russia, to all appearances, will intensify military preparations, as a result of which the lion's share of its national income will be "eaten up" by the VPK. In their turn, the Western countries will have to employ adequate measures. The underlying geopolitical reasons for local wars, including the Armenian-Azerbaijan war, will become clearer, which will inevitably lead to new outbreaks of military operations.

It is difficult to say today whether the "new thinking" will suffer the fate of "detente." As it is difficult to foresee whether the Balkans, where at one time the First World War started, have become the birthplace of a second Cold War. However, such steps of the Russian leadership in no way promote the removal of tension in the region, the cessation of military operations, the growth of trust, and the like. One does not like to believe that the Kremlin was counting on such a result. And, today, those who planned and conducted the exercise close to the Turkish border will have to choose between the epithets: "new nonprofessional," or "old hawk."

Turkmen Gas Delivery Cuts Anticipated

954F2069A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Azerigaz Up to Its Ears in Debt?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A curtailment of deliveries of Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan is expected in the coming days. Informing a KHABAR-SERVIS news agency correspondent of this development, Bakhram Amrakhov, vice president of the Azerigaz gas company, noted that the daily gas volume would be reduced from 6 million to 1 million cubic meters, due to the fact that the problem of payment for Turkmen gas deliveries has not yet been resolved. The debt here has already reached $100 million.

As far as satisfying the republic's requirements through its own resources is concerned, B. Amrakhov stated that the Azerbaijan Republic Oil and Gas Concern delivers 16-17 million cubic meters of gas per day, providing for only 40-45 percent of the republic's needs (the daily norm is 50-53 million cubic meters). In view of the shortage of natural gas, Azerigaz made the decision to halt temporarily the delivery of gas to a number of regions of Azerbaijan. Specifically, beginning in April, natural gas will go only as far as Gyandzha—supply farther on in this direction is terminated. Gas deliveries in the direction of Astarinskiy and Sheki-Zakataly are closed off. The only way out for these regions is to settle accounts with Azerigaz on an urgent basis with respect to shipments already delivered or to effect transition to other types of fuel.

The provision of gas to Nakhichevan has been catastrophic to date. Since 1989 only liquefied gas has been delivered to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, satisfying the needs of the autonomy to the extent of just 20 percent. Negotiations are under way at the present stage to build the Khoy-Dzhulf gas pipeline. We are a long way from seeing real results, however.

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Oil Deal Viewed As 'Colossal Mistake'

954F2070A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 2

[A week-in-review commentary by Leila Yunusova, chairman of the Independent Democratic Party: "Another Colossal Mistake Was Made This Week"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The main event of the week was ceding 5 percent to the Exxon company and another 5 percent to Turkish Petroleum of the 20-percent GNK [State Petroleum Company] share. We were told that the U.S. State Department, and even Secretary of State Christopher, had lobbied for Exxon. As had happened on 20 September 1994, the decision was dictated by political considerations. I dare say that in the foundation of this approach is a serious delusion regarding the American policy. Gifts and concessions do not buy benevolence in politics. They invite demands for even greater gifts and concessions. There is no place for gratitude in politics. You are valued precisely to the extent you are needed, and only as long as you are needed. Does America need Azerbaijan?

The U.S. policy in our region is defined mainly by three factors: containing fundamentalism; supporting Yeltsin (they do not see an alternative); and groping for a position regarding the new Russian imperialism (where to draw the line on its domination). In this context, it is naive to think that ceding another 5 percent to another American company can somehow influence the U.S. position, be it the question of occupied territories or repealing the 907th amendment of Congress. Life has demonstrated that the hopes to solve our problem via the "contract of the century," by shifting the task of preserving the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan onto other countries, had been completely unjustified. But we have not learned the lesson.

There were four main options regarding the disposition of the GNK's remaining 20-percent share: Retain the entire GNK share; cede it fully for a bonus; cede it partially (for instance, half the share); and finally, link ceding to an obligation to complete the project ahead of time plus a bonus (Project Locomotive).

I will not dwell on either the prestige or the administrative significance of this share for Azerbaijan. The former is an artificially inflated emotional factor, which is responsible for the fact that the public still confuses the GNK share (20 percent) in the consortium with Azerbaijan's share in the project (75 percent) and believes that by ceding the GNK share Azerbaijan would lose the latter. No educational work has even been conducted. The second—Azerbaijan's administrative control over the consortium—is fully envisaged by the contract's provisions. The GNK share has only economic significance.

The first option was perceived in the society as the optimum one. Unfortunately, the GNK does not have the money to finance this share, and it was unable to get such a loan in international banks on preferential terms. Ceding (selling off) the entire share to one or several companies would have immediately generated $150-300 million, which is a lot, given our empty state treasury.

The government selected the third option by ceding for $173.2 million half of the GNK share (10 percent) to Exxon and Turkish Petroleum. Most likely, this money will be paid in three stages: some right away, some after oil production begins (at best in about two years), and the rest after the export pipeline is put into operation (in about five years, under a favorable scenario). The fourth option (Locomotive) envisaged ceding the entire share for an immediate payment of $100-200 million, plus an obligation to accelerate the project implementation.

Accelerating the beginning of oil extraction and reaching ahead of schedule the level of stable oil production (six years instead of the nine-10 envisaged by the contract) would give Azerbaijan an additional 25 million tonnes of profit-making oil, or $3 billion over the first 10 years of the project's existence, that is, before 2005. We need to remember that Azerbaijan consumes 865 million tonnes [as published] of oil a year. The decline in oil production from existing oil fields since 1988 by at least 7 percent annually means that in 1996 we will produce only 6 million tonnes and for the first time in our history will become oil importers.

Under the current project schedule, envisaged by the consortium, we will remain oil importers until 2004. In other words, over this time the deficit of the oil payments balance will amount to $2-3 billion. There is no need to explain that this is a catastrophe. Today's standard of living will look like a "golden age." Preserving territorial integrity and independence of our state seems unlikely. Such is the price of a wrong decision.

This deficit of $2-3 billion could be balanced by the $3 billion from the aforementioned Locomotive option. It is of no principal importance which of the world's leading oil companies will become the "locomotive" of our contract. What is important is to sign such a contract that would give Azerbaijan oil from 1996 to 2005.

Let us admit that another colossal mistake has been made this week. We have painted ourselves into a corner.

The shortcomings of the "contract of the century," signed in a haste and out of political considerations, are a constant topic of discussion in the press. But the latest decision has stripped it of all prospects.

Unless this decision is repealed right away, in time life itself will repeal not only this decision but also the entire "contract of the century." Who will invest billions of dollars in a disintegrated social-state structure?

I have always believed that fulfilling undertaken obligations is a matter of honor for a government. But there is a reasonable limit to everything. Now that we have to choose between the existence of Azerbaijani statehood

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and the obligations to one American and one Turkish company, there cannot be, of course, two opinions about it. No country—in the West or the East—would forfeit its vital interests for the sake of foreign oil companies. There are more than enough international precedents in the world history.

The rest of the week's events (protests of political parties against the disbandment of the Boz Gurd party; the dispersion of depositors of three banks—Marmakhat, Etimad, and Vakhid; another extension of the state of emergency and the ban on the "black market" on Molokanka) have faded against the background of the ruinous consequences of the decision made on 3 April 1995.

Stabilization in Oil Production Reported

954F2069B Baku ZERKALO in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Despite the Reduced Rate of Drilling, Oil Production Has Stabilized"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Success has been achieved during the first quarter not only in stabilizing the extraction of oil in Azerbaijan, but in overfulfilling the plan by 1.5 million tonnes. Informing a KHABAR-SERVIS news agency correspondent of this development, GNKAR [Azerbaijan Republic Oil and Gas Concern] Vice President Khoshbakht Yusufzade noted that drilling volumes had decreased sharply at the same time due to shortages of funds. "We managed to stabilize oil production only by maintaining the drilling rate at operating wells," the GNKAR vice president stated. As far as gas extraction over this same period is concerned, the plan was overfulfilled by 29 million cubic meters.

Responding to the question of whether or not the situation of the oil industry will be improved following the oil price increases expected in a few days, Kh. Yusufzade replied negatively, explaining that whereas presently the State Committee for Fuels owes the oil industry more than 419 billion manat, the higher prices will only lead to a sharp increase in indebtedness....

Republic Expects $375 Million in Loans

954F2069C Baku ZERKALO in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 8

[Article by L. Yevgrashina: "Is Azerbaijan Expecting a 'Golden Rain' of Credits in 1995?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In 1995 Azerbaijan may receive foreign credits totalling $376 million. Informing a KHABAR-SERVIS news agency correspondent in this regard, Adyl Zeynalov, deputy director of the Administration for Foreign Investments and Credits of the Azerbaijan Ministry of Economics, noted that according to projections, the World Bank alone is planning to allocate the republic $125 million, of which $20 million is being afforded Azerigaz as an initial payment for modernization of the country's gas industry, $9 million—for modernization of Baku's water supply system, $20.8 million—to meet GNKAR's [Azerbaijan Republic Oil and Gas Concern] technical needs, $70 million—in rehabilitation credit to Azerbaijan; the remainder of this amount is to go to the republic as technical assistance for a number of ministries and departments.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is planning to allocate $8 million to Azerbaijan this year—$5 million for modernization of the water supply system of the capital and $3 million for preparatory work in the project for construction of the Yenikend Hydroelectric Power Station (total project cost—$59 million).

According to A. Zeynalov, negotiations are presently being conducted with Turkey's Eximbank on the allocation of $150 million for investment projects, despite the fact that Azerbaijan's letters of credit in this bank have been suspended. These projects include the production organization of washing machines and vacuum cleaners ($87 million, of which $2 million has been received and used), lubricating oils at the Azneftyag plant, construction fixtures at Azneftekhimmash, and paneling sheets at Nakhichevan plants. In addition, Eximbank plans to allocate more than $10 million for second-phase construction at Bina Airport, and over $24 million to erect 12 settlements for refugees. A great deal of attention will be devoted to the modernization of rural automatic telephone systems and the "DOKAP Project," for setting up space communications among Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenia, and China. The extremely beneficial projects financed by Eximbank include construction of a baby-food plant in Khyrdalan and the production organization of various types of vegetable oil in Saatly.

The Islamic Bank for Development intends to allocate $11 million to Azerbaijan in 1995, of which 9.8 million is designated for financing modernization of the Milsk-Mugan sewage system. The remainder is being distributed to five facilities: the Khyrdalan Dairy Plant and Lenkoran Canned Food Complex—for modernization; construction of the Alyat-Kazi-Magomed Road and hangar at Bina Airport; and reconstruction of the Samur-Apsheronsk Canal.

The allocation of $42.7 million in credits from the International Monetary Fund is also expected this year, out of a total of $170.8 million intended for Azerbaijan.

According to A. Zeynalov, other investors include the European Union—affording $7 million in grants to be used for development of the country's energy sector, personnel resources, and programs for the construction of prefabricated wooden homes in eight population centers of the republic, and the Turkish Agency for Cooperation (TIKA)—allocating $200,000 to the country as technical assistance in support of the statistics program and land reform. The Consortium of Western Oil Companies, affording GNKAR [Azerbaijan Republic Oil and Gas Concern] $120 million to modernize the Azeri Oil Field, may become a major investor in 1995. The deputy director of the Administration for Foreign Investments and Credits of the Azerbaijan Ministry of Economics also stated that a protocol of intent

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had been signed between Arabian Construction and Azer-Energy, which envisions significant capital investments. This same Arabian company plans to finance the construction of a five-star hotel, business center, and housing facilities in Baku. Negotiations are being conducted on modernization of the Shimal State Regional Electric Power Plant. These talks have reached a dead end at this stage, however, since a number of terms of the project are not suitable to the Azerbaijan side.

In addition, specialists from the People's Republic of China and Pakistan are developing project documentation for the construction of sugar refineries in the republic.

When asked by the KHABAR-SERVIS correspondent about prospects for cooperation between Azerbaijan and Japan, which has shown heightened interest in our country in recent times, A. Zeynalov replied: "This matter will be clarified only following the official visit of President G. Aliyev to Japan. Right now it is not appropriate to be discussing credits to Azerbaijan's economy on the state level. However, our relations with Japan are developing. In particular, modernization of the republic's gas industry is being financed through the World Bank by the Japanese Government. Ties with the Azerbaijan production association Azon are also being established."

Georgia

Shevardnadze on Stepanov, Rafsanjani Visits

LD1704114995 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0525 GMT 17 Apr 95

[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgian head of state and chairman of parliament, by correspondent Nato Oniani; place not given—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Good morning. Summing up last week's economic results, you will probably discuss the visit to Georgia by the Karelian prime minister [Viktor Stepanov]. At your meeting, he told you: We will be able to help you normalize relations with the North, while what is required of you is to help us in our relations with the South. [passage omitted]

[Shevardnadze] As regards the visit to Georgia by the chairman of the government of the Republic of Karelia, it was held within the framework of relations between two states, within the legal base for ties between Russia and Georgia. I must say that it was a very productive visit. We signed a document on leasing a forest tract in Karelia. This should help us greatly in supplying the republic with timber and pulp and paper, providing clauses in the agreement are properly carried through by the relevant agencies. There is now a prospect that our publishing business—newspapers and so on—may be saved. We also outlined areas for close cooperation in the future, which include shipbuilding and machine building in general, as well as tea production. Interest was also expressed in importing our dry wines and tea.

The Karelian prime minister, Mr. Stepanov, also had very interesting and useful meetings with the leadership of Ajaria. Prospects for mutually beneficial cooperation between these regions, these republics, were also clearly mapped out.

This shows something that has been said many times before: It is realistic and very productive for us to develop ties with Russian regions within the framework of cooperation between the two states. We can clearly see the great potential of working toward this.

Two republic-wide meetings were held last week. A meeting on 14 April involved republican law-enforcement and local government officials. It heard reports by law-enforcement agency chiefs. You will agree that it was an uncompromising and businesslike discussion on the results of the struggle against the criminal world. The situation has definitely improved, but there is still a lot to be done, as they say. The improvement in the situation, which I mentioned at that meeting, and also at the other, the following day, is reflected in absolute and percentage terms. This is true of the types of crime which are almost impossible to hide. However, I should also say here that a relentless struggle should start against concealed crime. For example, in the first quarter of this year the number of such serious crimes as murder, attempted murder, kidnapping and armed attack was 30, 40, 45 percent less than in the same period last year. [passage omitted]

I would like to say a few words about the spring sowing campaign. This year can be singled out in this respect. I am not saying that everything is in perfect order. However, this year we plowed and sowed considerably more—two, three, or four times more—than in previous years. This amounts to hundreds of thousands of hectares. I am sure that the pace of this drive will not subside and it will be carried through to the end. [passage omitted] [passage indistinct]

There is a general problem. It is very painful for our state. No one can deny that, unfortunately, there are many corrupt officials in the highest and medium echelons of power, and at a lower level. That is why units have been set up at law-enforcement agencies, at the Security Service, charged with fighting economic sabotage and corruption. Collection of information is under way. The time will come when we feel that we are ready for it, and this attack will start.

[Oniani] At the meeting of law-enforcement officials, Internal Affairs Minister Shota Kviraia said one interesting thing: Abkhazia has become an operational area for criminals from former Soviet republics. Another development relating to Abkhazia was the rather unpleasant incident which took place in Zugdidi last week. We learned this morning that refugees from Abkhazia had issued an ultimatum saying that if Georgian

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jurisdiction is not restored in Abkhazia by 15 May [expiry date for Russian peacekeepers' mandate], they will resort to different measures and demand the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping forces from the conflict zone. I would also like to mention that this morning, Abkhaz radio went on the air for the first time. Its first program ended several minutes before this interview began.

[Shevardnadze] As regards Abkhazia, Mr. Shota Kviraia is right in saying that criminals operate there. It is very sad that a very complex crime situation has developed in this part of Georgia. There is also lawlessness there. You will remember executions in Gali district, when people were shot. The world public has been informed about these incidents, and serious anxiety has been expressed at every level...

[Oniani interrupts] Our ambassador to the United States raised this issue in Congress.

[Shevardnadze] Yes, in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere.

Now, as regards the main problem, the talks on achiving a conflict settlement have not been suspended. On the contrary, work on legal documents concerning a conflict settlement has not stopped even for a day. This week and the next will be marked by increased activity. It will include the arrival in Moscow of UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali's special envoy, who will also join in the preparation of these documents.

I would like to stress the able work of our ambassador to Russia, Vazha Lortkipanidze. One of his main tasks at the moment is to work on these documents together with our other experts, including officials from the [Tbilisi-based] government and Supreme Council of Abkhazia. It is probably better to discuss this a little later, when there are tangible results.

As for the demands by refugees, it is difficult not to agree with the timetable they are demanding. With extraordinary patience and dignity they have been coping with inhuman suffering, caused by their expulsion from their homeland, the loss of relatives, and by material and financial difficulty.

As for the radio program you just mentioned, I know that it is being prepared and will come regularly. It will help the population that remains in Abkhazia, be it Georgian, Abkhazian, or anyone else, to form a clear picture of what is happening in Georgia. [passage omitted]

[Oniani] 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, will soon visit Tbilisi. What can you say about this visit in the context of traditionally interesting relations in our region? It seems that in addition to its importance as far as ethnic and political relatio[illegible] concerned, the visit will also address interesting [illegible]conomic problems which are of vital importance to the [illegible]ion

[Shevardnadze] Considering the special nature of relations between Iran and Georgia, which have existed for many centuries, a visit to our country by an Iranian president should undoubtedly be regarded as a major event. I do not think that Georgians can be indifferent to this visit. Building new relations between Iran and Georgia, and talking about new relations is not easy. It started with my visit to Tehran two years ago. I must say that Mr. Rafsanjani and all Iranian leaders showed extraordinary warmth and an extraordinarily kind attitude toward the Georgian delegation. And the results were really impressive.

In the course of the Iranian president's visit there will be a discussion about a new level, a new phase in our relations. There are specific areas and spheres where the two states can develop mutually beneficial cooperation on a rather large scale.

At the same time, we know full well that the two states have individual priorities, and traditions of cooperation with other countries. The meetings and dialogue in Tbilisi will not block but, rather, promote our countries' diverse, wide-ranging cooperation with the outside world.

[Oniani] Thank you very much.

Opposition Leader Critical of Closer Ties With Iran

LD1804104995 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 0900 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi—Speaking at a session of the Georgian Parliament today, ahead of the Iranian president's visit to Georgia, Irakli Tsereteli, leader of the opposition National Independence Party and member of parliament, criticized the establishment of closer ties between Georgia and "dark totalitarian Iran." He said that contacts between Georgia and Iran would lead to a negative U.S. attitude toward Georgia, which would in turn affect the country's well-being. Tsereteli concluded that relations between Georgia and Iran should only develop under Western supervision.

Deputy Premier, UN Envoy Discuss Development Program

LD1704203695 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Teimuraz Basilia, deputy Georgian prime minister, received Teodor Starcevic, UN envoy to Georgia, today. Mr. Starcevic said he was appointed head of the UN Development Program and was responsible for every project to be worked out in this direction. As for the projects themselves, the most significant one for Georgia is the project of a strategic document to be worked out jointly. The implementation of the project will mobilize resources and determine properly their utilization.

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It was noted at the meeting that the project of assistance for Georgia's nongovernmental organizations was being worked out, which, according to Starcevic, would assist the activities of the above organizations and irradicate poverty in Georgia.

Teimuraz Basilia said that representatives of the relevant ministries and departments will meet at a special session to discuss the documents presented by the United Nations.

This information was supplied by the press service of the Georgian Cabinet of Ministers.

Shevardnadze Decrees Restoration of Rail Network

LD1704154195 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1200 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Here is an edict by Eduard Shevardnadze, the head of the Georgian state:

Under the circumstances of the recent heavy economic crisis and a complex criminal situation in the republic, and as a result of the systematic blasts at rail installations, the malfunctioning of railway carriages, and the rail network, and as a result of the frequent power failures, safety guarantees of the railway traffic have fallen sharply. A state of emergency is to be declared on the republic's rail traffic due to the breakup of economic links and the nonavailability of the necessary funds for maintaining basic funds and in order to restore the damaged economy. In order to restore the republic's national industry—taking into consideration the significance of the railway transport, and in order to guarantee its normal functioning—the Committee of Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Georgia and the National Bank of Georgia, when working on the foreign state credits, are to work out the allotment of $20 million in 1995 and $40 million in 1996, for the restoration of rail transport under the projects submitted by the Railway Department.

Russian Peacekeepers Stop Abkhaz Militants

LD1704164895 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1435 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi [no date as received]—The press service of the Georgian Defense Ministry reports that on 15 April Abkhaz militants disguised as police in several buses attempted to break into the Gali District. The Russian peacekeeping forces led by Lieutenant General Vasiliy Yakushev cut short the attempt.

Gen. Yakushev has ordered an investigation into the incidents which occurred in the Zugdidi and Tsalenjikha Districts and in which Russian servicemen participated.

Abkhaz Refugees Warn 'Radical Moves' if Return Delayed

LD1704152195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1632 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, April 17 (Interfax)—Refugees from Abkhazia staying in Zugdidi, West Georgia, have warned Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze that they will resort to radical measures if their mass return does not begin before May 15.

According to official sources in Tbilisi, refugee representatives sent an appropriate letter to Shevardnadze Sunday [16 April].

The Chairman of the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet functioning in Tbilisi Tamaz Nadareishvili told Interfax Monday he shares the demands of the senders of the letter. "I cannot offer any guarantees, of course, but according to my knowledge the return of the refugees will begin in the nearest future," he said.

He said that all 100,000 refugees should return to Gali region supposedly in May.

Nadareishvili stressed that Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia will be actively involved in the process.

The next stage, he said, implies the return of refugees to the Ochamchira, Gulripsha and Sukhumi regions of Abkhazia.

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Estonia

Meri Meets With South Korean Presidential Envoy

WS1804094695 Tallinn BNS in English 1800 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Apr 17, BNS—President Lennart Meri on Monday [17 April] met with South Korea's special presidential envoy Chung Chong Wook. The envoy at the meeting handed to Meri a personal letter from Korean President Kim Yong-sam.

The delegation for the meeting at the Estonian presidential palace at Kadriorg also included Korean Ambassador Kim Nai Sung, deputy director of the Korean Foreign Ministry's Europe bureau, Cho Ilhwan, and Korea's honorary consul, Priit Maran.

The parties at the meeting discussed ways to establish closer ties between the two countries. The Korean presidential envoy said his nation was impressed by Estonia's economic progress.

Meri in his remarks said Estonia had committed itself to opening all doors for business contacts and creating good conditions for foreign investment.

The Estonian president also expressed hope that the country could open its trade and cultural center in Korea in the near future.

The Korean presidential envoy said his country hoped for Estonia's support for its bid to become a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council.

New Foreign Minister Stresses Normalizing Russian Ties

LD1704172095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1520 GMT 17 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, April 17 (Interfax)— New Estonian Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijarv told Interfax in Tallinn today that normalization of Estonian-Russian relations would be a priority in the foreign policy of the cabinet led by Tiito Vahi.

Sinijarv agreed that there were many unsettled problems in Estonian-Russian relations, including the territorial dispute.

He said the new Estonian government had not yet decided whether to submit for ratification by the parliament the Estonian-Russian agreements on troop-withdrawal and social guarantees to retired military servicemen signed last summer.

Sinijarv said the previous cabinet should have transferred the bilateral agreements to the parliament for ratification. He said the new cabinet would do this if a corresponding decision was made. He said the country must observe international treaties. He said international treaties could not be concluded and then ignored or declared invalid.

Sinijarv commented on the statement of the former chairman of the parliament's commission on foreign affairs, now the foreign minister without a portfolio Endel Lippmaa who had said on Saturday that he was against ratifying the Estonian-Russian agreements. Sinijarv said this was Lippmaa's private opinion which he had expressed before he had joined the cabinet.

Riivo Sinijarv was born in Tallinn on May 27, 1947. He graduated from the school of chemistry in the Tartu University. He worked in the Estonian Academy of Sciences' Physics and Chemistry Institute. SiniJarv was elected to the parliament in 1992. He was heading the commission on foreign affairs. Sinijarv has been the Estonian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Great Britain since 1993.

New Government Not Ready To Define Russian Accord Stance

WS1704142495 Tallinn BNS in English 1230 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Apr 17, BNS—The new Estonian Government sworn in on Monday [17 April] has not yet defined its position regarding the agreements on Russian troop withdrawal and social guarantees for retired Russian military in Estonia, signed by Presidents Lennart Meri and Boris Yeltsin in July last year, Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijarv said.

Sinijarv in remarks to reporters after the oath ceremony Monday said international agreements were things that signatories always had to abide by. "Two countries cannot make agreements and then, at the next moment, declare the agreements invalid," the new foreign minister said.

Sinijarv said he was confident that the country's relations with Russia could be improved. He added that the issue was to be discussed soon by the new Cabinet.

Sinijarv's fellow Cabinet member, European Affairs Minister without portfolio Endel Lippmaa in remarks to BNS on Saturday said he personally was opposed to ratification of the agreements in the Estonian parliament.

Lippmaa, who before his appointment as minister was elected the head of the new parliament's foreign affairs committee, said also the committee at its meetings lately had been rather critical of prospects of ratification of the agreements.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin put the agreements on Russian troop withdrawal from Estonia and on social guarantees for retired Russian military in Estonia to the parliament's lower house, the Duma, for ratification on

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Jan. 24 this year. Both documents were signed by Yeltsin and Estonian President Lennart Meri in Moscow on July 26.

Four days later, Estonian Foreign Ministry Deputy Chancellor Raul Malk and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed an agreement on dismantling of a former Soviet army nuclear facility at Estonia's Paldiski.

That document doesn't need ratification, officials say. It automatically runs out on Sept. 30 this year, by which time the buildings of the former nuclear facility are to be handed over to Estonia, and the Russian crew working on it must have left the country.

President To Put Full Support Behind New Government

WS1804092695 Tallinn BNS in English 1630 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Apr 17, BNS—Estonian President Lennart Meri, speaking before the parliament on Monday, said he was going to put his full constitutional power in support of the new government, sworn in on that same day.

"As president, I wish to support with the whole of my constitutional authority and moral power the government of Tiit Vahi, which has committed itself clearly and unambiguously to the priorities of Estonia's national security—namely the continuation of reforms and speedy integration of Estonia into the European Union and the European defense structures," Meri said.

Meri said he valued highly the position taken by Prime Minister Tiit Vahi and his Cabinet's Agriculture Minister Ilmar Mandmets, who clearly sided against a bill by their coalition partners that had called for virtual suspension of the privatization process.

The president said the bill had cast doubt on the new government's commitment to the reform path and had contributed to speculations that Estonia was swinging to the left.

"I have energetically confronted such claims, which are irresponsible, may dangerously undermine Estonia's international reputation and cast baseless doubt on Estonia's being a democratic country with a liberal economic system," the president said.

"I don't want to speculate on how much this inconsiderate bill has cost Estonia in kroons or dollars, but I would like to point at the need to carefully consider each word, each statement and decision also as to its international implications," Meri said.

Meri was referring in his remarks to a bill presented by a rural deputy in the KMU [Rural People's Party] coalition on April 6, but later taken back by the council of the KMU/Center Party coalition.

The bill had sought suspending of all transactions with state property until such time as the new government determines if they are economically expedient.

Lithuania

Ministry Experts: Trade 'Reoriented' From East to West

WS1704132595 Tallinn BNS in English 1755 GMT 16 Apr 95

[From the "Baltic Business Weekly" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lithuania reoriented its trade from Eastern to Western markets within 4 years, experts with the Lithuanian Ministry of Industry and Trade said after an analysis of the country's foreign trade in 1990-94 made public by the state agency ELTA.

From 1990 through 1994 exports of Lithuanian goods to the CIS reduced from 84.7 percent to 46.7 percent, while CIS imports from 72.2 to 50.2 percent. At the same time similar figures for Western countries grew from 15.3 to 53.3 percent and from 27.5 to 49.8 percent, respectively.

Growing faster than the country's overall foreign trade volume, trade with EC countries increased from 16.9 to 25.8 percent in terms of exports while imports rose from 18.7 to 26.4 percent.

A heavier volume of produce is now exported to Latvia and Estonia with exports to Latvia estimated at 193 million lits and Estonia—at 41 million lits relative to 682 million and 206 million lits in 1994, respectively, according to the Statistics Department. Moreover, Lithuania enjoys a positive balance in trade with these two countries having imported goods worth 255 million lits from Latvia (12 million in 1992) and 151 million lits from Estonia (5.6 million).

In 1994, Lithuania's overall exports were 8.077 billion lits while imports 9.355 billion lits.

Parliament Speaker on Current Economic Difficulties

AU1804105795 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Apr 95 p 3

[Interview with Parliament Speaker Ceslovas Jursenas by Miklos Ritecz in Budapest; date not given: "Lithuania Would Also Like To Join Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lithuania regards joining the European structures as its main foreign policy goal, Lithuanian Parliament Speaker Ceslovas Jursenas told us. Visiting Budapest at the invitiation of Hungarian Parliament Chairman Zoltan Gal, the Lithuanian guest also spoke about the economic difficulties in his country.

[Ritecz] How would you characterize Lithuania's situation in view of the fact that the left has been governing the country for more than two years? To what extent

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does society accept the fact that the expected economic "miracle" has failed to materialize?

[Jursenas] To be honestly, the situation in Lithuania is quite complex. The heritage we inherited proved to be much more serious than we or the population thought. In 1992, people thought that the popular Brazausaks would return and a moderate left-wing party would come, a party that would focus on solving the people's troubles, and the problems would suddenly disappear. Two years have passed since then, and we now see that the problems have not been solved for good, and life continues to be difficult. We created the legal, economic, and financial bases of prosperity, but we cannot speak of emerging from the crisis. The people are now living badly and in uncertainty, as opposed to the old times under socialism when, although they had a low standard of living, at least their subsistence level was guaranteed. Therefore, it is not surprising that they voice their dissatisfaction, mainly the older generation.

[Ritecz] What do you regard as positive in the activity of the current leadership?

[Jursenas] We introduced the Lithuanian national currency, the lit. We linked it to the U.S. dollar and, even if many people criticize it, it seems to be stable enough. We succeeded in curbing hyper-inflation; the monthly inflation rate today is only about 3 percent. Naturally, in economies that function normally this rate would be high, but compared with the previous Lithuanian annual rate of 1,200 percent it is very low. I also regard as a result the fact that we succeeded in adjusting the increase in the people's income to our rate of inflation. In other words, although the living standard is low, we can at least maintain it, and we no longer have to fear any serious further drop in the prevailing standard. Unfortunately, industrial output as a whole is declining, but a few sectors have recovered, and they can make their products compatible both in the East and the West.

[Ritecz] According to economists, the Lithuanian agriculture was hit the hardest when Sajudis suddenly decided to eliminate the kolkhozes.

[Jursenas] The kolkhozes were not among the best Soviet inventions. But in Lithuania they were at least partially capable of showing results, despite state subsidies and indebtedness. As organizations inherited from the Soviets, the kolkhozes must be eliminated. But Landsbergis and his people destroyed the foundations of our agriculture when they eliminated them, and this led to almost "postwar" conditions: there are no pigs and cattle, and there are no roofs over the barns. We regard the revival of agriculture as one of our main tasks, even if we have to use foreign loans.

[Ritecz] What are the relations between Vilnius and Moscow like today?

[Jursenas] I would not say that warm friendship connects us to Moscow, but we do not incite conflicts unnecessarily. We cannot be sure about Russian political developments. We should remember that the Russian transit line to Kaliningrad still goes through us. However, I can say that, in general, we have settled our relations with all our neighbors, including Latvia, Poland, Russia, and Belarus.

[Ritecz] Does the fact that 10 percent of Lithuania's population are Russians lead to tension?

[Jursenas] Moscow's complaints to the Baltic countries do not affect us. We adopted a liberal citizenship law before, namely the "zero version" according to which everyone living in Lithuania when the law came into force received Lithuanian citizenship.

[Ritecz] What does Vilnius regard as its main foreign policy priority?

[Jursenas] Western orientation and joining the European structures. I held talks mainly on this issue with the Hungarian leaders in Budapest. Although the road to Europe for us leads through Scandinavia, we also regard cooperation with the Visegrad group as important.

Seimas Discusses Money Laundering Scandal

LD1804111495 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] One of the main characters of the last week's series of articles titled, The Clan, in the daily RESPUBLIKA, Seimas Member, Alfonsas Navickas, today announced that he was suspending his powers in the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [LDLP], and in the Seimas faction of this party. Alfonsas Navickas suspended his powers for the time that law enforcement bodies investigate the facts about himself presented in the articles.

This announcement was made during the debates on the proposal from the Homeland Union, Lithuanian Conservatives, to enroll into the agenda of today's sitting the discussion on a draft resolution for setting up the Seimas commission. This commission would investigate the information, published in the Lithuanian press, on the laundering of the property and money of the former Lithuanian Communist Party and possible participation of some top officials of the current leadership and the Seimas members in these criminal activities.

The Conservatives proposed that this commission should be made up of representatives of all Seimas factions except the faction of the LDLP. The parliamentary faction of the LDLP refused to enroll this question into the sitting's agenda.

The head of the LDLP parliamentary faction, Gediminas Kirkilas, made a statement on the property of the former Lithuanian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The statement recalled that in autumn 1991 an ad hoc governmental commission, which also included the deputies of the Supreme Council, was set up. This commission inventoried, took over on behalf of the state and

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distributed all the property and the funds of the former Lithuanian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Taking into consideration the fact that the LDLP is not aware about the further fate of the property and that the aforementioned press publications raised certain doubts whether the use of the property which the former government took over was legal, the statement asks the State Control Department to investigate this issue once again.

In accordance with article 134 of the Lithuanian Constitution, it is the State Control Department who supervises proper governing and use of the state property.

This was the essence of the statement made by the LDLP parliamentary faction.

Meanwhile, the head of the Social Democratic Party parliamentary faction, Aloyzas Sakalas, speaking at a press conference, also advocated the idea of setting up the Seimas commission which would investigate the RESPUBLIKA articles.

However, in the opinion of the Social Democrats, this commission should also include the members of the LDLP parliamentary faction.

Due to the fact that the proposal from the Homeland Union, Lithuanian Conservatives, to set up a temporary Seimas commission for investigation was not included in today's sitting agenda, the collecting of signatures has been started under the request to enroll the question into the agenda of Thursday's [20 April] morning sitting. Signatures of one third of all Seimas members are needed. [passage omitted]

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